依恋强度:地区主义、民族主义和投票选择

IF 4.5 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE West European Politics Pub Date : 2023-09-13 DOI:10.1080/01402382.2023.2253514
Kaitlin Alper, Caroline Marie Lancaster
{"title":"依恋强度:地区主义、民族主义和投票选择","authors":"Kaitlin Alper, Caroline Marie Lancaster","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2253514","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"AbstractRadical right parties have grown in popularity recently, leaning heavily on state-level nationalism, anti-immigrant sentiment and the promise of a homogenous nation state. There has also recently been increased devolution of power to subnational communities, who historically have resisted homogenisation and infringements on their autonomy. This implies a tension between the interests of subnational units and those of radical right parties. Using data from the 2016 and 2018 European Social Surveys and a new measure of regional identity strength constructed from the Regionalist Parties Dataset (Massetti and Schakel Citation2016) for 10 European countries, this study shows that people living in regions with strong legacies of regionalism are less attached to their national state. Second, the article demonstrates regional identity strength is negatively associated with voting for radical right parties due to their opposition to radical right parties’ exclusive state-level nationalism. Lastly, this relationship can eclipse the effect of immigration attitudes on vote choice as radical right parties’ rhetoric around immigration generally focuses on the importance of cultural homogeneity. Evidence supporting these hypotheses is found using both cross-national data and case evidence from Italy. This study underscores the importance of examining the role older social cleavages play in structuring party politics in the transnational era.Keywords: Party politicscleavage theoryregional identitymultilevel governanceradical right parties AcknowledgementsWe would like to give special thanks to Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Christina Zuber, Sean T. Norton, David Attewell, John D. Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and the three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on various drafts of this manuscript. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Comparative Politics working group at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where we received valuable feedback from our colleagues at the department.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1 Massetti and Schakel's (Citation2016) database also includes three ‘controversial cases’ which are parties that have some association with a national party but which acts sufficiently independently as to be classified as a regionalist party for the purposes of their dataset. These are the CSU in the German region of Bavaria, the UPN in the Spanish region of Navarre, and the UUP in the UK region of Northern Ireland.2 This mirrors the strategies of nation-builders during the era of state consolidation, who, as noted previously, frequently co-opted symbols of regional identity and subsumed them into a broader, constructed national identity (Giordano and Roller Citation2001; Pasquier Citation2015). Similarly, modern radical right parties sometimes make claims that those peripheral cultures are in fact ‘purer’ expressions of a broader, unifying statewide identity.3 Analyses including Belgium may be found in Online Appendix Tables 10 and 11. Results are unchanged.4 Austria, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Spain is only present in 2018 due to no radical right votes being reported in 2016. Sweden is only present in 2016 due to incompatible region codes in 2018.5 As discussed, we also exclude Belgium from our main analyses. See Online Appendix Tables 10 and 11 for analyses including Belgium. Results are unchanged.6 See Appendix Table A1 of Massetti and Schakel (Citation2016) for the full list of regionalist parties and coding decisions.7 A strength of this measure is that it smooths out the inherent volatility in electoral results over such a long time frame. One potential concern would be if there were instances in which regionalist party vote share was extremely strong early on and then dropped precipitously to zero (or near zero) over time. This would indicate that perhaps the divide was no longer salient. However, this is not the case for any of the regions in our analysis. Although the nature of politics means that there is of course some amount of volatility in regionalist party vote share across elections, it is actually relatively stable over time (i.e. fluctuations are relatively evenly dispersed over time). See Online Appendix Table 6 for a) the cumulative average vote share, b) the (over-time) standard deviation in vote share, and c) the type of electoral system at the regional level, for every region in the analysis.8 NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) levels are cross-nationally standardized statistical units (based on population), where level 1 units are generally the largest subnational level in a given state, and level 3 units are the smallest non-local/municipal level, often corresponding to ‘counties’. Different NUTS levels may correspond to theoretically and/or practically ‘useful’ territorial units/regions in different countries (e.g. NUTS level 1 corresponds to German Länder while NUTS level 2 corresponds to Austrian Länder). In addition, the ESS and other surveys may use different NUTS levels in different countries. We choose NUTS levels in our analysis based on those in the ESS, so that we may match individual