{"title":"多布斯诉杰克逊妇女健康案对民事拘禁法的潜在影响。","authors":"Timothy S Hall","doi":"10.1017/amj.2023.37","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Since the publication of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health <i>in June of 2022, much attention has been paid to the direct effects of that decision on reproductive health care for pregnant or potentially pregnant individuals; and to the potential effects of the Court's approach in</i> Dobbs <i>to other established precedent related to privacy and autonomy, such as rights to contraception and marriage equality. This Article will explore another potential negative consequence of</i> Dobbs; its potential effect on the constitutional parameters of the law of civil commitment and involuntary medication of the mentally ill.The foundational Supreme Court case establishing the parameters of the State's right to involuntarily commit an individual to a mental institution was decided only two years after Roe v. Wade<i>. In 1975, the Supreme Court in</i> O'Connor v Donaldson held that an individual has a liberty interest in \"prefer[ring] one's home to the comforts of an institution,\" and that a State could not, \"without more,\" confine a non-dangerous individual. The two-prong test of requiring a showing of both mental illness and dangerousness to one's self or to others has remained the cornerstone of civil commitment law ever since.The language and analysis of O'Connor <i>is similar to that of</i> Roe<i>, the abortion rights case overturned by</i> Dobbs<i>. In particular, the grounding of the right to avoid civil commitment in the individual liberty and privacy interests are common themes in the two cases. The current Court, in its decision in</i> Dobbs<i>, has cast substantial doubt on the continued vitality of that analysis; and one can easily imagine a reconceptualization of</i> O'Connor <i>along the lines of</i> Dobbs <i>that substantially alters the requirements for civil commitment. In particular, the reliance in</i> Dobbs and other recent Supreme Court opinions on historical precedent as a linchpin of originalist analysis could lead the Court to search for justifications in colonial or 19<sup>th</sup>-century mental health practices, time periods which predate modern psychiatric science.This Article will explore the parallels in approach between Roe <i>and</i> O'Connor<i>, and will suggest ways in which the post-</i>Dobbs <i>Supreme Court majority might disrupt the civil commitment status quo, including potential expansion of civil commitment or other detention of pregnant individuals for the protection of the fetus; and possible relaxation of the dangerousness requirement for civil commitment articulated in</i> O'Connor.</p>","PeriodicalId":7680,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Law & Medicine","volume":"49 2-3","pages":"359-373"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Potential Effects of <i>Dobbs v. 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This Article will explore another potential negative consequence of</i> Dobbs; its potential effect on the constitutional parameters of the law of civil commitment and involuntary medication of the mentally ill.The foundational Supreme Court case establishing the parameters of the State's right to involuntarily commit an individual to a mental institution was decided only two years after Roe v. Wade<i>. In 1975, the Supreme Court in</i> O'Connor v Donaldson held that an individual has a liberty interest in \\\"prefer[ring] one's home to the comforts of an institution,\\\" and that a State could not, \\\"without more,\\\" confine a non-dangerous individual. The two-prong test of requiring a showing of both mental illness and dangerousness to one's self or to others has remained the cornerstone of civil commitment law ever since.The language and analysis of O'Connor <i>is similar to that of</i> Roe<i>, the abortion rights case overturned by</i> Dobbs<i>. In particular, the grounding of the right to avoid civil commitment in the individual liberty and privacy interests are common themes in the two cases. The current Court, in its decision in</i> Dobbs<i>, has cast substantial doubt on the continued vitality of that analysis; and one can easily imagine a reconceptualization of</i> O'Connor <i>along the lines of</i> Dobbs <i>that substantially alters the requirements for civil commitment. In particular, the reliance in</i> Dobbs and other recent Supreme Court opinions on historical precedent as a linchpin of originalist analysis could lead the Court to search for justifications in colonial or 19<sup>th</sup>-century mental health practices, time periods which predate modern psychiatric science.This Article will explore the parallels in approach between Roe <i>and</i> O'Connor<i>, and will suggest ways in which the post-</i>Dobbs <i>Supreme Court majority might disrupt the civil commitment status quo, including potential expansion of civil commitment or other detention of pregnant individuals for the protection of the fetus; and possible relaxation of the dangerousness requirement for civil commitment articulated in</i> O'Connor.