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引用次数: 0
摘要
根据主体敏感不变论(SSI),S 是否知道 p 不仅取决于主体的认识论地位(是否存在真实信念、充分理由等),还取决于主体所处情境中的非认识论因素;这些因素被视为对主体认识论地位的 "侵犯"。主体的实际利害关系并不是唯一的非认识论因素,但却是最突出的因素。基于利害关系的 SSI 认为,两个主体可以对某个命题处于相同的认识论地位,但两个主体的利害关系不同,因此其中一个主体可能知道该命题,而另一个主体可能不知道该命题。值得注意的是,迄今为止,人们还没有对利害关系这一概念进行过非常详细的讨论。本文对这一概念进行了深入探讨,并提出了详细的新分析。事实证明,利害关系不止一种,即事件利害关系、知识利害关系和行动利害关系。我讨论了即使是合理的利害关系概念也会引起的几个问题,并提出了解决方案。
What's a(t) stake? On stakes, encroachers, knowledge
According to subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), whether S knows that p depends not only on the subject's epistemic position (the presence of a true belief, sufficient warrant, etc.) but also on non-epistemic factors present in the subject's situation; such factors are seen as “encroaching” on the subject's epistemic standing. Not the only such non-epistemic factor but the most prominent one consists in the subject's practical stakes. Stakes-based SSI holds that two subjects can be in the same epistemic position with respect to some proposition but with different stakes for the two subjects so that one of them might know the proposition while the other might fail to know it. It is remarkable that the notion of stakes has not been discussed much in great detail at all so far. This paper takes a closer look at this notion and proposes a detailed, new analysis. It turns out that there is more than one kind of stakes, namely event-stakes, knowledge-stakes and action-stakes. I discuss several issues that even plausible notions of stakes raise and propose solutions.
期刊介绍:
Since its foundation in 1935, Theoria publishes research in all areas of philosophy. Theoria is committed to precision and clarity in philosophical discussions, and encourages cooperation between philosophy and other disciplines. The journal is not affiliated with any particular school or faction. Instead, it promotes dialogues between different philosophical viewpoints. Theoria is peer-reviewed. It publishes articles, reviews, and shorter notes and discussions. Short discussion notes on recent articles in Theoria are welcome.