Breaking the Bank: Effects of Domestic Conflict on the Banking Sector in Turkey

ABSTRACTAlthough banks occupy a central role in most (post-)conflict situations, there is a perplexing lack of attention to them in studies of political violence. As a case experiencing domestic conflict with varying degrees in the last decades, Turkey offers opportunities to understand how the banking sector, including state deposit banks, responds to such political violence. We focus on the short-term impact of political violence and address the following questions: Do all actors in the sector respond in similar ways to security threats? Is there variation according to conflict intensity? We shed light on these puzzles with an analysis of original data on bank ownership, bank branches, bank deposit amounts, and bank credits. We show that banks with profit incentives respond to conflict by lowering their presence in provinces hit by these attacks. In comparison, our finding that deposits in high conflict intensity areas are not affected suggests that it is indeed economic actors outside high intensity regions that are more sensitive to short-time changes in security compared to local ones. Overall, the results demonstrate that political violence hurts banks’ presence in conflict locations and their presence matters through credit provision to these areas.KEYWORDS: Bankingpolitical violencepost-conflict economypublic/private policy and terrorismconflict region Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplementary materialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2252104Notes1. John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’—Financing the Provisional IRA: Part 2,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 2 (2003): 1–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550312331293027; Emre Hatipoglu and Dursun Peksen, “Economic Sanctions and Banking Crises in Target Economies,” Defence and Peace Economics 29, no. 2 (2018): 171–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2016.1245811.2. Edward Moxon-Browne, European Terrorism (New York , Toronto: Macmillan, 1994); John Otis, “Rebirth, or Relapse? Colombia Hits a Post-War Turning Point,” Americas Quarterly, 2017. https://www.americasquarterly.org/fulltextarticle/rebirth-or-relapse-colombia-hits-a-post-war-turning-point/.3. Luigi Gioso Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, “The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development,” The American Economic Review 94, no. 3 (2004): 526–56.4. Paul Collier and Marguerite Duponchel, “The Economic Legacy of Civil War: Firm-Level Evidence from Sierra Leone,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 1 (2013): 65–88.5. Tilman Brück, Wim Naudé, and Philip Verwimp, “Small Business, Entrepreneurship and Violent Conflict in Developing Countries,” Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship 24, no. 2 (2011): 161–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/08276331.2011.10593532.6. Asli Demirgüc-Kunt, Leora F. Klapper, and Georgios A. Panos, “Entrepreneurship in Post-Conflict Transition,” Economics of Transition 19, no. 1 (2011): 27–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2010.00398.x.7. Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, and Xian Gu, “The Roles of Banks in Financial Systems.” in The Oxford Handbook of Banking, ed. Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux and John O. S. Wilson, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 39–61. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199688500.013.0002.8. Randall Collins,Weberian Sociological Theory, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 137.9. Allen et al., “The Roles of Banks.”10. Khusrav Gaibulloev and Javed Younas, “Conflicts and Domestic Bank Lending,” Public Choice 169, no. 3 (2016): 315–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0362-3; Nicolás de Roux and Luis R. Martinez, “Forgone Investment: Civil Conflict and Agricultural Credit in Colombia,” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Documento CEDE No. 22. Rochester, NY, 2021. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3832201.11. Paul Collier, “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 51, no. 1 (1999): 168–83.12. Brock S. Blomberg, Gregory D. Hess, and Athanasios Orphanides, “The Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism,” Journal of Monetary Economics 51, no. 5 (2004): 1007–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2004.04.001.13. Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, and Håvard Strand, “Development Consequences of Armed Conflict,” World Development 40, no. 9 (2012): 1713–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.031.14. Elisabeth Jean Wood, “The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks,” Annual Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2008): 539–61.15. Adriana Camacho and Catherine Rodriguez, “Firm Exit and Armed Conflict in Colombia,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 1 (2013): 89–116.16. