{"title":"《亲切的感知:华兹华斯、柯勒律治与漫长的十八世纪的天才神话》","authors":"A. W. Lee","doi":"10.1086/727691","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Next article FreeBook Review“Genial” Perception: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Myth of Genius in the Long Eighteenth Century. William Edinger. Clemson, SC: Clemson University Press, 2022. Pp. ix+287. Hope: A Literary History. Adam Potkay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. vii+422.A. W. LeeA. W. LeeContributing Editor, The Scriblerian and Kit-Cats Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreAdam Potkay’s latest monograph more or less picks up from his 2007 The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism. Winner of the Harry Levin Prize for the best book in literary history between 2006 and 2008, The Story of Joy culturally and philologically excavates “joy” from the Hebrew Bible through Yeats and beyond. In the present volume, he provides a similar service for the concept (or emotion or virtue) of hope. Potkay begins with the ancient Greeks—Hesiod, Aeschylus, Pindar, and Thucydides—and carries his survey through modernism—Kafka, Camus, Ellison, and Beckett. Throughout this process, he combines a probing historical imagination, a sharp critical discernment, and a deft eye for textual explication, along with the gifts of a good storyteller, to provide a thoroughly accessible yet intellectually engaging account.Each of the five chapters takes up a distinct cultural episteme: classical, Christian, Augustan, Romantic, and modernist. In each, Potkay elucidates the antinomies both positive and negative—and many complexities in between—that philosophers and literary artists have discerned and developed in their deployment of “hope.”The first chapter, focusing upon Greek and Roman antiquity, exhibits the limits and restrictions these two intertwined worlds imposed: hope as deceptive, as irrational, as productive of fearfulness, as distracting from the present moment, and as squandered on things devoid of authentic value. A good example of this layered dialectic may be found in Potkay’s handling of the texts by the Greek poet Hesiod, whose only surviving authentic writings, Theogony and Works and Days, feature the myth of Pandora’s jar. Zeus, enraged at the trickery of Prometheus, creates a beautiful woman whom he sends to earth with a container full of mortal ills, such as care, toil, and disease. After Pandora opens the lid, they all escape, leaving only hope (elpis, ἐλπὶς) in the jar. While the standard interpretation holds that hope is a comfort to humankind, Potkay explores other possibilities—especially the notion that Zeus intended it to be an additional torment. Prometheus’s presence in the story adduces further complexities, such as the Titan’s gifting mortals ignorance of their final fate, as well as fire. This constitutes a sort of “blind hope,” allowing people to undertake future-oriented endeavors, occluded from their possible failure of futility.In Works and Days, Hesiod admits two kinds of strife: one born of Night (Nyx), purely destructive, and a later one that promotes competition, leading to constructive effort that may yield fruitful results. Hope within the Greek poet thus possesses a binary status: on the one hand, by placing stock in things by their very nature delusive, empty, and unsatisfying, hope may be harmful; on the other hand, salubrious competition may contribute to virtuous and positive hope for future rewards. Prometheus also appears a century later, in both Aeschylus and Pindar. The former’s Prometheus Bound elevates the god to the status of a culture hero who brings humans fire and, consequently, the arts of cultivation, civilization. The latter’s epinicia (choral hymns) address the Titan in a handful of places, most prominently in Olympian 12 and Isthmian 8. Again, in both authors, hope receives ambivalent treatment. Aeschylus’s chorus of ocean nymphs applaud the boon of “blind hope”:PROMETHEUS.I planted firmly in their hearts blind hopefulness.CHORUS.Your gift brought them great blessing.(42)Pindar, however, dismisses this “blessing”: “with men, this is blind hope without power” (45). In Olympian 12, “shameless hope”—hope for either the undeserved and unachievable (or both)—is reproached, while “measured hope” or “good hope,” a via media, is condoned (44–47). (Prometheus in Greek suggests “forethought.”) Ultimately the essence of Pindaric wisdom lies in these verses: “[while] men must keep good hope in mind,” “it is best to keep one’s eyes always on each thing before one’s feet, / for over men hangs a deceptive existence, as it unwinds life’s path” (Isthmian 8.16, 13–14, in The Complete Odes, ed. Anthony Verity [Oxford University Press, 2007], 137).This emphasis upon the present moment plays a significant role in both early Eastern and Western philosophy. To follow one of many possible discursive trails, in the Roman world the Hellenistic philosophies of Epicureanism and Stoicism both gained considerable traction. Because of the total loss or only fragmentary remains of earlier works in Greek, the Roman poet Lucretius represents the former school most fully. Based upon a materialist atomistic theory, the mid-first century BCE De rerum natura (The Nature of Things) advocates jettisoning the fear of death—as well as personal immortality—in order to attain present-state mental tranquility (ataraxia). The Stoics too favored the primacy of the present, as they sought relief from suffering (apatheia), particularly as found in human passions. Hope was minimized in both schemes, although the later Roman Stoic Seneca allowed for the hope of helping others and preserving the security of homeland. Virgil may represent this in his “ruler hope,” that of a national savior, as found in his famous fourth eclogue (although Potkay subjects this to an