China’s 21st Century Maritime Strategy

Abstract In less than three decades, the People’s Liberation Army Navy developed from a minor coastal-defence force into the largest naval force in the world. China’s rapid rise in seapower has gained significant attention from established naval circles, academia, and the public. In their efforts to explain this development, analysts have often referred to 19th-century naval history, seeking to connect China’s maritime developments to the ideas of influential naval strategists like Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. However, in doing so, these naval thinkers are often used to make a case about long-term developments or strategic implications regarding China’s alleged grand strategy. This paper seeks to turn this methodology around by solely focusing on the reflection of those naval theories—in their own right—against China’s maritime strategy. In doing so, it aims to historicise China’s 21st-century maritime strategy by testing to what extent it is reflected by the ideas of the navalists that are often presumed to influence Chinese strategic circles. It is argued that while on a grand-strategic level, Chinese strategic thinking seems to reflect the essence of Mahan’s seapower argument regarding its focus on the interconnectedness of maritime commerce and national power, a closer analysis reveals significant discrepancies in terms of both implementation and the broader strategic mindset regarding China’s geostrategic situation.