共有人的介入

IF 1.3 4区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Competition Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-03-23 DOI:10.1093/joclec/nhab006
Nathan Shekita
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引用次数: 0

摘要

当投资者同时持有相关公司的部分和重要股份时,就存在共同所有权。在本文中,我汇编、记录并分类了30个独立的干预案例,以证明共同所有者如何影响公司行为。虽然以前的文献已经确定了共同所有权与产品市场结果之间的联系,但批评者质疑共同所有者改变投资组合公司行为的能力和动机。辩论中缺少的是可观察到的共同所有者的干预以及共同所有者行使其影响力的机制。本文从媒体报道、监管程序、政策团体和年度管理报告中收集相关案例研究,以揭示这些渠道。
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Interventions by Common Owners
Common ownership exists when investors concurrently hold partial and significant shares in related firms. In this paper, I compile, document, and taxonomize 30 separate cases of intervention to demonstrate how common owners influence firm behavior. Although previous literature has identified a link between common ownership and product market outcomes, critics have questioned a common owner’s ability and incentive to alter the behavior of portfolio firms. Missing from the debate are observable interventions from common owners and the mechanisms through which common owners exercise their influence. This paper compiles relevant case studies from media coverage, regulatory proceedings, policy groups, and annual stewardship reports to uncover these channels.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
26.70%
发文量
16
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