respondents to their regions.9 Again, see Online Appendix Table 6 for more detailed descriptive statistics about this variable by region.10 These are the only available variables of interest that have sufficient temporal and regional coverage to be included in our analyses.11 A regionalist faction still exists within the party, however, which could lead to possible complications or splits going forward (Albertazzi et al. Citation2018).Additional informationNotes on contributorsKaitlin AlperKaitlin Alper is a postdoctoral researcher at the Danish Centre for Welfare Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Her research focuses on comparative welfare state politics, the politics of multilevel governance and decentralisation, and comparative political economy, especially in Western Europe. Her work has appeared in Social Forces. [kalp@sam.sdu.dk]Caroline Marie LancasterCaroline Marie Lancaster is a research methodologist at NORC at the University of Chicago, where she focuses on psychometrics, program evaluation, and survey research. She has published in journals such as British Journal of Political Science and European Journal of Political Research on topics relating to political attitudes, immigration, and the radical right. [lancaster-caroline@norc.org]","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The strength of attachment: regionalism, nationalism and vote choice\",\"authors\":\"Kaitlin Alper, Caroline Marie Lancaster\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/01402382.2023.2253514\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"AbstractRadical right parties have grown in popularity recently, leaning heavily on state-level nationalism, anti-immigrant sentiment and the promise of a homogenous nation state. There has also recently been increased devolution of power to subnational communities, who historically have resisted homogenisation and infringements on their autonomy. This implies a tension between the interests of subnational units and those of radical right parties. Using data from the 2016 and 2018 European Social Surveys and a new measure of regional identity strength constructed from the Regionalist Parties Dataset (Massetti and Schakel Citation2016) for 10 European countries, this study shows that people living in regions with strong legacies of regionalism are less attached to their national state. Second, the article demonstrates regional identity strength is negatively associated with voting for radical right parties due to their opposition to radical right parties’ exclusive state-level nationalism. Lastly, this relationship can eclipse the effect of immigration attitudes on vote choice as radical right parties’ rhetoric around immigration generally focuses on the importance of cultural homogeneity. Evidence supporting these hypotheses is found using both cross-national data and case evidence from Italy. This study underscores the importance of examining the role older social cleavages play in structuring party politics in the transnational era.Keywords: Party politicscleavage theoryregional identitymultilevel governanceradical right parties AcknowledgementsWe would like to give special thanks to Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Christina Zuber, Sean T. Norton, David Attewell, John D. Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and the three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on various drafts of this manuscript. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Comparative Politics working group at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where we received valuable feedback from our colleagues at the department.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1 Massetti and Schakel's (Citation2016) database also includes three ‘controversial cases’ which are parties that have some association with a national party but which acts sufficiently independently as to be classified as a regionalist party for the purposes of their dataset. These are the CSU in the German region of Bavaria, the UPN in the Spanish region of Navarre, and the UUP in the UK region of Northern Ireland.2 This mirrors the strategies of nation-builders during the era of state consolidation, who, as noted previously, frequently co-opted symbols of regional identity and subsumed them into a broader, constructed national identity (Giordano and Roller Citation2001; Pasquier Citation2015). Similarly, modern radical right parties sometimes make claims that those peripheral cultures are in fact ‘purer’ expressions of a broader, unifying statewide identity.3 Analyses including Belgium may be found in Online Appendix Tables 10 and 11. Results are unchanged.4 Austria, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Spain is only present in 2018 due to no radical right votes being reported in 2016. Sweden is only present in 2016 due to incompatible region codes in 2018.5 As discussed, we also exclude Belgium from our main analyses. See Online Appendix Tables 10 and 11 for analyses including Belgium. Results are unchanged.6 See Appendix Table A1 of Massetti and Schakel (Citation2016) for the full list of regionalist parties and coding decisions.7 A strength of this measure is that it smooths out the inherent volatility in electoral results over such a long time frame. One potential concern would be if there were instances in which regionalist party vote share was extremely strong early on and then dropped precipitously to zero (or near zero) over time. This would indicate that perhaps the divide was no longer salient. However, this is not the case for any of the regions in our