Prabashi Dharmasiri, Mukesh Garg, Anthony Ng, Supardi Supardi
{"title":"自我牺牲还是空洞的象征:对1美元ceo的研究","authors":"Prabashi Dharmasiri, Mukesh Garg, Anthony Ng, Supardi Supardi","doi":"10.1111/acfi.13183","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine whether CEOs' voluntary acceptance of a $1 salary is a credible signal of sacrifice. We find that firms with $1 salary CEOs are: (i) more likely to be associated with income‐increasing accrual‐based earnings management; (ii) less likely to use real earnings management; and (iii) more likely to engage in corporate tax avoidance. Our results indicate that this performance enhancement is driven by the motivation to restore salaries to their original levels. Our results suggest that extreme salary sacrifice could indicate an empty promise to improve firm performance and should be considered cautiously by investors and regulators.","PeriodicalId":47973,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and Finance","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Self‐sacrifice or empty symbolism: A study of $1 <scp>CEOs</scp>\",\"authors\":\"Prabashi Dharmasiri, Mukesh Garg, Anthony Ng, Supardi Supardi\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/acfi.13183\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract We examine whether CEOs' voluntary acceptance of a $1 salary is a credible signal of sacrifice. We find that firms with $1 salary CEOs are: (i) more likely to be associated with income‐increasing accrual‐based earnings management; (ii) less likely to use real earnings management; and (iii) more likely to engage in corporate tax avoidance. Our results indicate that this performance enhancement is driven by the motivation to restore salaries to their original levels. Our results suggest that extreme salary sacrifice could indicate an empty promise to improve firm performance and should be considered cautiously by investors and regulators.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47973,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Accounting and Finance\",\"volume\":\"52 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Accounting and Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.13183\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Accounting and Finance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.13183","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Self‐sacrifice or empty symbolism: A study of $1 CEOs
Abstract We examine whether CEOs' voluntary acceptance of a $1 salary is a credible signal of sacrifice. We find that firms with $1 salary CEOs are: (i) more likely to be associated with income‐increasing accrual‐based earnings management; (ii) less likely to use real earnings management; and (iii) more likely to engage in corporate tax avoidance. Our results indicate that this performance enhancement is driven by the motivation to restore salaries to their original levels. Our results suggest that extreme salary sacrifice could indicate an empty promise to improve firm performance and should be considered cautiously by investors and regulators.
期刊介绍:
Accounting & Finance enjoys an excellent reputation as an academic journal that publishes articles addressing significant research questions from a broad range of perspectives. The journal: • publishes significant contributions to the accounting, finance, business information systems and related disciplines • develops, tests, or advances accounting, finance and information systems theory, research and practice • publishes theoretical, empirical and experimental papers that significantly contribute to the disciplines of accounting and finance • publishes articles using a wide range of research methods including statistical analysis, analytical work, case studies, field research and historical analysis • applies economic, organizational and other theories to accounting and finance phenomena and publishes occasional special issues on themes such as on research methods in management accounting. Accounting & Finance is essential reading for academics, graduate students and all those interested in research in accounting and finance. The journal is also widely read by practitioners in accounting, corporate finance, investments, and merchant and investment banking.