ironically arch reading). In sum, the first chapter compresses an extraordinary amount of information that my spare account here hardly does justice to. I offer it, however inadequate, to indicate something of the depth and sweep of Potkay’s project. Readers may thus take the preceding paragraphs as representative of the four chapters of the book that follow.Some of the themes just enumerated recur elsewhere in the book. For example, in chapter 2, we find “ruler hope” (as found in Virgil and Isaiah) resurrected into a universal messiah, as enunciated in the Christian gospels, and especially the Pauline epistolary corpus, which proclaimed the “good news” of Jesus’s imminent return. In Christianity, the tentative “good hope” found in the classical world in such figures as Pindar blossoms into an inescapable thematic promise, as in 1 Corinthians 13:13 (KJV): “And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.” These three become known as the theological virtues. Although St. Augustine resisted their imperative, they form a cornerstone in the majestic theological architecture of St. Thomas Aquinas, which remains today the primary theology of the Catholic Church. The chapter also examines the hope vested in the notion of salvation of all, based upon Romans 8:20–21 and developed by the early church fathers Origen and Gregory of Nyssa (and quietly reaffirmed in the twentieth century by theologians such as Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer). Major shifts in the Christian revolution of the early Common Era centuries include hope for eternal life (as opposed to the Lucretian celebration of individual annihilation) and investing in Christ’s offer of hope to the poor and wretched of the earth—as opposed to the Greco-Roman valorization of the aristocratic and literate elite. Such structural ligatures suturing the various chapters of Hope, whether based upon similarity or contrast (see, e.g., the extension of what has been elsewhere called “realizable hope” on the poor and enslaved, in chap. 3, and again, in chap. 5) resonate throughout, operating like so many leitmotifs that draw the music of the larger whole into unity. Later chapters extend and complicate the foundations laid out in the first two, as they range through authorities such as Milton and Pope, Samuel Johnson, Wordsworth and Percy Shelley, Goethe, George Eliot, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, and Kafka, ending with Waiting for Godot. The book’s conclusion observes:But, as we have seen, to Estragon’s [in Waiting for Godot] final suggestion that they might be better off if they parted, Vladimir answers in we-mode: “We’ll hang ourselves to-morrow… . Unless Godot comes.” Hope and suicide remain options, and constitute one antithesis in a play that, in the end, is as much about its own formal shape as it is about the human condition, or the condition of Europe after the Great Wars. Hope and its absence, as well as things to hope for and their absence, remain organizing principles long after Europe’s age of unified faith has ended.(324)If this does not return us full circle back to Hesiod and the classical world, it does suffice to lightly interlace the last four chapters into a satisfyingly succinct little knot.The readings in Hope, at times brilliant, can also be elliptical. Discussing, for example, Tacitus in one page, Kant in two, can exert demands that not all readers might be ready to meet. However, while one may not agree with all the author’s interpretative conclusions, dismissing them without consideration would be a mistake. Hope is not a quick read. If the reader truly digs into the primary passages Potkay examines—as I often attempted to do—mapping the context, parsing lines in the original languages, tracing contacts and connections with other relevant works, then a truly rewarding experience emerges. Potkay leads us through some of the peaks of the Western intellectual tradition (save the lamentable gap of the Italian Renaissance and the northern humanists, especially Erasmus and Thomas More) through the complex, expansive prism of “hope.” Some may view this focus as a turnoff: while he examines texts written by members of the laboring classes (Stephen Duck, Mary Collier), women (Hannah More, Dickinson), and people of color (Equiano, Wright, Brooks, Ellison), his brief is not to burst open the canon. But this is not tantamount to accusing the book of lacking contemporary relevance. With catastrophic climate change, democratic political systems facing their possible mortality, and globally threatening diseases, we in 2023 (and the years ahead) need hope now more than ever. Hope undertakes a thorough, if not comprehensive, examination of this elusive yet indispensable property of the human psyche, this, perhaps, inalienable human right.William Edinger has written a book, “Genial” Perception: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Myth of Genius in the Long Eighteenth Century, that was published almost on the same day as Potkay’s. “Genial” Perception and Hope share other things in common. Both take the Romantic period as central to their discursive purview. Both practice what might be called “cultural philology,” the parsing of a single word throughout its etymological, social, and literary history. In Edinger’s case, it is “genial,” by which he means “genius,” in Samuel Johnson’s phrase, to perceive directly and originally, “not weakened or distorted by the intervention of any other mind” (1; Preface to Shakespeare [1765]). Of course, Potkay’s survey commands a rather larger stadial embrace: Who else’s recent monograph would profit by comparison to Hope’s Himalayan sweep? However, while Edinger’s project claims “only” the British long eighteenth century as its field, it allows him to trace genealogies extending back to the seventeenth century (in both France and Britain), as well as to the ancient classical world.Edinger draws his key term from usage by both Coleridge (“genial discrimination” [Biographia Literaria]) and Wordsworth (“genial circumstances” [The Prelude]). Traditionally, Romanticism (a term that Edinger, for the most part, eschews) was seen as cutting a new path in reaction against its immediate generational forbears, proclaiming the values of innate genius and the unmediated imagination, as opposed to a mimetic model of literary creation that held sway at least since Platonic and Aristotelian aesthetics: the two perspectives were memorably telegraphed in the title of M. H. Abrams’s famous book, The Mirror and the Lamp. Edinger closely examines Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s poetic and critical texts, tracing an intellectual history culminating in Kant and the late eighteenth century, one that in fact impregnated the minds of the fellow poets when youths. Edinger describes a “modern” (i.e., post-Dryden) critical ideology he identifies as “critical naturalism”—an ideology based on the terms “n/Nature,” “genius,” and “imagination.” He writes: “Where the two [Wordsworth and Coleridge] considered themselves autonomous as genial perceivers … their [perhaps unconscious] embrace of a recognizably traditional critical terminology” served as foundational to their “discoveries” (187).This philological excursion memorably concludes by closely reading the different drafts of the Mount Snowdon passage in The Prelude, locating such precursive influences as Spenser, Milton, Shaftesbury, Collins, Akenside, James Clarke, James Beattie, William Gilpin, and even Wordsworth’s own early self, as found in Descriptive Sketches, concluding that “language here is no mere vehicle or instrument of vision but a creative agent of the vision itself. Wordsworth was not inspired by an epiphany on a mountain [, but language or history itself]” (186).This is an important book, one that deserves a richer consideration than allowed by present space constraints. Indeed, this is true of my accounts of both Hope and “Genial” Perception. However, a more piercing needle threads through the two. In his preface, Potkay movingly informs us that the death of his wife prompted him to begin his book in tribute to her. Obversely, William Edinger passed away shortly after the publication of “Genial” Perception, leaving behind his spouse and family, as well as two unpublished sequels to the present book. If the hurry and worries of immediate life can wear humans down, literature and literary criticism may, hopefully, provide a countervailing—and uplifting—alternative. Next article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Modern Philology Ahead of Print Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/727691 HistoryPublished online October 04, 2023 For permission to reuse, please contact [email protected].PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.","PeriodicalId":45201,"journal":{"name":"MODERN PHILOLOGY","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\":<i>“Genial” Perception: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Myth of Genius in the Long Eighteenth Century</i>\",\"authors\":\"A. W. Lee\",\"doi\":\"10.1086/727691\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Next article FreeBook Review“Genial” Perception: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Myth of Genius in the Long Eighteenth Century. William Edinger. Clemson, SC: Clemson University Press, 2022. Pp. ix+287. Hope: A Literary History. Adam Potkay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. vii+422.A. W. LeeA. W. LeeContributing Editor, The Scriblerian and Kit-Cats Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreAdam Potkay’s latest monograph more or less picks up from his 2007 The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism. Winner of the Harry Levin Prize for the best book in literary history between 2006 and 2008, The Story of Joy culturally and philologically excavates “joy” from the Hebrew Bible through Yeats and beyond. In the present volume, he provides a similar service for the concept (or emotion or virtue) of hope. Potkay begins with the ancient Greeks—Hesiod, Aeschylus, Pindar, and Thucydides—and carries his survey through modernism—Kafka, Camus, Ellison, and Beckett. Throughout this process, he combines a probing historical imagination, a sharp critical discernment, and a deft eye for textual explication, along with the gifts of a good storyteller, to provide a thoroughly accessible yet intellectually engaging account.Each of the five chapters takes up a distinct cultural episteme: classical, Christian, Augustan, Romantic, and modernist. In each, Potkay elucidates the antinomies both positive and negative—and many complexities in between—that philosophers and literary artists have discerned and developed in their deployment of “hope.”The first chapter, focusing upon Greek and Roman antiquity, exhibits the limits and restrictions these two intertwined worlds imposed: hope as deceptive, as irrational, as productive of fearfulness, as distracting from the present moment, and as squandered on things devoid of authentic value. A good example of this layered dialectic may be found in Potkay’s handling of the texts by the Greek poet Hesiod, whose only surviving authentic writings, Theogony and Works and Days, feature the myth of Pandora’s jar. Zeus, enraged at the trickery of Prometheus, creates a beautiful woman whom he sends to earth with a container full of mortal ills, such as care, toil, and disease. After Pandora opens the lid, they all escape, leaving only hope (elpis, ἐλπὶς) in the jar. While the standard interpretation holds that hope is a comfort to humankind, Potkay explores other possibilities—especially the notion that Zeus intended it to be