基于双池的最优说服

IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.3982/te4663
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Takuro Yamashita
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引用次数: 3

摘要

保持均值的收缩对于研究贝叶斯信息设计模型至关重要。我们引入了一类双池策略,以及一类双池分布作为它们在后端的诱导分布。我们证明了在一个区间内任意给定先验的所有均值保持收缩集合中的每个极值点都采用双池化分布的形式。通过暗示,每个具有区间状态空间的贝叶斯说服问题都承认一个最优双池化分布作为解,反过来,对于每个双池化分布,存在一个贝叶斯说服问题,该分布是唯一解。
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Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling
Mean‐preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of bi‐pooling policies , and the class of bi‐pooling distributions as their induced distributions over posteriors. We show that every extreme point in the set of all mean‐preserving contractions of any given prior over an interval takes the form of a bi‐pooling distribution. By implication, every Bayesian persuasion problem with an interval state space admits an optimal bi‐pooling distribution as a solution, and conversely, for every bi‐pooling distribution, there is a Bayesian persuasion problem for which that distribution is the unique solution.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.90%
发文量
35
审稿时长
52 weeks
期刊介绍: Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index
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