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":7680,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Journal of Law & Medicine\",\"volume\":\"49 2-3\",\"pages\":\"359-373\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Journal of Law & Medicine\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/amj.2023.37\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2024/2/12 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Journal of Law & Medicine","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/amj.2023.37","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2024/2/12 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
自 2022 年 6 月美国最高法院公布多布斯诉杰克逊妇女健康案(Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health)的判决以来,该判决对怀孕或可能怀孕者的生殖健康护理的直接影响,以及法院在多布斯案中的做法对其他与隐私和自主权相关的既定先例(如避孕权和婚姻平等权)的潜在影响备受关注。本文将探讨多布斯案的另一个潜在负面影响,即其对精神病人民事收容和非自愿用药法律的宪法参数的潜在影响。最高法院确立国家非自愿将个人送入精神病院的权利参数的基础性案例是在罗伊诉韦德案之后仅两年做出的判决。1975 年,最高法院在 "奥康纳诉唐纳森案"(O'Connor v Donaldson)中认为,个人有 "宁可住在自己家里,也不愿意住在舒适的精神病院 "的自由权,而且国家不能 "在没有更多条件的情况下 "禁闭一个没有危险的人。奥康纳的措辞和分析与被多布斯推翻的堕胎权案件罗伊的措辞和分析相似。特别是,将避免民事拘禁的权利建立在个人自由和隐私利益的基础上是这两个案件的共同主题。现任法院在对多布斯案的判决中对这一分析的持续生命力提出了实质性的质疑;人们可以很容易地想象,按照多布斯案的思路对奥康纳案进行重新概念化,从而大幅改变民事拘禁的要求。特别是,多布斯和其他近期的最高法院意见依赖于历史先例作为原创主义分析的关键,这可能会导致法院在殖民时期或19世纪的精神健康实践中寻找正当理由,而这些时期都是现代精神病学之前的时期。本文将探讨罗伊案与奥康纳案在处理方法上的相似之处,并将提出多布斯案后最高法院多数法官可能会破坏民事拘禁现状的方式,包括可能扩大民事拘禁或以其他方式拘留孕妇以保护胎儿;以及可能放宽奥康纳案中阐明的民事拘禁的危险性要求。
Potential Effects of Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health on Civil Commitment Law.
Since the publication of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health in June of 2022, much attention has been paid to the direct effects of that decision on reproductive health care for pregnant or potentially pregnant individuals; and to the potential effects of the Court's approach in Dobbs to other established precedent related to privacy and autonomy, such as rights to contraception and marriage equality. This Article will explore another potential negative consequence of Dobbs; its potential effect on the constitutional parameters of the law of civil commitment and involuntary medication of the mentally ill.The foundational Supreme Court case establishing the parameters of the State's right to involuntarily commit an individual to a mental institution was decided only two years after Roe v. Wade. In 1975, the Supreme Court in O'Connor v Donaldson held that an individual has a liberty interest in "prefer[ring] one's home to the comforts of an institution," and that a State could not, "without more," confine a non-dangerous individual. The two-prong test of requiring a showing of both mental illness and dangerousness to one's self or to others has remained the cornerstone of civil commitment law ever since.The language and analysis of O'Connor is similar to that of Roe, the abortion rights case overturned by Dobbs. In particular, the grounding of the right to avoid civil commitment in the individual liberty and privacy interests are common themes in the two cases. The current Court, in its decision in Dobbs, has cast substantial doubt on the continued vitality of that analysis; and one can easily imagine a reconceptualization of O'Connor along the lines of Dobbs that substantially alters the requirements for civil commitment. In particular, the reliance in Dobbs and other recent Supreme Court opinions on historical precedent as a linchpin of originalist analysis could lead the Court to search for justifications in colonial or 19th-century mental health practices, time periods which predate modern psychiatric science.This Article will explore the parallels in approach between Roe and O'Connor, and will suggest ways in which the post-Dobbs Supreme Court majority might disrupt the civil commitment status quo, including potential expansion of civil commitment or other detention of pregnant individuals for the protection of the fetus; and possible relaxation of the dangerousness requirement for civil commitment articulated in O'Connor.
期刊介绍:
desde Enero 2004 Último Numero: Octubre 2008 AJLM will solicit blind comments from expert peer reviewers, including faculty members of our editorial board, as well as from other preeminent health law and public policy academics and professionals from across the country and around the world.