劳动法庭的法官偏见与公司绩效

IF 3.9 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Journal of the European Economic Association Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.1093/jeea/jvad046
Pierre Cahuca, Stéphane Carcillo, Berengere Patault, Flavien Moreau
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文论证了法官在给予不当解雇赔偿方面存在的差异,并表明其对小型低绩效企业的影响与对其他企业的影响不同。亲工人的判断偏见减少了所有公司创造的就业机会,增加了小型和低绩效公司永久性工作的破坏,但减少了大型高绩效公司的永久性工作。亲工人偏见减少了小型和低绩效公司的就业和生存,但对其他公司的这些结果没有显著影响。在由亲工人法官评判的公司里,长期在职员工保住工作的可能性在大公司和高绩效公司里增加,而在小公司和低绩效公司里减少。
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Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance
Abstract This paper documents the existence of judge-specific differences on granting compensation for wrongful dismissal and shows that their consequences are different for small low-performing firms than for other firms. Pro-worker judge bias reduces job creation for all firms, increases the destruction of permanent jobs in small and low-performing firms but reduces it in large high-performing firms. Pro-worker bias reduces employment and survival for small and low-performing firms but has no significant effects on these outcomes for the other firms. The probability that permanent incumbent workers keep their job in firms judged by a pro-worker judge increases in large and high-performing firms, while it decreases in small, poorly performing firms.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: Journal of the European Economic Association replaces the European Economic Review as the official journal of the association. JEEA publishes articles of the highest scientific quality and is an outlet for theoretical and empirical work with global relevance. The journal is committed to promoting the ambitions of the EEA: the development and application of economics as a science, as well as the communication and exchange between teachers, researchers and students in economics.
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