an additional torment. Prometheus’s presence in the story adduces further complexities, such as the Titan’s gifting mortals ignorance of their final fate, as well as fire. This constitutes a sort of “blind hope,” allowing people to undertake future-oriented endeavors, occluded from their possible failure of futility.In Works and Days, Hesiod admits two kinds of strife: one born of Night (Nyx), purely destructive, and a later one that promotes competition, leading to constructive effort that may yield fruitful results. Hope within the Greek poet thus possesses a binary status: on the one hand, by placing stock in things by their very nature delusive, empty, and unsatisfying, hope may be harmful; on the other hand, salubrious competition may contribute to virtuous and positive hope for future rewards. Prometheus also appears a century later, in both Aeschylus and Pindar. The former’s Prometheus Bound elevates the god to the status of a culture hero who brings humans fire and, consequently, the arts of cultivation, civilization. The latter’s epinicia (choral hymns) address the Titan in a handful of places, most prominently in Olympian 12 and Isthmian 8. Again, in both authors, hope receives ambivalent treatment. Aeschylus’s chorus of ocean nymphs applaud the boon of “blind hope”:PROMETHEUS.I planted firmly in their hearts blind hopefulness.CHORUS.Your gift brought them great blessing.(42)Pindar, however, dismisses this “blessing”: “with men, this is blind hope without power” (45). In Olympian 12, “shameless hope”—hope for either the undeserved and unachievable (or both)—is reproached, while “measured hope” or “good hope,” a via media, is condoned (44–47). (Prometheus in Greek suggests “forethought.”) Ultimately the essence of Pindaric wisdom lies in these verses: “[while] men must keep good hope in mind,” “it is best to keep one’s eyes always on each thing before one’s feet, / for over men hangs a deceptive existence, as it unwinds life’s path” (Isthmian 8.16, 13–14, in The Complete Odes, ed. Anthony Verity [Oxford University Press, 2007], 137).This emphasis upon the present moment plays a significant role in both early Eastern and Western philosophy. To follow one of many possible discursive trails, in the Roman world the Hellenistic philosophies of Epicureanism and Stoicism both gained considerable traction. Because of the total loss or only fragmentary remains of earlier works in Greek, the Roman poet Lucretius represents the former school most fully. Based upon a materialist atomistic theory, the mid-first century BCE De rerum natura (The Nature of Things) advocates jettisoning the fear of death—as well as personal immortality—in order to attain present-state mental tranquility (ataraxia). The Stoics too favored the primacy of the present, as they sought relief from suffering (apatheia), particularly as found in human passions. Hope was minimized in both schemes, although the later Roman Stoic Seneca allowed for the hope of helping others and preserving the security of homeland. Virgil may represent this in his “ruler hope,” that of a national savior, as found in his famous fourth eclogue (although Potkay subjects this to an ironically arch reading). In sum, the first chapter compresses an extraordinary amount of information that my spare account here hardly does justice to. I offer it, however inadequate, to indicate something of the depth and sweep of Potkay’s project. Readers may thus take the preceding paragraphs as representative of the four chapters of the book that follow.Some of the themes just enumerated recur elsewhere in the book. For example, in chapter 2, we find “ruler hope” (as found in Virgil and Isaiah) resurrected into a universal messiah, as enunciated in the Christian gospels, and especially the Pauline epistolary corpus, which proclaimed the “good news” of Jesus’s imminent return. In Christianity, the tentative “good hope” found in the classical world in such figures as Pindar blossoms into an inescapable thematic promise, as in 1 Corinthians 13:13 (KJV): “And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.” These three become known as the theological virtues. Although St. Augustine resisted their imperative, they form a cornerstone in the majestic theological architecture of St. Thomas Aquinas, which remains today the primary theology of the Catholic Church. The chapter also examines the hope vested in the notion of salvation of all, based upon Romans 8:20–21 and developed by the early church fathers Origen and Gregory of Nyssa (and quietly reaffirmed in the twentieth century by theologians such as Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer). Major shifts in the Christian revolution of the early Common Era centuries include hope for eternal life (as opposed to the Lucretian celebration of individual annihilation) and investing in Christ’s offer of hope to the poor and wretched of the earth—as opposed to the Greco-Roman valorization of the aristocratic and literate elite. Such structural ligatures suturing the various chapters of Hope, whether based upon similarity or contrast (see, e.g., the extension of what has been elsewhere called “realizable hope” on the poor and enslaved, in chap. 3, and again, in chap. 5) resonate throughout, operating like so many leitmotifs that draw the music of the larger whole into unity. Later chapters extend and complicate the foundations laid out in the first two, as they range through authorities such as Milton and Pope, Samuel Johnson, Wordsworth and Percy Shelley, Goethe, George Eliot, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, and Kafka, ending with Waiting for Godot. The book’s conclusion observes:But, as we have seen, to Estragon’s [in Waiting for Godot] final suggestion that they might be better off if they parted, Vladimir answers in we-mode: “We’ll hang ourselves to-morrow… . Unless Godot comes.” Hope and suicide remain options, and constitute one antithesis in a play that, in the end, is as much about its own formal shape as it is about the human condition, or the condition of Europe after the Great Wars. Hope and its absence, as well as things to hope for and their absence, remain organizing principles long after Europe’s age of unified faith has ended.