广义补偿原理

IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.3982/te3971
Karl Schulz, Aleh Tsyvinski, Nicolas Werquin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

经济动荡通常会产生赢家和输家。补偿问题包括设计一项现有所得税制度的改革,通过重新分配前者的收益来抵消后者的福利损失。当只有扭曲性税收工具可用且工资在一般均衡下由内生决定时,我们推导了补偿性税收改革及其对政府预算影响的公式。我们将这一结果应用于美国机器人化的补偿。
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Generalized compensation principle
Economic disruptions generally create winners and losers. The compensation problem consists of designing a reform of the existing income tax system that offsets the welfare losses of the latter by redistributing the gains of the former. We derive a formula for the compensating tax reform and its impact on the government budget when only distortionary tax instruments are available and wages are determined endogenously in general equilibrium. We apply this result to the compensation of robotization in the United States.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.90%
发文量
35
审稿时长
52 weeks
期刊介绍: Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index
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