寡头法院:管辖权、公司权力和民主衰落

IF 2.1 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Michigan Law Review Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.36644/mlr.122.1.oligarchic
Helen Hershkoff, Luke Norris
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引用次数: 0

摘要

管辖权是司法权行使的基础。正是由于这个原因,客体管辖权,即赋予法院解决纠纷权力的司法权,今天已经成为公司诉讼当事人与监管国家之间斗争的中心。在一个明显的趋势中,公司正在利用管辖权来操纵论坛的选择。在此过程中,他们正在消耗资源较少的政党,回避对案情的听证会,并使自己免受试图管理其行为的法律的约束。公司的做法是提出创造性的理由,将原告排除在法庭之外,并将他们推向仲裁,如果做不到这一点,就将原告锁定在联邦法院而不是州法院,或者将联邦案件推给可能缺乏权力或意愿来解决案件中潜在问题的行政机构。这些努力在很大程度上是成功的。本文提供了近几十年来联邦法院如何默许公司驱动的努力,以利用司法理论为其独特的私人优势的全景视图,并认为,这些理论变化共同构成了美国法律和程序的拐点。我们认为,公司审判实践使司法权倾向于放松管制的努力,这破坏了对平等、尊严和参与的法律承诺。司法权的转移,可能看起来仅仅是技术性和非政治性的,是我们所说的寡头法院架构的核心部分——法院作为公共机构,以牺牲公共目标为代价,改变他们的程序来满足私人和公司的利益,从而巩固了经济权力,并将其转化为集中的政治权力,从而破坏了健全民主生活的可能性。我们在联邦主体管辖权中描述的趋势与二十世纪之交的早期公司之争产生了共鸣。但是,今天寡头法院的构建对民主的影响并不仅仅是早期企业努力的重演。为了显示其影响的范围,该条退后一步,澄清了为什么司法管辖权对民主很重要。根据法律和社会动员文献,我们认为司法权作为一种政治资源发挥作用,促进了民主竞争的机会,既反映又塑造了国家的开放性和封闭性。将管辖权集中在更大范围的民主中,我们将探讨寡头法院如何通过巩固经济权力和缩小工人、消费者和其他资源较少的诉讼当事人的参与选择,来嵌入美国民主衰落的更大范围。
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The Oligarchic Courthouse: Jurisdiction, Corporate Power, and Democratic Decline
Jurisdiction is foundational to the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely for this reason that subject matter jurisdiction, the species of judicial power that gives a court authority to resolve a dispute, has today come to the center of a struggle between corporate litigants and the regulatory state. In a pronounced trend, corporations are using jurisdictional maneuvers to manipulate forum choice. Along the way, they are wearing out less-resourced parties, circumventing hearings on the merits, and insulating themselves from laws that seek to govern their behavior. Corporations have done so by making creative arguments to lock plaintiffs out of court and push them into arbitration, and failing that, to lock plaintiffs into federal court rather than state court, or to punt federal cases to administrative agencies that may lack the power or will to resolve the underlying issues in the case. These efforts have largely been successful. This Article offers a panoramic view of how over recent decades federal courts have acquiesced in a corporate-driven effort to leverage jurisdictional doctrines to their unique private advantage, and contends that together, these doctrinal changes constitute an inflection point in U.S. law and procedure. We argue that corporate adjudicatory practice has slanted judicial power in favor of deregulatory efforts that undermine legal commitments to equality, dignity, and participation. The shifts in jurisdiction, which may seem to be merely technical and apolitical, are a core part of the architecture of what we call the oligarchic courthouse—one where courts as public institutions transform their procedures to meet private, corporate interests at the expense of public goals, thereby cementing economic power and translating it into concentrated political power that undermines the possibility of robust democratic life. The trends we describe in federal subject matter jurisdiction resonate with earlier corporate battles at the turn of the twentieth century. But the construction of today’s oligarchic courthouse holds implications for democracy that are not simply a reprise of earlier corporate efforts. To show the scope of the implications, the Article steps back and clarifies why jurisdiction matters to democracy. Drawing on law and social mobilization literature, we argue that jurisdiction functions as a political resource that facilitates opportunities for democratic contestation and both reflects and shapes the openness and closedness of the state. Having centered jurisdiction in a larger account of democracy, we explore how the oligarchic courthouse, by entrenching economic power and narrowing participatory options for workers, consumers, and other less-resourced litigants, can be nested in a larger account of democratic decline in the United States.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
3.70%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: The Michigan Law Review is a journal of legal scholarship. Eight issues are published annually. Seven of each volume"s eight issues ordinarily are composed of two major parts: Articles by legal scholars and practitioners, and Notes written by the student editors. One issue in each volume is devoted to book reviews. Occasionally, special issues are devoted to symposia or colloquia. First Impressions, the online companion to the Michigan Law Review, publishes op-ed length articles by academics, judges, and practitioners on current legal issues. This extension of the printed journal facilitates quick dissemination of the legal community’s initial impressions of important judicial decisions, legislative developments, and timely legal policy issues.
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