The “Legality” of Necessity in the State of Exception

In response to extreme conditions, government endowed with extraordinary powers in the form of a state of exception, released from the norms of a rule of law legal order, has been accepted as a modern political institution with an essential role in safeguarding democracy. It is only then, that a democratic government may achieve effective measures necessary to best address the extremities unfolding. The lack of public law theory legitimizing such an institution, alongside the heavy reliance on the medieval principle necessitas legem non habet as the institution’s theoretic premise, prompt contemporary theorist Giorgio Agamben to question the role of the state of exception within modern democracy. This paper will first present how Agamben grounds the state of exception to the concept of necessity, tracing the theory of necessity to its apparent European origin, in the writings of Gratian and Thomas Aquinas. Then, this paper will focus on divergent interpretations of necessity drawn from the halls of the Swiss Federal Palace, whilst discussing the fate of recent state of exceptions. These divergent interpretations of necessity, namely by Ernest Paul Graber and Robert Grimm, both historic members of the Swiss Federal Assembly, indicate how necessity may be interpreted in different ways. Finally, this paper will question the extent to which this parallel relationship, between the state of exception and the concept of necessity, may undermine a democratic rule of law legal order.