Jianfeng Wang, Zhonghao Chen, Jiahao Zhang, Yixin Xu, Tongguang Yu, Ziheng Zheng, Enze Ye, Sumitha George, Huazhong Yang, Yongpan Liu, Kai Ni, Vijaykrishnan Narayanan, Xueqing Li
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引用次数: 0
摘要
逻辑伪装是一种广泛采用的技术,可减轻集成电路(IC)供应链中知识产权(IP)盗版和过度生产的威胁。伪装逻辑通过物理层面的模糊性和制造后的可编程性实现功能混淆。然而,关于可编程性的讨论仅限于逻辑单元/门的层面,限制了逻辑伪装在更大范围内的应用。在这项工作中,我们为可编程伪装逻辑提出了一种新颖的模块级配置方法,无需额外的硬件端口和可忽略的资源即可实现。我们从理论上证明,可编程伪装逻辑单元的配置可以通过原始模块的输入和网表来实现。此外,我们还提出了一种基于铁电场效应晶体管(FeFET)的新型轻量级可重构逻辑门(rGate)系列,并将其应用于所提出的方法。通过灵活的替换和所提出的配置感知转换算法,这项工作的特点是只需输入编程方案以及高输出错误率和点函数式防御的结合。评估显示,伪装的可选 rGate 位置平均达到 95%,足以满足安全感知设计的要求。我们说明了函数状态遍历的指数复杂性,以及与基于密钥的方法相比,锁定黑盒对 SAT 攻击的增强防御能力。我们还保留了明显的输出汉明距离,并在典型基准下的门级和模块级评估中引入了可忽略不计的硬件开销。
A Module-Level Configuration Methodology for Programmable Camouflaged Logic
Logic camouflage is a widely adopted technique that mitigates the threat of intellectual property (IP) piracy and overproduction in the integrated circuit (IC) supply chain. Camouflaged logic achieves functional obfuscation through physical-level ambiguity and post-manufacturing programmability. However, discussions on programmability are confined to the level of logic cells/gates, limiting the broader-scale application of logic camouflage. In this work, we propose a novel module-level configuration methodology for programmable camouflaged logic that can be implemented without additional hardware ports and with negligible resources. We prove theoretically that the configuration of the programmable camouflaged logic cells can be achieved through the inputs and netlist of the original module. Further, we propose a novel lightweight ferroelectric FET (FeFET)-based reconfigurable logic gate (rGate) family and apply it to the proposed methodology. With the flexible replacement and the proposed configuration-aware conversion algorithm, this work is characterized by the input-only programming scheme as well as the combination of high output error rate and point-function-like defense. Evaluations show an average of >95% of the alternative rGate location for camouflage, which is sufficient for the security-aware design. We illustrate the exponential complexity in function state traversal and the enhanced defense capability of locked blackbox against SAT attacks compared to key-based methods. We also preserve an evident output Hamming distance and introduce negligible hardware overheads in both gate-level and module-level evaluations under typical benchmarks.
期刊介绍:
TODAES is a premier ACM journal in design and automation of electronic systems. It publishes innovative work documenting significant research and development advances on the specification, design, analysis, simulation, testing, and evaluation of electronic systems, emphasizing a computer science/engineering orientation. Both theoretical analysis and practical solutions are welcome.