群体性

IF 3.9 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Journal of the European Economic Association Pub Date : 2023-12-01 DOI:10.1093/jeea/jvad072
Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Dagmara Celik Katreniak, Julie Chytilová, Lubomír Cingl, Tomáš Želinský
{"title":"群体性","authors":"Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Dagmara Celik Katreniak, Julie Chytilová, Lubomír Cingl, Tomáš Želinský","doi":"10.1093/jeea/jvad072","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides evidence showing that people are more prone to engage in nasty behavior, malevolently causing _nancial harm to other people at own costs, when they make decisions in a group context rather than when making choices individually on their own. We establish this behavioral regularity in a series of large-scale experiments among university students, adolescents, and nationally representative samples of adults – more than ten thousand subjects in total. We test several potential mechanisms, and the results suggest that individual nasty inclinations are systematically more likely to affect behavior when decisions are made under the “cover” of a group, i.e., in a group decision-context that creates a perception of diffused responsibility.","PeriodicalId":48297,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the European Economic Association","volume":" 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Nastiness in Groups\",\"authors\":\"Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Dagmara Celik Katreniak, Julie Chytilová, Lubomír Cingl, Tomáš Želinský\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/jeea/jvad072\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper provides evidence showing that people are more prone to engage in nasty behavior, malevolently causing _nancial harm to other people at own costs, when they make decisions in a group context rather than when making choices individually on their own. We establish this behavioral regularity in a series of large-scale experiments among university students, adolescents, and nationally representative samples of adults – more than ten thousand subjects in total. We test several potential mechanisms, and the results suggest that individual nasty inclinations are systematically more likely to affect behavior when decisions are made under the “cover” of a group, i.e., in a group decision-context that creates a perception of diffused responsibility.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48297,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of the European Economic Association\",\"volume\":\" 2\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of the European Economic Association\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad072\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of the European Economic Association","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad072","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

这篇论文提供的证据表明,当人们在群体环境中做决定时,而不是单独做决定时,他们更容易做出恶劣的行为,以自己的代价恶意地给他人造成经济上的伤害。我们通过一系列大规模的实验,在大学生、青少年和全国代表性的成年人样本中建立了这种行为规律——总共有一万多名受试者。我们测试了几种潜在的机制,结果表明,当决策在群体的“掩护”下做出时,即在群体决策的背景下,创造了一种分散责任的感知,个人的恶劣倾向更有可能系统性地影响行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Nastiness in Groups
This paper provides evidence showing that people are more prone to engage in nasty behavior, malevolently causing _nancial harm to other people at own costs, when they make decisions in a group context rather than when making choices individually on their own. We establish this behavioral regularity in a series of large-scale experiments among university students, adolescents, and nationally representative samples of adults – more than ten thousand subjects in total. We test several potential mechanisms, and the results suggest that individual nasty inclinations are systematically more likely to affect behavior when decisions are made under the “cover” of a group, i.e., in a group decision-context that creates a perception of diffused responsibility.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: Journal of the European Economic Association replaces the European Economic Review as the official journal of the association. JEEA publishes articles of the highest scientific quality and is an outlet for theoretical and empirical work with global relevance. The journal is committed to promoting the ambitions of the EEA: the development and application of economics as a science, as well as the communication and exchange between teachers, researchers and students in economics.
期刊最新文献
Life Out of the Shadows: The Impacts of Regularization Programs on the Lives of Forced Migrants Social Capital, Government Expenditures and Growth Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games Sme Failures Under Large Liquidity Shocks: an Application to the Covid-19 Crisis The Making of Social Democracy: The Economic and Electoral Consequences of Norway’s 1936 Folk School Reform
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1