Autocratization, Disaster Management, and the Politics of Public Administration in Turkey

AbstractWhile state culpability in compounding disasters is nothing new, in the aftermath of the recent earthquake in Turkey the extent of state dysfunction characterized by paralysis of the administrative institutions was unprecedented. Autocratization does not mesh well with effective disaster and crisis management, neither in theory nor in practice. Over the last two decades, rising competitive authoritarianism in the country has undermined accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency in Turkish governance structures, all of which are key factors that support risk reduction and disaster management. Relying on a conceptual and theoretical inquiry informed by the concepts of autocratic legalism and tailor-made laws, this case study argues that countries characterized by competitive authoritarianism are less effective in managing disasters, because they abuse state institutions for partisan goals, create disparities in access to public resources, and diminish accountability mechanisms. The elimination of democracy as a guiding principle in public-sector management is proving ever more disastrous as details concerning the response to the earthquake emerge. This analysis offers lessons and insights regarding the strategies that were used to sideline the bureaucracy and oversight processes.Keywords: Public administrationcorruptiondisaster managementautocratizationcase study Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The three largest mass trials of the period include the Ergenekon trials (2008–2016) targeting opposition lawyers, politicians, academics, journalists, and military officers; the Sledgehammer (Turkish: Balyoz) trial (2010–2012) targeting secular military officers; and KCK (Kurdish: Koma Civakên Kurdistanê) trials (2009–2012) targeting Kurdish politicians, journalists, and activists. Over the course of those years, under Ergenekon over 500 tried, 275 convicted; under Sledhehammer over 350 tried, 300 convicted; under KCK over 1500 tried. The trials were repeatedly condemned as unjust and politically motivated. See for example Filkins, Citation2013; Jenkins, Citation2019; Zanotti & Thomas, Citation2023.2 By July 2013, 50 people including several representatives of the Chamber of Architects and Engineers (TMMOB) were detained. The Gezi trial would go on to continue over several convoluted political prosecutions for years, until lengthy sentences were handed out in 2022. For example, architect Mücella Yapıcı, the secretary general of the Environmental Impact Assessment Department of the TMMOB, alongside many others, is currently serving an 18-year sentence. Philanthropist Osman Kavala, accused of aiding and funding the protest, spent more than 4 years in prison without being convicted and later sentenced to life in prison without parole for charges related to the coup attempt. The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), Freedom House, PEN America, and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) referred to the Gezi Park verdicts as a “travesty of justice” in their joint statement (see Freedom House (2022, April 26). Turkey’s Gezi Trial Verdict a Travesty of Justice. Joint statement with the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), PEN America, and Reporters Without Borders (RSF). https://freedomhouse.org/article/turkeys-gezi-trial-verdict-travesty-justice).