Checked C1的正式模型

IF 0.9 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS Journal of Computer Security Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI:10.3233/jcs-230040
Liyi Li, Yiyun Liu, Deena Postol, Leonidas Lampropoulos, David Van Horn, Michael Hicks
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出了Checked C的正式模型,Checked C是一种旨在加强空间内存安全的C方言。我们的模型特别关注动态大小的、可能以null结尾的数组的语义。我们在Coq中形式化了这个模型,并证明了任何空间存储安全错误都可以归咎于标记为未检查的部分程序;这是一个Checked C特性,支持增量移植和向后兼容性。虽然我们的模型的操作语义使用带注释的(“fat”)指针来加强空间安全性,但我们证明了这种注释可以安全地擦除。使用PLT Redex,我们将模型的可执行版本和编译过程形式化为无类型的类c语言,并使用随机测试来验证生成的代码忠实地模拟了原始代码。最后,我们为Redex模型中的类型良好和几乎类型良好的术语开发了一个自定义随机生成器,并使用它来搜索我们的模型和Clang Checked C实现之间的不一致之处。我们发现这些步骤是共同开发语言(Checked C仍在开发中)及其核心模型的有用方法。
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A formal model of Checked C1
We present a formal model of Checked C, a dialect of C that aims to enforce spatial memory safety. Our model pays particular attention to the semantics of dynamically sized, potentially null-terminated arrays. We formalize this model in Coq, and prove that any spatial memory safety errors can be blamed on portions of the program labeled unchecked; this is a Checked C feature that supports incremental porting and backward compatibility. While our model’s operational semantics uses annotated (“fat”) pointers to enforce spatial safety, we show that such annotations can be safely erased. Using PLT Redex we formalize an executable version of our model and a compilation procedure to an untyped C-like language, as well as use randomized testing to validate that generated code faithfully simulates the original. Finally, we develop a custom random generator for well-typed and almost-well-typed terms in our Redex model, and use it to search for inconsistencies between our model and the Clang Checked C implementation. We find these steps to be a useful way to co-develop a language (Checked C is still in development) and a core model of it.
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来源期刊
Journal of Computer Security
Journal of Computer Security COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS-
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
35
期刊介绍: The Journal of Computer Security presents research and development results of lasting significance in the theory, design, implementation, analysis, and application of secure computer systems and networks. It will also provide a forum for ideas about the meaning and implications of security and privacy, particularly those with important consequences for the technical community. The Journal provides an opportunity to publish articles of greater depth and length than is possible in the proceedings of various existing conferences, while addressing an audience of researchers in computer security who can be assumed to have a more specialized background than the readership of other archival publications.
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