Towards a Politicized Anatomy of Fundamental Disagreement

Fundamental disagreement is at the core of many debates surrounding epistemic relativism. Proponents of epistemic relativism argue that certain disagreements are irresolvable because proponents base their views on fundamentally different epistemic principles and, thus, fundamentally different epistemic systems. Critics of epistemic relativism argue that this analysis is wrong since the particular epistemic principles in question are most of the time derived from or instances of the same, more basic, epistemic principle. With regard to the individuation of epistemic systems, there is, thus, an impasse within the epistemic relativism literature. It is the aim of this article to employ the recently developed notion of ‘situated judgments’ as well as the concepts of ‘world-traveling’ and ‘epistemic friction’ to provide an epistemic agent-based, dynamic account of disagreeing and thereby also contribute to the question of how to individuate an epistemic system.