{"title":"8 模态逻辑的有值非确定性语义","authors":"Pawel Pawlowski, Daniel Skurt","doi":"10.1007/s10992-023-09733-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The aim of this paper is to study a particular family of non-deterministic semantics for modal logics that has eight truth-values. These eight-valued semantics can be traced back to Omori and Skurt (2016), where a particular member of this family was used to characterize the normal modal logic <b>K</b>. The truth-values in these semantics convey information about a proposition’s truth/falsity, whether the proposition is necessary/not necessary, and whether it is possible/not possible. Each of these triples is represented by a unique value. In this paper we will study which modal logics can be obtained by changing the interpretation of the <span>\\(\\Box \\)</span> modality, assuming that the interpretation of other connectives stays constant. We will show what axioms are responsible for a particular interpretations of <span>\\(\\Box \\)</span>. Furthermore, we will study subsets of these axioms. We show that some of the combinations of the axioms are equivalent to well-known modal axioms. We apply the level-valuation technique to all of the systems to regain the closure under the rule of necessitation. We also point out that some of the resulting logics are not sublogics of <b>S5</b> and comment briefly on the corresponding frame conditions that are forced by these axioms. Ultimately, we sketch a proof of meta-completeness for all of these systems.</p>","PeriodicalId":51526,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC","volume":"81 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"8 Valued Non-Deterministic Semantics for Modal Logics\",\"authors\":\"Pawel Pawlowski, Daniel Skurt\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10992-023-09733-4\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The aim of this paper is to study a particular family of non-deterministic semantics for modal logics that has eight truth-values. These eight-valued semantics can be traced back to Omori and Skurt (2016), where a particular member of this family was used to characterize the normal modal logic <b>K</b>. The truth-values in these semantics convey information about a proposition’s truth/falsity, whether the proposition is necessary/not necessary, and whether it is possible/not possible. Each of these triples is represented by a unique value. In this paper we will study which modal logics can be obtained by changing the interpretation of the <span>\\\\(\\\\Box \\\\)</span> modality, assuming that the interpretation of other connectives stays constant. We will show what axioms are responsible for a particular interpretations of <span>\\\\(\\\\Box \\\\)</span>. Furthermore, we will study subsets of these axioms. We show that some of the combinations of the axioms are equivalent to well-known modal axioms. We apply the level-valuation technique to all of the systems to regain the closure under the rule of necessitation. We also point out that some of the resulting logics are not sublogics of <b>S5</b> and comment briefly on the corresponding frame conditions that are forced by these axioms. Ultimately, we sketch a proof of meta-completeness for all of these systems.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51526,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC\",\"volume\":\"81 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09733-4\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09733-4","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
8 Valued Non-Deterministic Semantics for Modal Logics
The aim of this paper is to study a particular family of non-deterministic semantics for modal logics that has eight truth-values. These eight-valued semantics can be traced back to Omori and Skurt (2016), where a particular member of this family was used to characterize the normal modal logic K. The truth-values in these semantics convey information about a proposition’s truth/falsity, whether the proposition is necessary/not necessary, and whether it is possible/not possible. Each of these triples is represented by a unique value. In this paper we will study which modal logics can be obtained by changing the interpretation of the \(\Box \) modality, assuming that the interpretation of other connectives stays constant. We will show what axioms are responsible for a particular interpretations of \(\Box \). Furthermore, we will study subsets of these axioms. We show that some of the combinations of the axioms are equivalent to well-known modal axioms. We apply the level-valuation technique to all of the systems to regain the closure under the rule of necessitation. We also point out that some of the resulting logics are not sublogics of S5 and comment briefly on the corresponding frame conditions that are forced by these axioms. Ultimately, we sketch a proof of meta-completeness for all of these systems.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Philosophical Logic aims to provide a forum for work at the crossroads of philosophy and logic, old and new, with contributions ranging from conceptual to technical. Accordingly, the Journal invites papers in all of the traditional areas of philosophical logic, including but not limited to: various versions of modal, temporal, epistemic, and deontic logic; constructive logics; relevance and other sub-classical logics; many-valued logics; logics of conditionals; quantum logic; decision theory, inductive logic, logics of belief change, and formal epistemology; defeasible and nonmonotonic logics; formal philosophy of language; vagueness; and theories of truth and validity. In addition to publishing papers on philosophical logic in this familiar sense of the term, the Journal also invites papers on extensions of logic to new areas of application, and on the philosophical issues to which these give rise. The Journal places a special emphasis on the applications of philosophical logic in other disciplines, not only in mathematics and the natural sciences but also, for example, in computer science, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, linguistics, jurisprudence, and the social sciences, such as economics, sociology, and political science.