The power of framing: The role of information provision in promoting whistleblowing

Whistleblowing policies are seldom effective in inducing civil servants to report misconduct. While current literature focusses more upon the identification of the chief factors that prevent witnesses from reporting, it overlooks potentially effective strategies to stimulate active behavior. In particular, it neglects the framing and impact of information provision. According to the prospect theory, information that frames the consequences of non-reporting as negative is more effective in enhancing the intention to report misconduct, as opposed to information that frames the consequences of reporting as positive. This study tested these propositions through an online survey experiment targeted at the civil servants of a major European city. We exposed participants to four different frames of economic and psychological consequences of reporting wrongdoing, in order to analyze the impact of various frames upon participants' reporting intentions. The results of this study confirm the relevance of the prospect theory and clearly indicate how the presentation of information affects active behavior.