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引用次数: 0
摘要
新创企业如何在同时面临委托问题和代理问题的情况下提高绩效，这是一个重要但研究不足的问题。本研究探讨了首席执行官双重身份在缓解委托人问题和提高创业成功率方面的有效性。首席执行官双重身份赋予首席执行官更多权力，可以缓解委托人问题；但首席执行官双重身份可能同时加剧首席执行官的代理问题。利用人工收集的 1403 家新成立的美国商业银行的面板数据，我们发现 CEO 双重性与新企业绩效之间存在正相关关系。当首席执行官同时也是其公司的创始人时，首席执行官双重性与新创企业绩效之间的关系就会加强，而当公司所有权份额反映了在位公司的大量投资时，这种关系就会减弱。我们的研究结果突出表明，风险治理需要同时解决委托和代理问题。
Venture governance, CEO duality, and new venture performance
How a new venture improves performance when facing both principal and agency problems is an important yet understudied question. This study examines the effectiveness of CEO duality in mitigating the principal problem and enhancing entrepreneurial success. By granting more power to CEOs, CEO duality can alleviate the principal problem; however, CEO duality may simultaneously exacerbate CEOs' agency problems. Using manually collected panel data on 1403 newly established U.S. commercial banks, we find a positive relationship between CEO duality and new venture performance. The CEO duality–new venture performance relationship strengthens when CEOs are also founders of their firms and weakens when the share of corporate ownership reflects heavy investment by incumbent firms. Our findings highlight that venture governance needs to address principal and agency problems simultaneously.
期刊介绍：
The Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal is a research journal that publishes original work recommended by a developmental, double-blind review process conducted by peer scholars. Strategic entrepreneurship involves innovation and subsequent changes which add value to society and which change societal life in ways which have significant, sustainable, and durable consequences. The SEJ is international in scope and acknowledges theory- and evidence-based research conducted and/or applied in all regions of the world. It is devoted to content and quality standards based on scientific method, relevant theory, tested or testable propositions, and appropriate data and evidence, all replicable by others, and all representing original contributions. The SEJ values contributions which lead to improved practice of managing organizations as they deal with the entrepreneurial process involving imagination, insight, invention, and innovation and the inevitable changes and transformations that result and benefit society.
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