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). https://econpapers.repec.org/bookchap/cupcbooks/9781107004566.htm.17. Adriana Camacho and Catherine Rodriguez, “Firm Exit and Armed Conflict in Colombia,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 1 (2013): 89–116.18. Tilman Brück, Wim Naudé, and Philip Verwimp, “Business under Fire: Entrepreneurship and Violent Conflict in Developing Countries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 1 (2013): 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712464846.19. Fırat Bilgel and Burhan Can Karahasan, “The Economic Costs of Separatist Terrorism in Turkey,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 2 (2017): 457–79; Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, “The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country,” American Economic Review 93, no. 1 (2003): 113–32. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803321455188.20. Carlos Bozzoli, Tilman Brück, and Nina Wald, “Self-Employment and Conflict in Colombia,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 1 (2013): 117–42.21. Lakshmi Iyer and Indhira Santos, “Creating Jobs in South Asia’s Conflict Zones,” Policy Research Working Papers. The World Bank, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6104.22. Wood, “Social Processes Civil War.”23. Kobi Peleg, James Regens, James Gunter, and Dena Jaffe, “The Normalisation of Terror: The Response of Israel’s Stock Market to Long Periods of Terrorism,” Disasters 35 (2011): 268–83. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01203.x.24. Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, “What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11,” Journal of Economic Literature 57, no. 2 (2019): 275–328. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181444.25. Andrew H. Chen and Thomas F. Siems, “The Effects of Terrorism on Global Capital Markets,” European Journal of Political Economy 20, no. 2 (2004): 349–66.26. Marc Chesney, Ganna Reshetar, and Mustafa Karaman, “The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets: An Empirical Study,” Journal of Banking & Finance 35, no. 2 (2011): 253–67.27. Ross Levine, “Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence,” in Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf (Elsevier, 2005), 1A:865–934. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01012-9.28. Gaibulloev and Younas, “Conflicts Domestic Bank Lending.”29. Allyson Lucinda Benton, “Violent Crime and Capital Market Punishment: How Violent Crime Affects the Supply of Debt to Municipal Mexico,” Studies in Comparative International Development 52, no. 4 (2017): 483–509. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-017-9256-8.30. de Roux and Martinez, “Forgone Investment.”31. Benton, “Violent Crime Capital Market.”32. Marc Rockmore, Christopher B. Barrett, and Jeannie Annan, “The Implications of Aggregate Measures of Exposure to Violence for the Estimated Impacts on Individual Risk Preferences,” World Development 157 (2020): 105925. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.105925; Tuba Gün Çınğı and Nadir Suğur, “Terror Risk Perception and Fear of Terror in Turkey: Predictors, Bases and Consequences,” Terrorism and Political Violence 34, no. 3 (2022): 514–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1711741.33. Gary S Becker and Yona Rubinstein, “Fear and the Response to Terrorism: An Economic Analysis,” CEP Discussion Papers. Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, 2011. https://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/abstract.asp?index=3891.34. Chengchun Li, Syed Mansoob Murshed, and Sailesh Tanna, “The Impact of Civil War on Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Developing Countries,” The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 26, no. 4 (2017): 488–507. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638199.2016.1270347.35. Mehmet Yanmış, Çözümden Çatışmaya Kürt Meselesi (2012–2016) (Ankara: Grifon, 2017), 78.36. Alexander Gerschenkron, “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (1962),” in The Globalization and Development Reader: Perspectives on Development and Global Change, ed Timmons Roberts, Amy Hite and Nitsan Chorev, 2nd ed. (Wiley Blackwell, 1962), 62–79. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1809184.37. Joseph E Stiglitz, “The Role of the State in Financial Markets,” The World Bank Economic Review 7, no. suppl_1 (1993): 19–52. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/7.suppl_1.19.38. John Hawkins and Dubravko Mihaljek, “The Banking Industry in the Emerging Market Economies: Competition, Consolidation and Systemic Stability: An Overview,” BIS Papers 4, no. 4 (2001): 1–44; Thomas Marois and Ali Rıza Güngen, “Credibility and Class in the Evolution of Public Banks: The Case of Turkey,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 43, no. 6 (2016): 1285–1309. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1176023; Zeynep Önder and Süheyla Özyıldırım, “Political Connection, Bank Credits and Growth: Evidence from Turkey,” The World Economy 34, no. 6 (2011): 1042–65.39. Brück et al., “Small Business Violent Conflict,” 163.40. Rockmore et al., “Aggregate Measures Exposure Violence.”41. Patricia Justino, “Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective on the Causes and Duration of Warfare,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 3 (2009): 315–33.42. G. Andrew Karolyi, “The Consequences of Terrorism for Financial Markets: What Do We Know?” Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics, 2006. https://ideas.repec.org//p/ecl/ohidic/2006-6.html.43. Michael P Cañares, “In Violence as in Peace: Violent Conflict and Rural Entrepreneurship in the Philippines,” Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship 24, no. 2 (2011): 253–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/08276331.2011.10593537.44. Kalkinma Bakanligi, On Birinci Kalkınma Planı 2019–2023 (Ankara: Kalkinma Bakanligi, 2019). https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/On_Birinci_Kalkinma_Plani-2019-2023.pdf.45. Information about banks ownership, assets distribution, branch, and personnel can be found at The Bank Association of Turkey’s statistical reports.46. Türkiye Bankalar Birliği (TBB), “Veri Sorgulama Sistemi,” 2019. https://www.tbb.org.tr/tr.47. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “Government Ownership of Banks,” The Journal of Finance 57, no. 1 (2002): 265–301.48. Dani Rodrik, “How Should Structural Adjustment Programs Be Designed?” World Development 18, no. 7 (1990): 933–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(90)90077-B.49. Thomas Marois, States, Banks and Crisis: Emerging Finance Capitalism in Mexico and Turkey (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 102.50. Gülsün Akin, Ahmet Aysan, and Levent Yildiran, “Transformation of the Turkish Financial Sector in the Aftermath of the 2001 Crisis,” in Turkey and the Global Economy: Neo-Liberal Restructuring and Integration in the Post-Crisis Era, ed Ziya Öniş and Fikret Senses, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), 73–100.51. Caner Bakir and Ziya Öniş, “The Regulatory State and Turkish Banking Reforms in the Age of Post-Washington Consensus,” Development and Change 41, no. 1 (2010): 77–106. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01634.x.52. Türkiye Bankalar Birliği (TBB), “Veri Sorgulama Sistemi.”53. Akin et al., “Transformation Turkish Financial Sector.”54. Seda Demiralp and Selva Demiralp, “Erosion of Central Bank Independence in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 20, no. 1 (2019): 49–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2018.1505512.55. Francesco Pavoni, Doruk Acar, and Filippo Ghizzoni, Maximum Branching: Revaluating and Revitalizing Your Network-Focus on Turkey (Istanbul: Roland Berger Middle East & Turkey Office, 2013).56. Marois, States, Banks and Crisis 57.57. Ibid., 184.58. Arzu Kibris, “The Geo-Temporal Evolution of Violence in Civil Conflicts: A Micro Analysis of Conflict Diffusion on a New Event Data Set,” Journal of Peace Research 58, no. 5 (2021): 885–99.59. Bilgel and Karahasan, “Economic Costs Separatist Terrorism,” 458; See also Nadir Öcal and Jülide Yildirim, “Regional Effects of Terrorism on Economic Growth in Turkey: A Geographically Weighted Regression Approach,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 4 (2010): 477–89.60. Veli Yadirgi, The Political Economy of the Kurds of Turkey: From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2017).61. Mesut Yeğen, “The Kurdish Question in Turkey: Denial to Recognition,” in Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue, ed Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 67–84.62. Mehmet Gurses, “The Evolving Kurdish Question in Turkey,” Middle East Critique 29, no. 3 (2020): 307–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2020.1770448.63. https://www.riskmerkezi.org/Content/Upload/istatistikiraporlar/ekler/1416/Risk_Merkezi_Aylik_Bulteni_Haziran_2018.pdf.64. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/batmanda-20-atm-yakildi-3-milyon-lira-kayip-27372573.65. https://www.finansgundem.com/haber/teror-karsiliksiz-ceki-patlatti/453369.66. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/ekonomi/guneydogu-ekonomisi-zorda-isadami-karamsar-151358.67. Polat S Alpman, Esmer yakalılar: Kent-sınıf-kimlik ve Kürt emeği (İletişim Yayınevi, 2016). https://iletisim.com.tr/kitap/esmer-yakalilar/9263.68. “10 bin kepenk kapandı,” Cumhuriyet, January 25, 2017, http://egazete.cumhuriyet.com.tr/oku/192/2017-01-25/0.69. TESEV, Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu’da Sosyal ve Ekonomik Öncelikler (Istanbul: TESEV, 2006). https://www.tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/rapor_Dogu_Ve_Guneydogu_Anadoluda_Sosyal_Ve_Ekonomik_Oncelikler.pdf.70. https://www.dunya.com/ekonomi/ziraat-bankasi-genel-muduru-can-akin-caglar-guneydogu039da-az-haberi-34945 https://www.dunya.com/finans/haberler/kredide-guneydogu-onde-kosuyor-haberi-219289 https://www.dunya.com/ekonomi/sektorel-kredi-artisinda-lider-guneydogu-haberi-255364 https://www.isbank.com.tr/bankamizi-taniyin/ulke-istikrari-icin-kaynaklarimizi-maharetimizi-sonuna-kadar-kullanacagiz.71. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “Global Terrorism Database,” 2016. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.72. Hüseyin Alptekin, “Tracking Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Introducing the Turkey Terrorism Incidents Database,” Mediterranean Politics 28, no. 1 (2023): 124–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2021.1894727.73. Kibris, “Geo-Temporal Evolution Violence.”74. Enders and Sandler, Political Economy of Terrorism.75. START, “Global Terrorism Database,” 9 See codebook.76. Gaibulloev and Younas, “Conflicts Domestic Bank Lending,”; Li et al., “Civil War Foreign Investment.”77. Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), “Gross Domestic Product by Provinces, 2019,” Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), 2021. https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Gross-Domestic-Product-by-Provinces-2019-33663&dil=2; Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), “Gross Domestic Product by Provinces; 1987–2001,” 2001.78. The Online Appendix provides details about how we calculated province-year level population data from 1987 to 2018.79. World Bank, “Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual %),” 2021. https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/inflation-consumer-prices-annual-0.80. Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT), “Indicative Exchange Rates,” 2021. https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/index.php?/evds/serieMarket/#collapse_2.81. Demiralp and Demiralp, “Erosion Central Bank Independence.”82. Jie Zhang, “More Political Representation, More Economic Development? Evidence from Turkey,” Public Choice 187, no. 3 (2021): 275–99. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00773-6.83. Marois, States, Banks and Crisis, 182.84. Servet Mutlu, “Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 4 (1996): 517–41; Arzu Kibris, “The Polarization Trap,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 6 (2014): 492–522. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.903452; Ceren Belge, “Civilian Victimization and the Politics of Information in the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey,” World Politics 68, no. 2 (2016): 275–306; Güneş Murat Tezcür, “Ordinary People, Extraordinary Risks: Participation in an Ethnic Rebellion,” American Political Science Review 110, no. 2 (2016): 247–64. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000150; Zeki Sarıgil, Ethnic Boundaries in Turkish Politics (New York: NYU Press, 2018). https://nyupress.org/9781479882168/ethnic-boundaries-in-turkish-politics.85. We limit the analysis to banks that had at least two branches in the previous year as some foreign banks open only one branch (typically in Istanbul). The sample, therefore, starts with year 1989.86. Rockmore et al., “Aggregate Measures Exposure Violence.”87. Peleg et al., “The Normalisation of Terror”; Justino, “Poverty and Violent Conflict.”88. Önder and Özyıldırım, “Political Connection, Bank Credits.”89. Mesut Yeğen, “Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 1 (2007): 119–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870601006603; Yeğen, “Kurdish Question in Turkey”; Zeki Sarıgil, “Curbing Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism in Turkey: An Empirical Assessment of pro-Islamic and Socio-Economic Approaches,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 33, no. 3 (2010): 533–53; Erdem Yörük and Hişyar Özsoy, “Shifting Forms of Turkish State Paternalism toward the Kurds: Social Assistance as ‘Benevolent’ Control,” Dialectical Anthropology 37, no. 1 (2013): 153–5890. The Wald Chi Square statistic for Model 1 is 51879.19 (p value = 0) and for Model 2 is 26557.43 (p value = 0).91. The marginal effect of attacks in the conflict-prone region (Southeast = 1) for non-state banks (state = 0) is equal to −0.001 (with a standard error of 0.0005) and for state banks (state = 1) is equal to −0.004 (with a standard error of 0.001). In the rest of the country, the marginal effect of attacks for state banks is estimated as −0.001 (with a standard error of 0.002).92. When Southeast is equal to 1, the marginal effect of attacks is .00002 (s.e. 0.0003).93. The consecutive marginal effects are 0.0001 (s.e. 0006) and 0.005 (s.e. 0.0009).94. Alptekin, “Tracking Terrorism Counter-Terrorism.”95. Kibris, “Geo-Temporal Evolution Violence.”96. Gaibulloev and Younas, “Conflicts Domestic Bank Lending.”97. Daniel Meierrieks and Thomas Gries, “Causality between Terrorism and Economic Growth,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 1 (2013): 91–104. