{"title":"弹劾是捍卫民主的最后手段?不同制度背景下的政府首脑免职","authors":"Mahir Tokatlı","doi":"10.1007/s11615-023-00488-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Democracy would essentially fail if, despite an electoral defeat, the government refused to concede office. This possibility is a constant uncertainty that democracy has to deal with, which makes it fragile in terms of its survival. This was on full display after the 2020 U.S. presidential election, including the resulting denials by then President Trump and his followers and their attempts to have the results overturned, with the dramatic conflict culminating in the storming of the Capitol. Trust, but also mistrust, is constitutive for democratic regimes: Trust makes democracies exist, and mistrust makes them survive. Recent studies have pointed out that institutionalized mistrust has long been ignored as relevant for democracies; however, there is little if any research attention given to the most pivotal tool in terms of institutionalized mistrust, namely the vote of no confidence or the early removal of the head of government from office. In parliamentary systems, parliament can remove the head of government for political reasons, whereas presidentialism lacks this option, although impeachment provides a way of removal on legal grounds. This article aims to prompt further reflection in comparative government on how these tools of institutionalized mistrust are defined in the context of different institutional settings and what potential risks they entail. Do the principles of trust and mistrust actually differ between the various governmental systems? Finally, does impeachment strengthen democratic principles, or is it pathological in a sense that it might even foster autocratization?","PeriodicalId":45529,"journal":{"name":"Politische Vierteljahresschrift","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Impeachment as Last Resort to Safeguard Democracy? Removing the Head of Government in Different Institutional Settings\",\"authors\":\"Mahir Tokatlı\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11615-023-00488-w\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Democracy would essentially fail if, despite an electoral defeat, the government refused to concede office. This possibility is a constant uncertainty that democracy has to deal with, which makes it fragile in terms of its survival. This was on full display after the 2020 U.S. presidential election, including the resulting denials by then President Trump and his followers and their attempts to have the results overturned, with the dramatic conflict culminating in the storming of the Capitol. Trust, but also mistrust, is constitutive for democratic regimes: Trust makes democracies exist, and mistrust makes them survive. Recent studies have pointed out that institutionalized mistrust has long been ignored as relevant for democracies; however, there is little if any research attention given to the most pivotal tool in terms of institutionalized mistrust, namely the vote of no confidence or the early removal of the head of government from office. In parliamentary systems, parliament can remove the head of government for political reasons, whereas presidentialism lacks this option, although impeachment provides a way of removal on legal grounds. 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Impeachment as Last Resort to Safeguard Democracy? Removing the Head of Government in Different Institutional Settings
Abstract Democracy would essentially fail if, despite an electoral defeat, the government refused to concede office. This possibility is a constant uncertainty that democracy has to deal with, which makes it fragile in terms of its survival. This was on full display after the 2020 U.S. presidential election, including the resulting denials by then President Trump and his followers and their attempts to have the results overturned, with the dramatic conflict culminating in the storming of the Capitol. Trust, but also mistrust, is constitutive for democratic regimes: Trust makes democracies exist, and mistrust makes them survive. Recent studies have pointed out that institutionalized mistrust has long been ignored as relevant for democracies; however, there is little if any research attention given to the most pivotal tool in terms of institutionalized mistrust, namely the vote of no confidence or the early removal of the head of government from office. In parliamentary systems, parliament can remove the head of government for political reasons, whereas presidentialism lacks this option, although impeachment provides a way of removal on legal grounds. This article aims to prompt further reflection in comparative government on how these tools of institutionalized mistrust are defined in the context of different institutional settings and what potential risks they entail. Do the principles of trust and mistrust actually differ between the various governmental systems? Finally, does impeachment strengthen democratic principles, or is it pathological in a sense that it might even foster autocratization?
期刊介绍:
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Politische Vierteljahresschrift (PVS) (“German Political Science Quarterly”, GPSQ) publishes the latest double-blind peer-reviewed research results from all sub-disciplines of political science. It thus includes original contributions from political theory and the history of ideas, from the analysis and comparison of political systems, from policy analysis, from the field of international relations and foreign policy, from empirical social research and methodology, from political sociology as well as political science pedagogy.
The contributions published in PVS come from German or German-speaking political scientists as well as from international political scientists who refer to the German or German-speaking political science.
Special Issues
Special Issues provide opportunities to contribute to important thematic and/or theoretical developments in political science or its subfields. Regular Calls for Proposals are initiated by the Editors, but potential Guest Editors may also send offers for special issues at any time. Special issues include at least six contributions to be recruited by the Guest Editors, supplemented by an introduction. Most of these contributions are critical papers, but the integration of a literature review and/or one or two research notes is also possible. All contributions need to successfully pass the double-blind peer-review process before publication.
The PVS is listed in the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI).
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Die Politische Vierteljahresschrift (PVS) – German Political Science Quarterly bietet Raum für neueste Forschungsergebnisse aus allen Teildisziplinen der Politikwissenschaft. Sie beinhaltet doppelblind begutachtete Beiträge aus der Politischen Theorie und Ideengeschichte, aus dem Bereich Analyse und Vergleich politischer Systeme, aus der Policy-Analyse, aus dem Bereich der Internationalen Beziehungen und der Außenpolitik, aus der empirischen Sozialforschung und Methodenlehre, der Politischen Soziologie sowie der Didaktik der Politikwissenschaft.
Die in der PVS veröffentlichten Beiträge stammen von deutschen bzw. deutschsprachigen Politikwissenschaftler*innen sowie von internationalen Politikwissenschaftler*innen, die sich mit der deutschen bzw. deutschsprachigen Politikwissenschaft auseinandersetzen.
Special Issues
Das Special Issue soll die Möglichkeit bieten, auf thematische und theoretische Entwicklungen im Fach insgesamt oder in einzelnen Teildisziplinen zu reagieren, denen eine fachallgemeine Bedeutung zugeschrieben werden kann. Die Redaktion akquiriert mögliche Schwerpunkte eigenständig über entsprechende Call for Proposals, ist aber für entsprechende Initiativen und Vorschläge offen.
In Special Issues werden mindestens sechs von Gastherausgeber*innen einzuwerbende Beiträge zusammengefasst und durch eine inhaltliche Einleitung durch die Gastherausgeber*innen ergänzt. Die Beiträge sollen schwerpunktmäßig Abhandlungen sein; es sind aber auch die Integration einer Literaturübersicht und/oder einer bis zwei Research Notes möglich. Veröffentlicht werden ausschließlich Beiträge, die erfolgreich das anonymisierte Gutachter*innenverfahren durchlaufen haben und für eine Veröffentlichung empfohlen wurden.
Die PVS wird im Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) erfasst.