高效理性预期的战略基础

IF 5.9 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI:10.1093/restud/rdad116
Paulo Barelli, S. Govindan, Robert Wilson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究的是一种有交易者的经济,这些交易者的报酬是准线性的,而且他们的私人信号对一个未观察到的状态参数具有参考价值。极限经济有无限多的交易者,他们被划分为一组有限的对称类别,称为类型。当且仅当有效分配具有单调性时,包括拍卖在内的一类市场机制会产生与瓦尔拉斯理性预期均衡相同的结果。举例说明两者不同的情况。单调性限制了交易者类型之间的异质性。
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Strategic Foundations of Efficient Rational Expectations
We study an economy with traders whose payoffs are quasilinear and whose private signals are informative about an unobserved state parameter. The limit economy has infinitely many traders partitioned into a finite set of symmetry classes called types. Market mechanisms in a class that includes auctions yield the same outcome as the Walrasian rational expectations equilibrium if and only if the efficient allocation has a monotonicity property. Examples illustrate cases where they differ. Monotonicity restricts the heterogeneity among traders’ types.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.40
自引率
3.40%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: Founded in 1933 by a group of young British and American economists, The Review of Economic Studies aims to encourage research in theoretical and applied economics, especially by young economists. Today it is widely recognised as one of the core top-five economics journals. The Review is essential reading for economists and has a reputation for publishing path-breaking papers in theoretical and applied economics. The Review is committed to continuing to publish strong papers in all areas of economics. The Editors aim to provide an efficient and high-quality review process to the Review''s authors. Where articles are sent out for full review, authors receive careful reports and feedback. Since 1989 The Review has held annual May Meetings to offer young students in economics and finance the chance to present their research to audiences in Europe.
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