美德与人工智能

Derek C. Schuurman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文探讨了人工智能与美德的两个问题。第一个问题是人工智能是否有能力获得美德,第二个问题是人工智能是否能够帮助人类获得美德。有人认为,人工智能不可能是一个道德的主体,因此不可能真正有道德。然而,人工智能可以执行与良性行为相一致的行为。引入了“代理美德”的概念,其中善良的程序员可以努力设计人工智能程序,训练它们模仿某些美德或按照美德行事。其次,有人认为,由于人工智能系统可以推动人类重复的做法和习惯,它们将不可避免地塑造和形成用户。因此,人工智能系统可能被设计成帮助人类形成美德;同样,他们也可能被误导去鼓励某些恶习。最后,基督教传统中的美德概念与世俗的美德概念形成对比,并用于告知人工智能在美德形成中的作用的限制。
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Virtue and Artificial Intelligence
Two questions concerning artificial intelligence (AI) and virtue are explored. The first question is whether AI is capable of virtue, and the second question explores if AI can assist humans in the acquisition of virtue. It is argued that AI cannot be a moral agent and therefore cannot genuinely be virtuous. However, AI can perform behaviors that are in accordance with virtuous behavior. The notion of "virtue-by-proxy" is introduced in which virtuous programmers can strive to design AI programs that are trained to mimic certain virtues or behave in accordance with virtue. Next, it is argued that since AI systems can nudge humans toward repeated practices and habits, they will inevitably shape and form users. Thus, AI systems might be designed to assist humans with virtue formation; likewise, they could be misdirected to encourage certain vices. Finally, the concept of virtue in the Christian tradition is contrasted with secular notions of virtue and is used to inform limits on the role of AI in virtue formation.
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