共享还是转售?制造商如何处理旧产品?

IF 1.9 4区 管理学 Q3 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Naval Research Logistics Pub Date : 2024-01-03 DOI:10.1002/nav.22171
Mengnan Wang, Juliang Zhang, T. C. E. Cheng
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了鼓励消费者重复使用旧产品,一些制造商推出了二手平台,而另一些制造商则采用了共享平台。对于这些制造商来说,哪个平台更有利于他们是一个有趣的问题。为了解决这个问题,我们提出了一个两期模型,在这个模型中,异质消费者决定是在第一期购买新产品,还是在第二期在平台上租赁(购买)二手产品。在按比例收取交易费的情况下,我们发现,如果单位生产成本较高,估值差异较小,或者第一期的高价值消费者数量少于第二期,那么两个平台都能使制造商受益。此外,当残值为 0 时,两个平台是等价的。当残值为正时,二手平台比共享平台更有利于制造商。当单位生产成本较高且第一期的高价值消费者较少时,共享平台会促使制造商设定比二手平台更高的销售价格。否则,二手平台的销售和转售价格都会更高。我们还考虑了一般消费者估值分布、多个产品生命周期和固定交易费的情况。我们的研究结果可以帮助制造商做出处理二手产品的平台选择决策。
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Sharing or reselling? How does manufacturer handle used products?
To encourage consumers to reuse their used products, some manufacturers launch second-hand platforms while others adopt sharing platforms. Which platform benefits them more is an interesting problem for such manufacturers. To address this problem, we propose a two-period model in which heterogeneous consumers decide whether to buy new products in Period 1 or to rent (buy) used products on the platform in Period 2. Under a proportional transaction fee, we show that the two platforms can benefit the manufacturer if the unit production cost is high, and the valuation difference is low or the number of high-value consumers in Period 1 is fewer than in Period 2. Moreover, the two platforms are equivalent when the salvage value is 0. When the salvage value is positive, the second-hand platform benefits the manufacturer more than the sharing platform. The sharing platform induces the manufacturer to set a higher sale price than the second-hand platform when the unit production cost is high and there are fewer high-value consumers in Period 1. Otherwise, the sale and reselling prices are higher under the second-hand platform. We also consider the cases with a general consumer valuation distribution, multiple product life cycles, and a fixed transaction fee. Our findings can help manufacturers make the decision on platform choice to handle used products.
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来源期刊
Naval Research Logistics
Naval Research Logistics 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
4.20
自引率
4.30%
发文量
47
审稿时长
8 months
期刊介绍: Submissions that are most appropriate for NRL are papers addressing modeling and analysis of problems motivated by real-world applications; major methodological advances in operations research and applied statistics; and expository or survey pieces of lasting value. Areas represented include (but are not limited to) probability, statistics, simulation, optimization, game theory, quality, scheduling, reliability, maintenance, supply chain, decision analysis, and combat models. Special issues devoted to a single topic are published occasionally, and proposals for special issues are welcomed by the Editorial Board.
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