(324)If this does not return us full circle back to Hesiod and the classical world, it does suffice to lightly interlace the last four chapters into a satisfyingly succinct little knot.The readings in Hope, at times brilliant, can also be elliptical. Discussing, for example, Tacitus in one page, Kant in two, can exert demands that not all readers might be ready to meet. However, while one may not agree with all the author’s interpretative conclusions, dismissing them without consideration would be a mistake. Hope is not a quick read. If the reader truly digs into the primary passages Potkay examines—as I often attempted to do—mapping the context, parsing lines in the original languages, tracing contacts and connections with other relevant works, then a truly rewarding experience emerges. Potkay leads us through some of the peaks of the Western intellectual tradition (save the lamentable gap of the Italian Renaissance and the northern humanists, especially Erasmus and Thomas More) through the complex, expansive prism of “hope.” Some may view this focus as a turnoff: while he examines texts written by members of the laboring classes (Stephen Duck, Mary Collier), women (Hannah More, Dickinson), and people of color (Equiano, Wright, Brooks, Ellison), his brief is not to burst open the canon. But this is not tantamount to accusing the book of lacking contemporary relevance. With catastrophic climate change, democratic political systems facing their possible mortality, and globally threatening diseases, we in 2023 (and the years ahead) need hope now more than ever. Hope undertakes a thorough, if not comprehensive, examination of this elusive yet indispensable property of the human psyche, this, perhaps, inalienable human right.William Edinger has written a book, “Genial” Perception: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Myth of Genius in the Long Eighteenth Century, that was published almost on the same day as Potkay’s. “Genial” Perception and Hope share other things in common. Both take the Romantic period as central to their discursive purview. Both practice what might be called “cultural philology,” the parsing of a single word throughout its etymological, social, and literary history. In Edinger’s case, it is “genial,” by which he means “genius,” in Samuel Johnson’s phrase, to perceive directly and originally, “not weakened or distorted by the intervention of any other mind” (1; Preface to Shakespeare [1765]). Of course, Potkay’s survey commands a rather larger stadial embrace: Who else’s recent monograph would profit by comparison to Hope’s Himalayan sweep? However, while Edinger’s project claims “only” the British long eighteenth century as its field, it allows him to trace genealogies extending back to the seventeenth century (in both France and Britain), as well as to the ancient classical world.Edinger draws his key term from usage by both Coleridge (“genial discrimination” [Biographia Literaria]) and Wordsworth (“genial circumstances” [The Prelude]). Traditionally, Romanticism (a term that Edinger, for the most part, eschews) was seen as cutting a new path in reaction against its immediate generational forbears, proclaiming the values of innate genius and the unmediated imagination, as opposed to a mimetic model of literary creation that held sway at least since Platonic and Aristotelian aesthetics: the two perspectives were memorably telegraphed in the title of M. H. Abrams’s famous book, The Mirror and the Lamp. Edinger closely examines Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s poetic and critical texts, tracing an intellectual history culminating in Kant and the late eighteenth century, one that in fact impregnated the minds of the fellow poets when youths. Edinger describes a “modern” (i.e., post-Dryden) critical ideology he identifies as “critical naturalism”—an ideology based on the terms “n/Nature,” “genius,” and “imagination.” He writes: “Where the two [Wordsworth and Coleridge] considered themselves autonomous as genial perceivers … their [perhaps unconscious] embrace of a recognizably traditional critical terminology” served as foundational to their “discoveries” (187).This philological excursion memorably concludes by closely reading the different drafts of the Mount Snowdon passage in The Prelude, locating such precursive influences as Spenser, Milton, Shaftesbury, Collins, Akenside, James Clarke, James Beattie, William Gilpin, and even Wordsworth’s own early self, as found in Descriptive Sketches, concluding that “language here is no mere vehicle or instrument of vision but a creative agent of the vision itself. Wordsworth was not inspired by an epiphany on a mountain [, but language or history itself]” (186).This is an important book, one that deserves a richer consideration than allowed by present space constraints. Indeed, this is true of my accounts of both Hope and “Genial” Perception. However, a more piercing needle threads through the two. In his preface, Potkay movingly informs us that the death of his wife prompted him to begin his book in tribute to her. Obversely, William Edinger passed away shortly after the publication of “Genial” Perception, leaving behind his spouse and family, as well as two unpublished sequels to the present book. If the hurry and worries of immediate life can wear humans down, literature and literary criticism may, hopefully, provide a countervailing—and uplifting—alternative. 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摘要
