军方董事和股价信息性:这有什么大惊小怪的?

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2024-01-20 DOI:10.1007/s11156-023-01240-6
Tasawar Nawaz, Tahseen Nawaz
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究利用手工建立的独特数据集(属于在新兴经济体运营的非金融企业),首次报告了在控制了董事会属性、代理人异质性和企业水平差异之后,具有军事经验的董事会的企业股票价格反映了更多的企业特定信息。对信息量和军事董事代理的其他规格进行稳健分析的结果支持这样一种观点,即受过军事训练的董事可能会提高上市公司的透明度,并鼓励将更多公司特定信息纳入股票价格。进一步的分析表明,军方董事可能会削弱首席执行官与董事会之间的联系,并解决公司董事会层面的方向性变化:军方董事给董事会带来纪律,从而转化为对首席执行官的严格监督,并提高公司治理质量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Military directors and stock price informativeness: What's all the fuss about?

Exploiting a unique hand-built dataset, belonging to non-financial firms, operating in an emerging economy, this study, first of its kind, reports that stock prices of firms with military-experienced board of directors reflect more firm specific information after controlling for board attributes, agent heterogeneity and firm level variation. The results robust to alternative specifications of informativeness and military director proxy support the notion that military-trained directors may enhance transparency in public listed companies and encourage the incorporation of more firm-specific information into stock prices. Further analysis suggests that military directors may enfeeble CEO–board nexus and settle the directional variations at the corporate board level: military directors bring discipline in the board room that translates into rigorous CEO monitoring and improved corporate governance quality.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
17.60%
发文量
87
期刊介绍: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting deals with research involving the interaction of finance with accounting, economics, and quantitative methods, focused on finance and accounting. The papers published present useful theoretical and methodological results with the support of interesting empirical applications. Purely theoretical and methodological research with the potential for important applications is also published. Besides the traditional high-quality theoretical and empirical research in finance, the journal also publishes papers dealing with interdisciplinary topics.
期刊最新文献
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