analysis. Although the nature of politics means that there is of course some amount of volatility in regionalist party vote share across elections, it is actually relatively stable over time (i.e. fluctuations are relatively evenly dispersed over time). See Online Appendix Table 6 for a) the cumulative average vote share, b) the (over-time) standard deviation in vote share, and c) the type of electoral system at the regional level, for every region in the analysis.8 NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) levels are cross-nationally standardized statistical units (based on population), where level 1 units are generally the largest subnational level in a given state, and level 3 units are the smallest non-local/municipal level, often corresponding to ‘counties’. Different NUTS levels may correspond to theoretically and/or practically ‘useful’ territorial units/regions in different countries (e.g. NUTS level 1 corresponds to German Länder while NUTS level 2 corresponds to Austrian Länder). In addition, the ESS and other surveys may use different NUTS levels in different countries. We choose NUTS levels in our analysis based on those in the ESS, so that we may match individual respondents to their regions.9 Again, see Online Appendix Table 6 for more detailed descriptive statistics about this variable by region.10 These are the only available variables of interest that have sufficient temporal and regional coverage to be included in our analyses.11 A regionalist faction still exists within the party, however, which could lead to possible complications or splits going forward (Albertazzi et al. Citation2018).Additional informationNotes on contributorsKaitlin AlperKaitlin Alper is a postdoctoral researcher at the Danish Centre for Welfare Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Her research focuses on comparative welfare state politics, the politics of multilevel governance and decentralisation, and comparative political economy, especially in Western Europe. Her work has appeared in Social Forces. [kalp@sam.sdu.dk]Caroline Marie LancasterCaroline Marie Lancaster is a research methodologist at NORC at the University of Chicago, where she focuses on psychometrics, program evaluation, and survey research. She has published in journals such as British Journal of Political Science and European Journal of Political Research on topics relating to political attitudes, immigration, and the radical right. [lancaster-caroline@norc.org]\",\"PeriodicalId\":48213,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"West European Politics\",\"volume\":\"51 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"West European Politics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2253514\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"West European Politics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2253514","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

不同的NUTS水平可能对应于不同国家理论上和/或实际上“有用”的领土单位/地区(例如,NUTS 1级对应于德国Länder,而NUTS 2级对应于奥地利Länder)。此外,ESS和其他调查可能在不同国家使用不同的NUTS水平。在我们的分析中,我们根据ESS中的NUTS水平来选择NUTS水平,这样我们就可以将个别受访者与其所在地区相匹配同样,请参见在线附录表6,以获得有关该变量按地区的更详细描述性统计数据这些是唯一可用的变量,有足够的时间和区域覆盖,包括在我们的分析然而,地方主义派系仍然存在于党内,这可能会导致未来的复杂化或分裂(Albertazzi等人)。Citation2018)。作者简介:kaitlin Alper是南丹麦大学丹麦福利研究中心的博士后研究员。她的研究主要集中在比较福利国家政治、多层次治理和分权政治以及比较政治经济学,特别是在西欧。她的作品发表在《社会力量》杂志上。[kalp@sam.sdu.dk]Caroline Marie Lancaster是芝加哥大学NORC的研究方法学家,她专注于心理测量学、项目评估和调查研究。她曾在《英国政治科学杂志》和《欧洲政治研究杂志》等期刊上发表有关政治态度、移民和激进右翼的文章。[lancaster-caroline@norc.org]
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The strength of attachment: regionalism, nationalism and vote choice
AbstractRadical right parties have grown in popularity recently, leaning heavily on state-level nationalism, anti-immigrant sentiment and the promise of a homogenous nation state. There has also recently been increased devolution of power to subnational communities, who historically have resisted homogenisation and infringements on their autonomy. This implies a tension between the interests of subnational units and those of radical right parties. Using data from the 2016 and 2018 European Social Surveys and a new measure of regional identity strength constructed from the Regionalist Parties Dataset (Massetti and Schakel Citation2016) for 10 European countries, this study shows that people living in regions with strong legacies of regionalism are less attached to their national state. Second, the article demonstrates regional identity strength is negatively associated with voting for radical right parties due to their opposition to radical right parties’ exclusive state-level nationalism. Lastly, this relationship can eclipse the effect of immigration attitudes on vote choice as radical right parties’ rhetoric around immigration generally focuses on the importance of cultural homogeneity. Evidence supporting these hypotheses is found using both cross-national data and case evidence from Italy. This study underscores the importance of examining the role older social cleavages play in structuring party politics in the transnational era.Keywords: Party politicscleavage theoryregional identitymultilevel governanceradical right parties AcknowledgementsWe would like to give special thanks to Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Christina Zuber, Sean T. Norton, David Attewell, John D. Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and the three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on various drafts of this manuscript. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Comparative Politics working group at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where we received valuable feedback from our colleagues at the department.