金融危机的信息观

IF 5 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Annual Review of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-01 DOI:10.1146/annurev-financial-110118-123041
Tri Vi Dang,Gary Gorton,Bengt Holmström
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引用次数: 0

摘要

可以作为交换媒介的短期债务被设计成对信息不敏感。任何人都不应被引诱去获取私人信息,以便在可能破坏债务价值稳定的交易中获得信息优势。短期债务将获取同一基础资产支持的所有同等价值证券之间信息的动机降至最低。此外,以债务支持短期债务(即,使用债务作为抵押品)将所有类型的同等价值抵押品的信息敏感性降至最低。这些特征与周期性发生的金融危机是一致的。在这里采用的信息观点中,当支持短期债务的抵押品被认为已经失去了足够的价值,从而引起交易者怀疑一些人可能会获得私人信息时,金融危机就会发生。在危机中,债务从信息不敏感转变为信息敏感。
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The Information View of Financial Crises
Short-term debt that can serve as a medium of exchange is designed to be information insensitive. No one should be tempted to acquire private information to gain an informational advantage in trading that could destabilize the value of the debt. Short-term debt minimizes the incentive to acquire information among all securities of equal value backed by the same underlying asset. Moreover, backing short-term debt with debt (i.e., using debt as collateral) minimizes information sensitivity across all types of collateral with equal value. These features are consistent with financial crises occurring periodically. In the information view adopted here, a financial crisis can occur when the collateral backing the short-term debt is thought to have lost enough value to raise doubts among the traders that some may acquire private information. In a crisis, there is a shift from information-insensitive to information-sensitive debt.
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26
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