利益相关者冲突与标准制定基金会监督

IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107122
Amanda M. Convery , Matt Kaufman , Terry D. Warfield
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究考察了基金会监督权力作为一种独特的工具,用于维持会计专业的授权,以制定标准。先前的文献传统上侧重于标准制定委员会和围绕拟议会计准则的技术争论。我们研究财务会计基金会(FAF)是否可以通过行使其监督角色来管理利益相关者冲突并使有争议的活动合法化。本案例是对FAF的GASB权力范围项目的定性分析,该项目是FAF监督权力的罕见公开行使,尽管利益相关者在监督和标准制定之间的界限上存在分歧,但FAF仍应用了其权力。我们注意到FAF对标准制定正当程序的监督,而不是对拟议标准制定项目内容的监督。该政策将这一模糊边界上的私人咨询正式化,以保障董事会的自主权和授权。对FASB和其他有争议的会计问题(例如,围绕ESG报告的审议)的影响和优先级进行了讨论。
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Stakeholder conflict and standard-setting foundation oversight

This study examines foundation oversight authority as a distinct tool used to maintain the accounting profession’s delegated authority to set standards. Prior literature traditionally focuses on the standard-setting boards and technical arguments surrounding proposed accounting standards. We examine whether the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) can manage stakeholder conflict and legitimize contentious activity through exercise of its oversight role. The presented case is a qualitative analysis of the FAF’s GASB Scope of Authority project, a rare public exercise of FAF oversight authority, in which the FAF applied its authority despite stakeholder disagreement on the line between oversight and standard setting. We observe the FAF’s oversight of standard setting due process as opposed to the content of proposed standard setting projects. The policy formalizes private consultation at this blurred boundary to safeguard board autonomy and delegated authority. Implications and precedence for the FASB and other contentious accounting issues (e.g., deliberations around ESG reporting) are discussed.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.
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