由于希腊文的早期作品全部丢失或只剩下碎片,罗马诗人卢克莱修最充分地代表了前一派。公元前一世纪中叶,基于唯物主义原子论理论,《事物的本质》(De rerum natura)提倡放弃对死亡的恐惧——以及个人的永生——以达到当前状态的精神平静(精神状态)。斯多葛学派也赞成以现在为首要,因为他们寻求从痛苦(冷漠)中解脱出来,尤其是在人类的激情中。尽管后来的罗马斯多葛派塞内加允许帮助他人和维护祖国安全的希望,但在这两种计划中,希望都被最小化了。维吉尔可能在他的“统治者的希望”中表达了这一点,一个国家的救世主,就像他著名的第四首牧歌一样(尽管波特凯对这一点进行了讽刺的解读)。总而言之,第一章压缩了大量的信息,我在这里的简短叙述很难公正地描述这些信息。我只是想用它来说明波特凯的作品的深度和广度,尽管这还不够。因此,读者可以把前面的段落作为本书接下来四章的代表。刚才列举的一些主题在本书的其他地方也出现了。例如,在第2章中,我们发现“统治者的希望”(维吉尔和以赛亚)复活成为一个普遍的弥赛亚,正如基督教福音书中所阐述的那样,尤其是保罗的书信体,它宣布了耶稣即将回来的“好消息”。在基督教中,在古典世界中像品达这样的人物身上发现的试探性的“美好的希望”,变成了一个不可避免的主题应许,如在哥林多前书13:13 (KJV)中:“如今常存的有信心,有盼望,有爱,这三样;但其中最伟大的是慈善。”这三种美德被称为神学美德。虽然圣奥古斯丁反对他们的命令,但他们形成了圣托马斯·阿奎那宏伟的神学架构的基石,今天仍然是天主教会的主要神学。这一章还考察了基于罗马书8:20-21,由早期教会教父奥利金和尼萨的格里高利发展起来的所有人得救的概念所赋予的希望(并在20世纪被卡尔·巴特和迪特里希·邦霍费尔等神学家悄悄地重申)。公元早期几个世纪基督教革命的主要转变包括对永生的希望(而不是卢克莱西亚对个人毁灭的庆祝),以及对基督给地球上贫穷和不幸的人带来希望的投资——而不是希腊罗马对贵族和文化精英的崇拜。无论是基于相似还是对比(例如,在第三章和第五章中,在其他地方被称为“可实现的希望”的延伸),这种结构上的连接将《希望》的各个章节缝合在一起,贯穿始终,就像许多主题一样,将更大整体的音乐拉进统一之中。后面的章节在前两章的基础上进行了扩展和复杂化,涉及到弥尔顿和蒲柏、塞缪尔·约翰逊、华兹华斯和珀西·雪莱、歌德、乔治·艾略特、陀思妥耶夫斯基、尼采和卡夫卡等权威人物,以《等待戈多》结尾。但是,正如我们所看到的,当爱斯特拉冈(在《等待戈多》中)最后建议他们分手可能会更好时,弗拉基米尔以我们的方式回答:“我们明天上吊吧... .。除非戈多来了。”希望和自杀仍然是两种选择,在这部戏剧中构成了一个对立,最终,这部戏剧既关乎自身的形式,也关乎人类的状况,或关乎一战后欧洲的状况。希望和希望的缺失,以及希望的事物和希望的缺失,在欧洲统一信仰的时代结束后很久仍然是组织原则。(324)如果这还不能让我们回到赫西奥德和古典世界,那么把最后四章轻轻交织成一个令人满意的简洁的小结就足够了。《希望》中的阅读有时很精彩,有时也很隐晦。例如,用一页纸讨论塔西佗,用两页纸讨论康德,可能会提出并非所有读者都准备好满足的要求。然而,虽然人们可能不同意作者的所有解释性结论,但不加考虑就将其驳回将是一个错误。希望不容易读懂。如果读者真正深入挖掘波特凯考察的主要段落——就像我经常尝试做的那样——绘制上下文,解析原文的线条,追踪与其他相关作品的联系和联系,那么真正有益的体验就会出现。波特凯通过“希望”这个复杂而广阔的棱镜,带领我们穿越了西方知识传统的一些高峰(除了意大利文艺复兴时期与北方人文主义者之间令人遗憾的差距,尤其是伊拉斯谟和托马斯·莫尔)。 有些人可能会认为这种关注令人反感:虽然他研究了劳动阶级成员(斯蒂芬·杜克、玛丽·科利尔)、女性(汉娜·莫尔、狄金森)和有色人种(埃奎亚诺、赖特、布鲁克斯、埃里森)的作品,但他的主旨并不是要打破传统。但这并不等于指责这本书缺乏当代意义。随着灾难性的气候变化,民主政治制度面临可能的死亡,以及威胁全球的疾病,我们在2023年(以及未来几年)比以往任何时候都更需要希望。《希望》对人类精神这一难以捉摸却又不可或缺的属性——也许是不可剥夺的人权——进行了彻底(如果不是全面的话)的考察。威廉·艾丁格写了一本书,《亲切的感知:华兹华斯、柯勒律治和漫长的18世纪的天才神话》,几乎与波特凯的书同一天出版。“亲切的”感知和希望还有其他共同点。两人都把浪漫主义时期作为他们论述范围的中心。两者都在实践所谓的“文化文献学”,即对一个词在其词源学、社会史和文学史上的解析。在艾丁格的例子中,“亲切”是指“天才”,用塞缪尔·约翰逊(Samuel Johnson)的话说,是直接和原始地感知,“没有被任何其他思想的干预削弱或扭曲”(1;《莎士比亚序言》[1765])。当然,波特凯的调查得到了更广泛的传统支持:与霍普对喜马拉雅山脉的调查相比,还有谁的最新专著能从中受益?然而,虽然Edinger的项目声称“仅”英国的18世纪作为其研究领域,但它允许他追溯家谱,追溯到17世纪(在法国和英国),以及古代古典世界。艾丁格从柯勒律治(《文学传》中的“亲切的歧视”)和华兹华斯(《前奏》中的“亲切的环境”)的用法中提取了他的关键术语。传统上,浪漫主义(艾丁格在很大程度上回避了这个词)被视为一条与它的嫡代先辈相对立的新道路,它宣扬天赋和无媒介想象的价值,与至少自柏拉图和亚里士多德美学以来占据主导地位的文学创作模仿模式相对立:这两种观点在艾布拉姆斯(m.h. Abrams)的名作《镜子与灯》(the Mirror and the Lamp)的标题中令人难忘地体现了出来。艾丁格仔细研究了华兹华斯和柯勒律治的诗歌和批评文本,追溯了康德和18世纪晚期的思想史,这段思想史实际上浸没了年轻时诗人同伴的思想。艾丁格描述了一种“现代”(即后德莱顿)批判意识形态,他将其定义为“批判自然主义”——一种基于“自然”、“天才”和“想象力”等术语的意识形态。他写道:“这两位(华兹华斯和柯勒律治)认为自己是自主的、亲切的感知者……他们(也许是无意识地)接受了公认的传统批评术语”,为他们的“发现”奠定了基础(187)。通过仔细阅读《前奏》中《斯诺登山》段落的不同草稿,找到了斯宾塞、弥尔顿、沙夫茨伯里、柯林斯、阿肯赛德、詹姆斯·克拉克、詹姆斯·比蒂、威廉·吉尔平,甚至华兹华斯自己早期的影响,得出了这样一个令人难忘的语言学之旅的结论:“这里的语言不仅仅是视觉的载体或工具,而是视觉本身的创造性代理人。”华兹华斯的灵感不是来自山上的顿悟,而是语言或历史本身”(186)。这是一本重要的书,值得比目前篇幅所限更丰富的考虑。事实上,我对“希望”和“亲切”感知的描述都是如此。然而,一根更刺眼的针穿过了这两根。在他的序言中,波特凯感人地告诉我们,他妻子的死促使他开始写这本书,向她致敬。相反,威廉·艾丁格在《亲切的感知》出版后不久就去世了,留下了他的妻子和家庭,以及这本书的两部未出版的续集。如果眼前生活的匆忙和忧虑会让人疲惫不堪,那么文学和文学批评或许有望提供一种抵消和振奋人心的选择。下一篇文章详细信息图表参考文献被现代语言学引用提前印刷文章DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/727691 history2023年10月4日在线发布,如需重复使用,请联系[email protected]. pdf下载Crossref报告没有引用本文的文章。
:“Genial” Perception: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Myth of Genius in the Long Eighteenth Century
Next article FreeBook Review“Genial” Perception: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Myth of Genius in the Long Eighteenth Century. William Edinger. Clemson, SC: Clemson University Press, 2022. Pp. ix+287. Hope: A Literary History. Adam Potkay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. vii+422.A. W. LeeA. W. LeeContributing Editor, The Scriblerian and Kit-Cats Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreAdam Potkay’s latest monograph more or less picks up from his 2007 The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism. Winner of the Harry Levin Prize for the best book in literary history between 2006 and 2008, The Story of Joy culturally and philologically excavates “joy” from the Hebrew Bible through Yeats and beyond. In the present volume, he provides a similar service for the concept (or emotion or virtue) of hope. Potkay begins with the ancient Greeks—Hesiod, Aeschylus, Pindar, and Thucydides—and carries his survey through modernism—Kafka, Camus, Ellison, and Beckett. Throughout this process, he combines a probing historical imagination, a sharp critical discernment, and a deft eye for textual explication, along with the gifts of a good storyteller, to provide a thoroughly accessible yet intellectually engaging account.Each of the five chapters takes up a distinct cultural episteme: classical, Christian, Augustan, Romantic, and modernist. In each, Potkay elucidates the antinomies both positive and negative—and many complexities in between—that philosophers and literary artists have discerned and developed in their deployment of “hope.”The first chapter, focusing upon Greek and Roman antiquity, exhibits the limits and restrictions these two intertwined worlds imposed: hope as deceptive, as irrational, as productive of fearfulness, as distracting from the present moment, and as squandered on things devoid of authentic value. A good example of this layered dialectic may be found in Potkay’s handling of the texts by the Greek poet Hesiod, whose only surviving authentic writings, Theogony and Works and Days, feature the myth of Pandora’s jar. Zeus, enraged at the trickery of Prometheus, creates a beautiful woman whom he sends to earth with a container full of mortal ills, such as care, toil, and disease. After Pandora opens the lid, they all escape, leaving only hope (elpis, ἐλπὶς) in the jar. While the standard interpretation holds that hope is a comfort to humankind, Potkay explores other possibilities—especially the notion that Zeus intended it to be an additional torment. Prometheus’s