{"title":"无策略的对象分配：表征结果","authors":"Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 1-5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489623001038/pdfft?md5=bc4467fdedc7062bd578e1c3b0ee345a&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489623001038-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result\",\"authors\":\"Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51118,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Mathematical Social Sciences\",\"volume\":\"128 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 1-5\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489623001038/pdfft?md5=bc4467fdedc7062bd578e1c3b0ee345a&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489623001038-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Mathematical Social Sciences\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489623001038\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mathematical Social Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489623001038","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result
This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.
期刊介绍：
The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences.
Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models.
Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.
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