IN THE NAME OF THE STATUS QUO: THE U.S. AND THE PROBLEM OF KOREAN REUNIFICATION IN 1955–1966

The article examines the U.S. approaches to the Korean question in the decade between the failure of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the entry into force of the U.S.–South Korea mutual defense treaty and the establishment of a new status quo in the region, and the beginning of the conflict in the Korean DMZ of 1966–1969. During this period, the Americans insisted that only the Republic of Korea, established in 1948 with the direct UN involvement, was the only legitimate regime on the peninsula. They allowed Korean unification only in the format of North Korea's accession to the Republic of Korea. The evolution of American policy in the region in the context of the change of political regimes in the south of the country and the transformation of North Korean tactics to restore the territorial unity of Korea are discussed. In general, during the period under review, the Americans quite effectively resisted the DPRK's attempts to put the issue of restoring Korean unity on the international agenda in a constructive way. The UN acted as a tool for legitimizing the U.S. military presence in the region, while the Korean Unification and Restoration Commission in fact merely broadcasted South Korea’s official point of view on events. On the other hand, the contradictions between real U.S. policy and Washington's articulated support for Korean unity discredited the American position in the eyes of the southerners. The Communists did not doze off, systematically working to strengthen their position in the UN. Under these circumstances, by the second half of the 1960s, the U.S. position on the Korean issue at the UN was in dire need of modernization.