无悔学习支持选民的能力

IF 1.4 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-09-11 DOI:10.1080/02691728.2023.2252763
Petr Spelda, Vit Stritecky, John Symons
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引用次数: 0

摘要

民主的程序理由强调包容性和尊重,这样做会与依赖选民能力的工具理由发生冲突。这种冲突引发了对陪审团定理的质疑,并使其在民主理论中的地位受到质疑。我们表明,一种称为元归纳的无悔学习可以帮助满足能力假设,而不会先验地排除选民或不同的意见领袖。元归纳法根据意见领袖过去的预测表现为其分配权重,以确定其在选民推荐中的包含程度。该权重将元归纳的表现与后见之明的最佳意见领袖之间的差异最小化。这种差异代表了元归纳的遗憾,其最小化确保了推荐在支持选民能力方面是最优的。元归纳具有最佳的真相追踪特性,即使它是错误/虚假信息的目标,也可以支持选民的能力,应该被视为支持超多元民主的工具。
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No-Regret Learning Supports Voters’ Competence
Procedural justifications of democracy emphasize inclusiveness and respect and by doing so come into conflict with instrumental justifications that depend on voters’ competence. This conflict raises questions about jury theorems and makes their standing in democratic theory contested. We show that a type of no-regret learning called meta-induction can help to satisfy the competence assumption without excluding voters or diverse opinion leaders on an a priori basis. Meta-induction assigns weights to opinion leaders based on their past predictive performance to determine the level of their inclusion in recommendations for voters. The weighting minimizes the difference between the performance of meta-induction and the best opinion leader in hindsight. The difference represents the regret of meta-induction whose minimization ensures that the recommendations are optimal in supporting voters’ competence. Meta-induction has optimal truth-tracking properties that support voters’ competence even if it is targeted by mis/disinformation and should be considered a tool for supporting democracy in hyper-plurality.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
17.60%
发文量
60
期刊介绍: Social Epistemology provides a forum for philosophical and social scientific enquiry that incorporates the work of scholars from a variety of disciplines who share a concern with the production, assessment and validation of knowledge. The journal covers both empirical research into the origination and transmission of knowledge and normative considerations which arise as such research is implemented, serving as a guide for directing contemporary knowledge enterprises. Social Epistemology publishes "exchanges" which are the collective product of several contributors and take the form of critical syntheses, open peer commentaries interviews, applications, provocations, reviews and responses
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