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312445650.98. Bozzoli et al., “Self-Employment Conflict Colombia,” 128.99. Ministry of Treasury and Finance, “Merkezi Yönetim Bütçe Istatistikleri (2004–2023),” 2023. https://muhasebat.hmb.gov.tr/iller-itibariyle-merkezi-yonetim-butce-istatistikleri-2004-2019.100. Catherine Rodríguez and Fabio Sánchez, “Armed Conflict Exposure, Human Capital Investments, and Child Labor: Evidence from Colombia,” Defence and Peace Economics 23, no. 2 (2012): 161–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2011.597239.101. Christopher F. Baum, Mark E. Schaffer, and Steven Stillman, “Enhanced Routines for Instrumental Variables/Generalized Method of Moments Estimation and Testing,” The Stata Journal 7, no. 4 (2007): 465–506.102. John D Sargan, “The Estimation of Economic Relationships Using Instrumental Variables,” Econometrica 26, no. 3 (1958): 393–415. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907619.103. Lars Peter Hansen, “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators,” Econometrica 50, no. 4 (1982): 1029–54. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912775.104. We use the endog option for the xtivreg2 command Schaffer, Mark E, “XTIVREG2: Stata Module to Perform Extended IV/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-Class Regression for Panel Data Models,” Statistical Software Components, 2020. https://ideas.repec.org//c/boc/bocode/s456501.html. written for Stata.105. For state bank deposits in the conflict-prone areas where the test statistic lies at the border with a p value equal to 0.084, province’s share of total defense spending would not work as an instrument since increased deterrence would lead to larger number of personnel who would get their salaries deposited in the state banks.106. Mehmet Gurses, “Environmental Consequences of Civil War: Evidence from the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey,” Civil Wars 14, no. 2 (2012): 254–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2012.679495.107. Brück et al., “Business under Fire,” 15.108. Barbara F. Walter, “Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 7 (2015): 1242–72.109. Bolanda Hewa Thilakaweera, Charles Harvie, and Amir Arjomandi, “Branch Expansion and Banking Efficiency in Sri Lanka’s Post‐conflict Era,” Journal of Asian Economics 47 (2016): 45–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2016.09.001.110. Guiso et al., “Social Capital Financial Development.”111. See Tony Addison, Alemayehu Geda, Philippe Le Billon, and S Mansoob Murshed, “Reconstructing and Reforming the Financial System in Conflict and ‘Post-Conflict’ Economies,” The Journal of Development Studies 41, no. 4 (2005): 703–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380500092861.112. Ayşegül Eruygur and Tolga Omay, “Terrorism and the Stock Market: A Case Study for Turkey Using STR Models,” Journal of Reviews on Global Economics 3 (2014): 220–27.Additional informationNotes on contributorsEmine ArıEmine Arı is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Bilkent University. She defended her dissertation on state of emergency and international conflict and cooperation at Koç University in August 2022. Her main research interests are civil conflict, terrorism, and political violence. Her research is now available in the Journal of Peace Research.Reşat BayerReşat Bayer is Associate Professor of International Relations at Koç University. His primary research interests are international cooperation and conflict, political violence, and peace within and between countries. His research has appeared in the British Journal of Political Science, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Peace Research, Public Choice, Globalizations, PS: Politics and Political Science, among other journals. He is also the data host of the Diplomatic Exchange data set of the Correlates of War project.Özge KemahlıoğluÖzge Kemahlıoğlu is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Sabancı University. Her research mainly focuses on party politics, sub-national governments, distributive politics, and incumbency advantage. Her single and co-authored articles on these topics appeared in Comparative Politics, Journal of Politics, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Latin American Politics and Society, South European Politics and Society, Swiss Political Science Review, Turkish Studies, and Public Choice. She is the author of Agents or Bosses? Patronage and Intra-party Politics in Argentina and Turkey, published in 2012.