打开潘多拉的盒子:国际投资法中不合格延长战争条款下的严格责任

L. Koen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

人们越来越感兴趣的是,国际投资法在多大程度上规定了国家赔偿武装冲突造成的损失的义务。这篇文章探讨了普遍存在的战争条款,这些条款认为国家有责任为战争损失支付赔偿,而投资者无需证明过错。该贡献考虑了最近针对叙利亚的一个案例,在这个案例中,投资者被允许通过最惠国(MFN)条款在另一个条约中依赖这样的战争条款。该贡献发现,最惠国条款大大增加了可以依赖无条件延长战争条款的投资者数量。它考虑了不受限制的延长战争条款,以及通过喀麦隆、叙利亚和也门的最惠国待遇条款,其他投资者可以在多大程度上依赖这些条款。然后,它考虑了金砖国家在对不合格的延长战争条款进行必要改革方面可以发挥的作用。报告认为,这些刚刚摆脱武装冲突的国家几乎无力满足其人民最基本的发展需求,更不用说对外国投资者承担几乎无限的责任,因此迫切需要这些改革。
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Opening Pandora’s Box: Strict Liability Under Unqualified Extended War Clauses in International Investment Law
There has been a growing interest in the extent to which international investment law imposes an obligation on the state to compensate for losses arising from an armed conflict. This contribution explores the prevalence of war clauses that hold the state liable to pay compensation for war losses without the investor needing to prove fault. The contribution considers a recent case against Syria in which an investor was permitted to rely on such a war clause in another treaty through the most favoured nation (MFN) clause. The contribution finds that MFN clauses substantially increase the number of investors who can rely on unqualified extended war clauses. It considers unqualified extended war clauses and the extent to which other investors can rely on them through an MFN clause in Cameroon, Syria and Yemen. It then considers the role that the BRICS countries can play in bringing about the necessary reforms to unqualified extended war clauses. It argues that these reforms are urgently needed as these states emerging from armed conflict can scarcely afford to meet their people’s most essential developmental needs, let alone virtually unlimited liability to foreign investors.
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