S. Poddar, Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee), Swapnendu Banerjee
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Optimal Contract Under Endogenous Platform Services: Implications of Tax and Advertising
The paper evaluates the contracting problem between a platform and a seller under information asymmetry where the seller holds private information about his/her cost for product quality. Price per product is influenced by seller’s product quality and platform’s service quality. Cost-sharing contract is more desirable as it induces a higher level of qualities and generates higher profit for the platform compared to revenue-sharing contract. The product quality and platform’s service quality vary negatively with the ad-valorem tax imposed on price of the product. We then introduce advertising in our model and observe that the level of advertising is lower under information asymmetry. JEL Classification: D86, L21, M37
Studies in MicroeconomicsEconomics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
14
期刊介绍：
Studies in Microeconomics seeks high quality theoretical as well as applied (or empirical) research in all areas of microeconomics (broadly defined to include other avenues of decision science such as psychology, political science and organizational behavior). In particular, we encourage submissions in new areas of Microeconomics such as in the fields of Experimental economics and Behavioral Economics. All manuscripts will be subjected to a peer-review process. The intended audience of the journal are professional economists and young researchers with an interest and expertise in microeconomics and above. In addition to full-length articles MIC is interested in publishing and promoting shorter refereed articles (letters and notes) that are pertinent to the specialist in the field of Microeconomics (broadly defined). MIC will periodically publish special issues with themes of particular interest, including articles solicited from leading scholars as well as authoritative survey articles and meta-analysis on the themed topic. We will also publish book reviews related to microeconomics, and MIC encourages publishing articles from policy practitioners dealing with microeconomic issues that have policy relevance under the section Policy Analysis and Debate.
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