presence in the story adduces further complexities, such as the Titan’s gifting mortals ignorance of their final fate, as well as fire. This constitutes a sort of “blind hope,” allowing people to undertake future-oriented endeavors, occluded from their possible failure of futility.In Works and Days, Hesiod admits two kinds of strife: one born of Night (Nyx), purely destructive, and a later one that promotes competition, leading to constructive effort that may yield fruitful results. Hope within the Greek poet thus possesses a binary status: on the one hand, by placing stock in things by their very nature delusive, empty, and unsatisfying, hope may be harmful; on the other hand, salubrious competition may contribute to virtuous and positive hope for future rewards. Prometheus also appears a century later, in both Aeschylus and Pindar. The former’s Prometheus Bound elevates the god to the status of a culture hero who brings humans fire and, consequently, the arts of cultivation, civilization. The latter’s epinicia (choral hymns) address the Titan in a handful of places, most prominently in Olympian 12 and Isthmian 8. Again, in both authors, hope receives ambivalent treatment. Aeschylus’s chorus of ocean nymphs applaud the boon of “blind hope”:PROMETHEUS.I planted firmly in their hearts blind hopefulness.CHORUS.Your gift brought them great blessing.(42)Pindar, however, dismisses this “blessing”: “with men, this is blind hope without power” (45). In Olympian 12, “shameless hope”—hope for either the undeserved and unachievable (or both)—is reproached, while “measured hope” or “good hope,” a via media, is condoned (44–47). (Prometheus in Greek suggests “forethought.”) Ultimately the essence of Pindaric wisdom lies in these verses: “[while] men must keep good hope in mind,” “it is best to keep one’s eyes always on each thing before one’s feet, / for over men hangs a deceptive existence, as it unwinds life’s path” (Isthmian 8.16, 13–14, in The Complete Odes, ed. Anthony Verity [Oxford University Press, 2007], 137).This emphasis upon the present moment plays a significant role in both early Eastern and Western philosophy. To follow one of many possible discursive trails, in the Roman world the Hellenistic philosophies of Epicureanism and Stoicism both gained considerable traction. Because of the total loss or only fragmentary remains of earlier works in Greek, the Roman poet Lucretius represents the former school most fully. Based upon a materialist atomistic theory, the mid-first century BCE De rerum natura (The Nature of Things) advocates jettisoning the fear of death—as well as personal immortality—in order to attain present-state mental tranquility (ataraxia). The Stoics too favored the primacy of the present, as they sought relief from suffering (apatheia), particularly as found in human passions. Hope was minimized in both schemes, although the later Roman Stoic Seneca allowed for the hope of helping others and preserving the security of homeland. Virgil may represent this in his “ruler hope,” that of a national savior, as found in his famous fourth eclogue (although Potkay subjects this to an ironically arch reading). In sum, the first chapter compresses an extraordinary amount of information that my spare account here hardly does justice to. I offer it, however inadequate, to indicate something of the depth and sweep of Potkay’s project. Readers may thus take the preceding paragraphs as representative of the four chapters of the book that follow.Some of the themes just enumerated recur elsewhere in the book. For example, in chapter 2, we find “ruler hope” (as found in Virgil and Isaiah) resurrected into a universal messiah, as enunciated in the Christian gospels, and especially the Pauline epistolary corpus, which proclaimed the “good news” of Jesus’s imminent return. In Christianity, the tentative “good hope” found in the classical world in such figures as Pindar blossoms into an inescapable thematic promise, as in 1 Corinthians 13:13 (KJV): “And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.” These three become known as the theological virtues. Although St. Augustine resisted their imperative, they form a cornerstone in the majestic theological architecture of St. Thomas Aquinas, which remains today the primary theology of the Catholic Church. The chapter also examines the hope vested in the notion of salvation of all, based upon Romans 8:20–21 and developed by the early church fathers Origen and Gregory of Nyssa (and quietly reaffirmed in the twentieth century by theologians such as Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer). Major shifts in the Christian revolution of the early Common Era centuries include hope for eternal life (as opposed to the Lucretian celebration of individual annihilation) and investing in Christ’s offer of hope to the poor and wretched of the earth—as opposed to the Greco-Roman valorization of the aristocratic and literate elite. Such structural ligatures suturing the various chapters of Hope, whether based upon similarity or contrast (see, e.g., the extension of what has been elsewhere called “realizable hope” on the poor and enslaved, in chap. 3, and again, in chap. 5) resonate throughout, operating like so many leitmotifs that draw the music of the larger whole into unity. Later chapters extend and complicate the foundations laid out in the first two, as they range through authorities such as Milton and Pope, Samuel Johnson, Wordsworth and Percy Shelley, Goethe, George Eliot, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, and Kafka, ending with Waiting for Godot. The book’s conclusion observes:But, as we have seen, to Estragon’s [in Waiting for Godot] final suggestion that they might be better off if they parted, Vladimir answers in we-mode: “We’ll hang ourselves to-morrow… . Unless Godot comes.” Hope and suicide remain options, and constitute one antithesis in a play that, in the end, is as much about its own formal shape as it is about the human condition, or the condition of Europe after the Great Wars. Hope and its absence, as well as things to hope for and their absence, remain organizing principles long after Europe’s age of unified faith has ended.