{"title":"如何不确保公众对科学的信任:代表性价值观与两极分化和边缘化","authors":"Soazig Le Bihan","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.119","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The demise of the value-free ideal constitutes a threat to public trust in science. One proposal is that whenever making value judgments, scientists rely only on democratic values. Since the influence of democratic values on scientific claims and recommendations is legitimate, public trust in science is warranted. I challenge this proposal. Appealing to democratic values will not suffice to secure trust because of at least two obstacles: polarization and marginalization.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How to Not Secure Public Trust in Science: Representative Values v. Polarization and Marginalization\",\"authors\":\"Soazig Le Bihan\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/psa.2023.119\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract The demise of the value-free ideal constitutes a threat to public trust in science. One proposal is that whenever making value judgments, scientists rely only on democratic values. Since the influence of democratic values on scientific claims and recommendations is legitimate, public trust in science is warranted. I challenge this proposal. Appealing to democratic values will not suffice to secure trust because of at least two obstacles: polarization and marginalization.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54620,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.119\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.119","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
How to Not Secure Public Trust in Science: Representative Values v. Polarization and Marginalization
Abstract The demise of the value-free ideal constitutes a threat to public trust in science. One proposal is that whenever making value judgments, scientists rely only on democratic values. Since the influence of democratic values on scientific claims and recommendations is legitimate, public trust in science is warranted. I challenge this proposal. Appealing to democratic values will not suffice to secure trust because of at least two obstacles: polarization and marginalization.
期刊介绍：
Since its inception in 1934, Philosophy of Science, along with its sponsoring society, the Philosophy of Science Association, has been dedicated to the furthering of studies and free discussion from diverse standpoints in the philosophy of science. The journal contains essays, discussion articles, and book reviews.
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