部分远期所有权下的供应合同

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-01-14 DOI:10.1111/jems.12574
Matthias Hunold, Frank Schlütter
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引用次数: 0

摘要

有了远期所有权,上游供应商会将其供应合同对下游企业的影响内部化,迄今为止,人们都认为这会降低价格。我们的研究表明,如果企业采用两部制关税,下游企业的价格通常会提高。远期所有权的价格上涨效应在可观察到的和秘密的两部分关税中都会出现,只是经济原因不同。在数量和价格竞争以及不同的信念细化条件下,结果都会出现。与上游企业和下游企业之间的完全纵向合并相比,部分远期所有权对消费者而言可能更有利可图,也更有害。
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Supply contracts under partial forward ownership
With forward ownership, an upstream supplier internalizes the effect of its supply contracts on the downstream firms, which is so far understood to decrease prices. We show that, instead, downstream prices generally increase if firms use two-part tariffs. The price-increasing effect of forward ownership occurs with both observable and secret two-part tariffs, albeit for different economic reasons. The results arise under both quantity and price competition as well as for different belief refinements. Partial forward ownership can be more profitable and more harmful for consumers than a full vertical merger between an upstream and a downstream firm.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
期刊最新文献
Issue Information Vertical mergers without foreclosure Dynamic competition for customer memberships Forward contracting and the endogenous activity of heterogeneous firms On fraud and certification of green production
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