自我牺牲还是空洞的象征:对1美元ceo的研究

IF 3.1 4区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Accounting and Finance Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI:10.1111/acfi.13183
Prabashi Dharmasiri, Mukesh Garg, Anthony Ng, Supardi Supardi
{"title":"自我牺牲还是空洞的象征:对1美元ceo的研究","authors":"Prabashi Dharmasiri, Mukesh Garg, Anthony Ng, Supardi Supardi","doi":"10.1111/acfi.13183","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine whether CEOs' voluntary acceptance of a $1 salary is a credible signal of sacrifice. We find that firms with $1 salary CEOs are: (i) more likely to be associated with income‐increasing accrual‐based earnings management; (ii) less likely to use real earnings management; and (iii) more likely to engage in corporate tax avoidance. Our results indicate that this performance enhancement is driven by the motivation to restore salaries to their original levels. Our results suggest that extreme salary sacrifice could indicate an empty promise to improve firm performance and should be considered cautiously by investors and regulators.","PeriodicalId":47973,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and Finance","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Self‐sacrifice or empty symbolism: A study of $1 <scp>CEOs</scp>\",\"authors\":\"Prabashi Dharmasiri, Mukesh Garg, Anthony Ng, Supardi Supardi\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/acfi.13183\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract We examine whether CEOs' voluntary acceptance of a $1 salary is a credible signal of sacrifice. We find that firms with $1 salary CEOs are: (i) more likely to be associated with income‐increasing accrual‐based earnings management; (ii) less likely to use real earnings management; and (iii) more likely to engage in corporate tax avoidance. Our results indicate that this performance enhancement is driven by the motivation to restore salaries to their original levels. Our results suggest that extreme salary sacrifice could indicate an empty promise to improve firm performance and should be considered cautiously by investors and regulators.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47973,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Accounting and Finance\",\"volume\":\"52 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Accounting and Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.13183\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Accounting and Finance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.13183","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文研究了ceo自愿接受1美元工资是否是一个可信的牺牲信号。我们发现,ceo薪酬为1美元的公司:(i)更有可能与收入增加的权责发生制盈余管理相关联;(ii)不太可能采用真实盈余管理;(三)更有可能参与企业避税。我们的研究结果表明,这种绩效提升是由工资恢复到原来水平的动机驱动的。我们的研究结果表明,极端的薪酬牺牲可能意味着提高公司绩效的空头承诺,投资者和监管机构应谨慎考虑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Self‐sacrifice or empty symbolism: A study of $1 CEOs
Abstract We examine whether CEOs' voluntary acceptance of a $1 salary is a credible signal of sacrifice. We find that firms with $1 salary CEOs are: (i) more likely to be associated with income‐increasing accrual‐based earnings management; (ii) less likely to use real earnings management; and (iii) more likely to engage in corporate tax avoidance. Our results indicate that this performance enhancement is driven by the motivation to restore salaries to their original levels. Our results suggest that extreme salary sacrifice could indicate an empty promise to improve firm performance and should be considered cautiously by investors and regulators.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Accounting and Finance
Accounting and Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
7.70%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Accounting & Finance enjoys an excellent reputation as an academic journal that publishes articles addressing significant research questions from a broad range of perspectives. The journal: • publishes significant contributions to the accounting, finance, business information systems and related disciplines • develops, tests, or advances accounting, finance and information systems theory, research and practice • publishes theoretical, empirical and experimental papers that significantly contribute to the disciplines of accounting and finance • publishes articles using a wide range of research methods including statistical analysis, analytical work, case studies, field research and historical analysis • applies economic, organizational and other theories to accounting and finance phenomena and publishes occasional special issues on themes such as on research methods in management accounting. Accounting & Finance is essential reading for academics, graduate students and all those interested in research in accounting and finance. The journal is also widely read by practitioners in accounting, corporate finance, investments, and merchant and investment banking.
期刊最新文献
Allocation of decision‐making power and labour income share in listed companies: Evidence from China How do big customers influence bank loans in China? The role of state ownership and political connections ESG, financial constraint and financing activities: A study in the Chinese market Affect and reason in uncertain accounting settings: The case of capital investment appraisal Corporate sexual orientation equality and carbon emission
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1