{"title":"先发劣势:主权评级的捕鼠器","authors":"Patrycja Klusak, Moritz Kraemer, Huong Vu","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12155","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using 102 sovereigns rated by the three largest credit rating agencies (CRA), S&P, Moody's and Fitch between January 2000 and January 2019, we document that the first-mover CRA (S&P) in downgrades falls into a commercial trap. Namely, each sovereign downgrade by one notch by the first-mover CRA (S&P) results in 2.4% increase in the probability of a rating contract being cancelled by the sovereign client. The more downgrades S&P makes in a given month, the more their sovereign rating coverage falls relative to its rivals. Our results are more pronounced for downgrades on small sovereign borrowers than on large sovereign borrowers. This paper explores the interaction between three themes of the literature: herding behaviour amongst CRAs, issues of conflict of interest and ratings quality. Our empirical evidence gives credence to, and underscores the need for sovereign ratings to be made in an impartial way and independent of their commercial ramifications elsewhere in the CRA.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"31 1","pages":"3-44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fmii.12155","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"First-mover disadvantage: the sovereign ratings mousetrap\",\"authors\":\"Patrycja Klusak, Moritz Kraemer, Huong Vu\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/fmii.12155\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Using 102 sovereigns rated by the three largest credit rating agencies (CRA), S&P, Moody's and Fitch between January 2000 and January 2019, we document that the first-mover CRA (S&P) in downgrades falls into a commercial trap. Namely, each sovereign downgrade by one notch by the first-mover CRA (S&P) results in 2.4% increase in the probability of a rating contract being cancelled by the sovereign client. The more downgrades S&P makes in a given month, the more their sovereign rating coverage falls relative to its rivals. Our results are more pronounced for downgrades on small sovereign borrowers than on large sovereign borrowers. This paper explores the interaction between three themes of the literature: herding behaviour amongst CRAs, issues of conflict of interest and ratings quality. Our empirical evidence gives credence to, and underscores the need for sovereign ratings to be made in an impartial way and independent of their commercial ramifications elsewhere in the CRA.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":39670,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"3-44\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fmii.12155\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fmii.12155\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Economics, Econometrics and Finance\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fmii.12155","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}
First-mover disadvantage: the sovereign ratings mousetrap
Using 102 sovereigns rated by the three largest credit rating agencies (CRA), S&P, Moody's and Fitch between January 2000 and January 2019, we document that the first-mover CRA (S&P) in downgrades falls into a commercial trap. Namely, each sovereign downgrade by one notch by the first-mover CRA (S&P) results in 2.4% increase in the probability of a rating contract being cancelled by the sovereign client. The more downgrades S&P makes in a given month, the more their sovereign rating coverage falls relative to its rivals. Our results are more pronounced for downgrades on small sovereign borrowers than on large sovereign borrowers. This paper explores the interaction between three themes of the literature: herding behaviour amongst CRAs, issues of conflict of interest and ratings quality. Our empirical evidence gives credence to, and underscores the need for sovereign ratings to be made in an impartial way and independent of their commercial ramifications elsewhere in the CRA.
期刊介绍:
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments bridges the gap between the academic and professional finance communities. With contributions from leading academics, as well as practitioners from organizations such as the SEC and the Federal Reserve, the journal is equally relevant to both groups. Each issue is devoted to a single topic, which is examined in depth, and a special fifth issue is published annually highlighting the most significant developments in money and banking, derivative securities, corporate finance, and fixed-income securities.