Pierre Cahuca, Stéphane Carcillo, Berengere Patault, Flavien Moreau
{"title":"劳动法庭的法官偏见与公司绩效","authors":"Pierre Cahuca, Stéphane Carcillo, Berengere Patault, Flavien Moreau","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad046","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper documents the existence of judge-specific differences on granting compensation for wrongful dismissal and shows that their consequences are different for small low-performing firms than for other firms. Pro-worker judge bias reduces job creation for all firms, increases the destruction of permanent jobs in small and low-performing firms but reduces it in large high-performing firms. Pro-worker bias reduces employment and survival for small and low-performing firms but has no significant effects on these outcomes for the other firms. The probability that permanent incumbent workers keep their job in firms judged by a pro-worker judge increases in large and high-performing firms, while it decreases in small, poorly performing firms.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":3.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance\",\"authors\":\"Pierre Cahuca, Stéphane Carcillo, Berengere Patault, Flavien Moreau\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/jeea/jvad046\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper documents the existence of judge-specific differences on granting compensation for wrongful dismissal and shows that their consequences are different for small low-performing firms than for other firms. Pro-worker judge bias reduces job creation for all firms, increases the destruction of permanent jobs in small and low-performing firms but reduces it in large high-performing firms. Pro-worker bias reduces employment and survival for small and low-performing firms but has no significant effects on these outcomes for the other firms. The probability that permanent incumbent workers keep their job in firms judged by a pro-worker judge increases in large and high-performing firms, while it decreases in small, poorly performing firms.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48297,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of the European Economic Association\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of the European Economic Association\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad046\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of the European Economic Association","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad046","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper documents the existence of judge-specific differences on granting compensation for wrongful dismissal and shows that their consequences are different for small low-performing firms than for other firms. Pro-worker judge bias reduces job creation for all firms, increases the destruction of permanent jobs in small and low-performing firms but reduces it in large high-performing firms. Pro-worker bias reduces employment and survival for small and low-performing firms but has no significant effects on these outcomes for the other firms. The probability that permanent incumbent workers keep their job in firms judged by a pro-worker judge increases in large and high-performing firms, while it decreases in small, poorly performing firms.
期刊介绍:
Journal of the European Economic Association replaces the European Economic Review as the official journal of the association. JEEA publishes articles of the highest scientific quality and is an outlet for theoretical and empirical work with global relevance. The journal is committed to promoting the ambitions of the EEA: the development and application of economics as a science, as well as the communication and exchange between teachers, researchers and students in economics.