无一致意见的分类汇总

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.002
Olivier Cailloux , Matthieu Hervouin , Ali I. Ozkes , M. Remzi Sanver
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引用次数: 0

摘要

分类是从一组对象到一组类别的投射映射。分类聚合函数将每个分类向量聚合成一个分类。我们证明,每个公民主权和独立的分类聚合函数本质上都是独裁的。这一不可能性意味着 Maniquet 和 Mongin(2016 年)早先的一个结果,他们证明了每一个一致且独立的分类聚合函数都是独裁的。这两种不可能性之间的关系让人联想到威尔逊(1972)和阿罗(1951)在偏好聚合中的不可能性之间的关系。此外,马尼盖特-蒙金的不可能性建立在至少存在三个类别的基础上,而我们提出了另一种证明技术,它涵盖了两个类别的情况,除非对象的数量也是两个。我们还确定了两个类别和两个对象情况下所有独立且一致的分类聚合函数。
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Classification aggregation without unanimity

A classification is a surjective mapping from a set of objects to a set of categories. A classification aggregation function aggregates every vector of classifications into a single one. We show that every citizen sovereign and independent classification aggregation function is essentially a dictatorship. This impossibility implies an earlier result of Maniquet and Mongin (2016), who show that every unanimous and independent classification aggregation function is a dictatorship. The relationship between the two impossibilities is reminiscent to the relationship between Wilson’s (1972) and Arrow’s (1951) impossibilities in preference aggregation. Moreover, while the Maniquet-Mongin impossibility rests on the existence of at least three categories, we propose an alternative proof technique that covers the case of two categories, except when the number of objects is also two. We also identify all independent and unanimous classification aggregation functions for the case of two categories and two objects.

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来源期刊
Mathematical Social Sciences
Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
审稿时长
59 days
期刊介绍: The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.
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