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1 Massetti and Schakel's (Citation2016) database also includes three ‘controversial cases’ which are parties that have some association with a national party but which acts sufficiently independently as to be classified as a regionalist party for the purposes of their dataset. These are the CSU in the German region of Bavaria, the UPN in the Spanish region of Navarre, and the UUP in the UK region of Northern Ireland.2 This mirrors the strategies of nation-builders during the era of state consolidation, who, as noted previously, frequently co-opted symbols of regional identity and subsumed them into a broader, constructed national identity (Giordano and Roller Citation2001; Pasquier Citation2015). Similarly, modern radical right parties sometimes make claims that those peripheral cultures are in fact ‘purer’ expressions of a broader, unifying statewide identity.3 Analyses including Belgium may be found in Online Appendix Tables 10 and 11. Results are unchanged.4 Austria, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Spain is only present in 2018 due to no radical right votes being reported in 2016. Sweden is only present in 2016 due to incompatible region codes in 2018.5 As discussed, we also exclude Belgium from our main analyses. See Online Appendix Tables 10 and 11 for analyses including Belgium. Results are unchanged.6 See Appendix Table A1 of Massetti and Schakel (Citation2016) for the full list of regionalist parties and coding decisions.7 A strength of this measure is that it smooths out the inherent volatility in electoral results over such a long time frame. One potential concern would be if there were instances in which regionalist party vote share was extremely strong early on and then dropped precipitously to zero (or near zero) over time. This would indicate that perhaps the divide was no longer salient. However, this is not the case for any of the regions in our analysis. Although the nature of politics means that there is of course some amount of volatility in regionalist party vote share across elections, it is actually relatively stable over time (i.e. fluctuations are relatively evenly dispersed over time). See Online Appendix Table 6 for a) the cumulative average vote share, b) the (over-time) standard deviation in vote share, and c) the type of electoral system at the regional level, for every region in the analysis.8 NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) levels are cross-nationally standardized statistical units (based on population), where level 1 units are generally the largest subnational level in a given state, and level 3 units are the smallest non-local/municipal level, often corresponding to ‘counties’. Different NUTS levels may correspond to theoretically and/or practically ‘useful’ territorial units/regions in different countries (e.g. NUTS level 1 corresponds to German Länder while NUTS level 2 corresponds to Austrian Länder). In addition, the ESS and other surveys may use different NUTS levels in different countries. We choose NUTS levels in our analysis based on those in the ESS, so that we may match individual respondents to their regions.9 Again, see Online Appendix Table 6 for more detailed descriptive statistics about this variable by region.10 These are the only available variables of interest that have sufficient temporal and regional coverage to be included in our analyses.11 A regionalist faction still exists within the party, however, which could lead to possible complications or splits going forward (Albertazzi et al. Citation2018).Additional informationNotes on contributorsKaitlin AlperKaitlin Alper is a postdoctoral researcher at the Danish Centre for Welfare Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Her research focuses on comparative welfare state politics, the politics of multilevel governance and decentralisation, and comparative political economy, especially in Western Europe. Her work has appeared in Social Forces. [kalp@sam.sdu.dk]Caroline Marie LancasterCaroline Marie Lancaster is a research methodologist at NORC at the University of Chicago, where she focuses on psychometrics, program evaluation, and survey research. She has published in journals such as British Journal of Political Science and European Journal of Political Research on topics relating to political attitudes, immigration, and the radical right. [lancaster-caroline@norc.org]
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
West European Politics
West European Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
10.00
自引率
7.10%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: West European Politics (WEP)has established itself as one of the most authoritative journals covering political and social issues in Western Europe. It has a substantial reviews section and coverage of all national elections in Western Europe. Its comprehensive scope, embracing all the major political and social developments in all West European countries, including the European Union, makes it essential reading for both political practitioners and academics.
期刊最新文献
Gordon Smith and Vincent Wright Memorial Prizes 2023 The role of national delegations in the politics of the European Parliament Un-solvable crises? Differential implementation and transboundary crisis management in the EU How the populist radical right exploits crisis: comparing the role of proximity in the COVID-19 and refugee crises in Germany Competing on competence: the issue profiles of mainstream parties in Western Europe
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1