{"title":"讨价还价中的道德偏好","authors":"Pau Juan-Bartroli, Emin Karagözoğlu","doi":"10.1007/s00199-023-01544-7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze the equilibrium of a bilateral bargaining game (Nash, 1953, Econometrica, 21: 128–140). where at least one of the individuals has a preference for morality (<i>homo moralis</i>). We show that the equilibrium set crucially depends on these moral preferences. Furthermore, our comparative static analyses provide insights into the distributional implications of individuals’ moral concerns and the composition of society. A comparison of the set of equilibria in our model with those under selfish preferences, Kantian equilibrium, fairness preferences, altruistic preferences, and inequality averse preferences reveals important differences.\n</p>","PeriodicalId":47982,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory","volume":"80 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Moral preferences in bargaining\",\"authors\":\"Pau Juan-Bartroli, Emin Karagözoğlu\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s00199-023-01544-7\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We analyze the equilibrium of a bilateral bargaining game (Nash, 1953, Econometrica, 21: 128–140). where at least one of the individuals has a preference for morality (<i>homo moralis</i>). We show that the equilibrium set crucially depends on these moral preferences. Furthermore, our comparative static analyses provide insights into the distributional implications of individuals’ moral concerns and the composition of society. A comparison of the set of equilibria in our model with those under selfish preferences, Kantian equilibrium, fairness preferences, altruistic preferences, and inequality averse preferences reveals important differences.\\n</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47982,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economic Theory\",\"volume\":\"80 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economic Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01544-7\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01544-7","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the equilibrium of a bilateral bargaining game (Nash, 1953, Econometrica, 21: 128–140). where at least one of the individuals has a preference for morality (homo moralis). We show that the equilibrium set crucially depends on these moral preferences. Furthermore, our comparative static analyses provide insights into the distributional implications of individuals’ moral concerns and the composition of society. A comparison of the set of equilibria in our model with those under selfish preferences, Kantian equilibrium, fairness preferences, altruistic preferences, and inequality averse preferences reveals important differences.
期刊介绍：
The purpose of Economic Theory is to provide an outlet for research - in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, and
- on specific topics in mathematics which is motivated by the analysis of economic problems. Economic Theory''s scope encompasses - but is not limited to - the following fields. - classical and modern equilibrium theory
- cooperative and non-cooperative game theory
- macroeconomics
- social choice and welfare
- uncertainty and information, intertemporal economics (including dynamical systems)
- public economics
- international and developmental economics
- financial economics, money and banking
- industrial organization Economic Theory also publishes surveys if they clearly picture the basic ideas at work in some areas, the essential technical apparatus which is used and the central questions which remain open. The development of a productive dialectic between stylized facts and abstract formulations requires that economic relevance be at the forefront. Thus, correct, and innovative, mathematical analysis is not enough; it must be motivated by - and contribute to - the understanding of substantive economic problems.
Officially cited as: Econ Theory
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