{"title":"比较学习","authors":"Benjamin Eva","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.99","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper concerns the diachronic rationality norms for comparative confidence judgements , i.e. judgements of the form ‘I am at least as confident in p as I am in q ’. Specifically, it identifies, characterises and evaluates an intuitively compelling learning rule called ‘comparative conditionalisation’ that specifies how agents should revise their comparative confidence judgements in the face of novel evidence.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Comparative Learning\",\"authors\":\"Benjamin Eva\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/psa.2023.99\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper concerns the diachronic rationality norms for comparative confidence judgements , i.e. judgements of the form ‘I am at least as confident in p as I am in q ’. Specifically, it identifies, characterises and evaluates an intuitively compelling learning rule called ‘comparative conditionalisation’ that specifies how agents should revise their comparative confidence judgements in the face of novel evidence.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54620,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":\"1 5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.99\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.99","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper concerns the diachronic rationality norms for comparative confidence judgements , i.e. judgements of the form ‘I am at least as confident in p as I am in q ’. Specifically, it identifies, characterises and evaluates an intuitively compelling learning rule called ‘comparative conditionalisation’ that specifies how agents should revise their comparative confidence judgements in the face of novel evidence.
期刊介绍：
Since its inception in 1934, Philosophy of Science, along with its sponsoring society, the Philosophy of Science Association, has been dedicated to the furthering of studies and free discussion from diverse standpoints in the philosophy of science. The journal contains essays, discussion articles, and book reviews.
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