(324)If this does not return us full circle back to Hesiod and the classical world, it does suffice to lightly interlace the last four chapters into a satisfyingly succinct little knot.The readings in Hope, at times brilliant, can also be elliptical. Discussing, for example, Tacitus in one page, Kant in two, can exert demands that not all readers might be ready to meet. However, while one may not agree with all the author’s interpretative conclusions, dismissing them without consideration would be a mistake. Hope is not a quick read. If the reader truly digs into the primary passages Potkay examines—as I often attempted to do—mapping the context, parsing lines in the original languages, tracing contacts and connections with other relevant works, then a truly rewarding experience emerges. Potkay leads us through some of the peaks of the Western intellectual tradition (save the lamentable gap of the Italian Renaissance and the northern humanists, especially Erasmus and Thomas More) through the complex, expansive prism of “hope.” Some may view this focus as a turnoff: while he examines texts written by members of the laboring classes (Stephen Duck, Mary Collier), women (Hannah More, Dickinson), and people of color (Equiano, Wright, Brooks, Ellison), his brief is not to burst open the canon. But this is not tantamount to accusing the book of lacking contemporary relevance. With catastrophic climate change, democratic political systems facing their possible mortality, and globally threatening diseases, we in 2023 (and the years ahead) need hope now more than ever. Hope undertakes a thorough, if not comprehensive, examination of this elusive yet indispensable property of the human psyche, this, perhaps, inalienable human right.William Edinger has written a book, “Genial” Perception: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the Myth of Genius in the Long Eighteenth Century, that was published almost on the same day as Potkay’s. “Genial” Perception and Hope share other things in common. Both take the Romantic period as central to their discursive purview. Both practice what might be called “cultural philology,” the parsing of a single word throughout its etymological, social, and literary history. In Edinger’s case, it is “genial,” by which he means “genius,” in Samuel Johnson’s phrase, to perceive directly and originally, “not weakened or distorted by the intervention of any other mind” (1; Preface to Shakespeare [1765]). Of course, Potkay’s survey commands a rather larger stadial embrace: Who else’s recent monograph would profit by comparison to Hope’s Himalayan sweep? However, while Edinger’s project claims “only” the British long eighteenth century as its field, it allows him to trace genealogies extending back to the seventeenth century (in both France and Britain), as well as to the ancient classical world.Edinger draws his key term from usage by both Coleridge (“genial discrimination” [Biographia Literaria]) and Wordsworth (“genial circumstances” [The Prelude]). Traditionally, Romanticism (a term that Edinger, for the most part, eschews) was seen as cutting a new path in reaction against its immediate generational forbears, proclaiming the values of innate genius and the unmediated imagination, as opposed to a mimetic model of literary creation that held sway at least since Platonic and Aristotelian aesthetics: the two perspectives were memorably telegraphed in the title of M. H. Abrams’s famous book, The Mirror and the Lamp. Edinger closely examines Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s poetic and critical texts, tracing an intellectual history culminating in Kant and the late eighteenth century, one that in fact impregnated the minds of the fellow poets when youths. Edinger describes a “modern” (i.e., post-Dryden) critical ideology he identifies as “critical naturalism”—an ideology based on the terms “n/Nature,” “genius,” and “imagination.” He writes: “Where the two [Wordsworth and Coleridge] considered themselves autonomous as genial perceivers … their [perhaps unconscious] embrace of a recognizably traditional critical terminology” served as foundational to their “discoveries” (187).This philological excursion memorably concludes by closely reading the different drafts of the Mount Snowdon passage in The Prelude, locating such precursive influences as Spenser, Milton, Shaftesbury, Collins, Akenside, James Clarke, James Beattie, William Gilpin, and even Wordsworth’s own early self, as found in Descriptive Sketches, concluding that “language here is no mere vehicle or instrument of vision but a creative agent of the vision itself. Wordsworth was not inspired by an epiphany on a mountain [, but language or history itself]” (186).This is an important book, one that deserves a richer consideration than allowed by present space constraints. Indeed, this is true of my accounts of both Hope and “Genial” Perception. However, a more piercing needle threads through the two. In his preface, Potkay movingly informs us that the death of his wife prompted him to begin his book in tribute to her. Obversely, William Edinger passed away shortly after the publication of “Genial” Perception, leaving behind his spouse and family, as well as two unpublished sequels to the present book. If the hurry and worries of immediate life can wear humans down, literature and literary criticism may, hopefully, provide a countervailing—and uplifting—alternative. 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