{"title":"史密斯先生去平地:机构、公共政策和无老板公司","authors":"Matthew McCaffrey","doi":"10.1108/jepp-10-2022-0102","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Purpose</h3>\n<p>This study aims to explore a range of institutional, environmental and policy conditions that influence the creation of “bossless” or “flat” companies, i.e. firms with little or no formal hierarchy.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Design/methodology/approach</h3>\n<p>The author builds on the theory and evidence presented by Foss and Klein (2022) in their study of the costs and benefits of organizing without hierarchy. The author also draws on a variety of related theoretical insights and empirical evidence. The paper is exploratory and anecdotal though and is intended to motivate further research rather than provide a definitive account of bossless organizing.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Findings</h3>\n<p>The paper develops nine propositions. It suggests that high levels of economic freedom create maximum scope for entrepreneurs to experiment with different organizational forms (1). Likewise, a lack of economic freedom increases the scope for the government to experiment (2). Markets characterized by technological innovation and uncertainty are likely to discourage bossless organizing (3 and 4), while stagnating industries with major capital requirements are likely to encourage it (5). Labor market interventions that increase the cost of employment contracts sometimes encourage firms to flatten (6), but more generally, these interventions encourage expanding management layers (7). In environments with strong intellectual property (IP) laws, companies with more modular and knowledge-based work are more likely to flatten (8). The creation of low-hierarchy firms such as cooperatives is encouraged by public subsidies, access to cheap credit and preferential tax treatment (9).</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Originality/value</h3>\n<p>Studies of bossless or flat firms focus almost exclusively on describing their internal organization and evaluating their performance; little attention is paid to the conditions that encourage or discourage the emergence of these firms. This paper focuses on the latter, with a view to encouraging more scholarly interest in this field.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->","PeriodicalId":44503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mr. Smith goes to flatland: institutions, public policy and the bossless company\",\"authors\":\"Matthew McCaffrey\",\"doi\":\"10.1108/jepp-10-2022-0102\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<h3>Purpose</h3>\\n<p>This study aims to explore a range of institutional, environmental and policy conditions that influence the creation of “bossless” or “flat” companies, i.e. firms with little or no formal hierarchy.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\\n<h3>Design/methodology/approach</h3>\\n<p>The author builds on the theory and evidence presented by Foss and Klein (2022) in their study of the costs and benefits of organizing without hierarchy. The author also draws on a variety of related theoretical insights and empirical evidence. The paper is exploratory and anecdotal though and is intended to motivate further research rather than provide a definitive account of bossless organizing.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\\n<h3>Findings</h3>\\n<p>The paper develops nine propositions. It suggests that high levels of economic freedom create maximum scope for entrepreneurs to experiment with different organizational forms (1). Likewise, a lack of economic freedom increases the scope for the government to experiment (2). Markets characterized by technological innovation and uncertainty are likely to discourage bossless organizing (3 and 4), while stagnating industries with major capital requirements are likely to encourage it (5). Labor market interventions that increase the cost of employment contracts sometimes encourage firms to flatten (6), but more generally, these interventions encourage expanding management layers (7). In environments with strong intellectual property (IP) laws, companies with more modular and knowledge-based work are more likely to flatten (8). The creation of low-hierarchy firms such as cooperatives is encouraged by public subsidies, access to cheap credit and preferential tax treatment (9).</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\\n<h3>Originality/value</h3>\\n<p>Studies of bossless or flat firms focus almost exclusively on describing their internal organization and evaluating their performance; little attention is paid to the conditions that encourage or discourage the emergence of these firms. This paper focuses on the latter, with a view to encouraging more scholarly interest in this field.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\",\"PeriodicalId\":44503,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1108/jepp-10-2022-0102\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/jepp-10-2022-0102","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Mr. Smith goes to flatland: institutions, public policy and the bossless company
Purpose
This study aims to explore a range of institutional, environmental and policy conditions that influence the creation of “bossless” or “flat” companies, i.e. firms with little or no formal hierarchy.
Design/methodology/approach
The author builds on the theory and evidence presented by Foss and Klein (2022) in their study of the costs and benefits of organizing without hierarchy. The author also draws on a variety of related theoretical insights and empirical evidence. The paper is exploratory and anecdotal though and is intended to motivate further research rather than provide a definitive account of bossless organizing.
Findings
The paper develops nine propositions. It suggests that high levels of economic freedom create maximum scope for entrepreneurs to experiment with different organizational forms (1). Likewise, a lack of economic freedom increases the scope for the government to experiment (2). Markets characterized by technological innovation and uncertainty are likely to discourage bossless organizing (3 and 4), while stagnating industries with major capital requirements are likely to encourage it (5). Labor market interventions that increase the cost of employment contracts sometimes encourage firms to flatten (6), but more generally, these interventions encourage expanding management layers (7). In environments with strong intellectual property (IP) laws, companies with more modular and knowledge-based work are more likely to flatten (8). The creation of low-hierarchy firms such as cooperatives is encouraged by public subsidies, access to cheap credit and preferential tax treatment (9).
Originality/value
Studies of bossless or flat firms focus almost exclusively on describing their internal organization and evaluating their performance; little attention is paid to the conditions that encourage or discourage the emergence of these firms. This paper focuses on the latter, with a view to encouraging more scholarly interest in this field.
期刊介绍:
Institutions – especially public policies – are a significant determinant of economic outcomes; entrepreneurship and enterprise development are often the channel by which public policies affect economic outcomes, and by which outcomes feed back to the policy process. The Journal of Entrepreneurship & Public Policy (JEPP) was created to encourage and disseminate quality research about these vital relationships. The ultimate aim is to improve the quality of the political discourse about entrepreneurship and development policies. JEPP publishes two issues per year and welcomes: Empirically oriented academic papers and accepts a wide variety of empirical evidence. Generally, the journal considers any analysis based on real-world circumstances and conditions that can change behaviour, legislation, or outcomes, Conceptual or theoretical papers that indicate a direction for future research, or otherwise advance the field of study, A limited number of carefully and accurately executed replication studies, Book reviews. In general, JEPP seeks high-quality articles that say something interesting about the relationships among public policy and entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship and economic development, or all three areas. Scope/Coverage: Entrepreneurship, Public policy, Public policies and behaviour of economic agents, Interjurisdictional differentials and their effects, Law and entrepreneurship, New firms; startups, Microeconomic analyses of economic development, Development planning and policy, Innovation and invention: processes and incentives, Regional economic activity: growth, development, and changes, Regional development policy.