快递:路边反馈策略如何影响家庭的回收绩效?来自社区计划的证据

IF 4.8 3区 管理学 Q1 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING Production and Operations Management Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI:10.1177/10591478241234999
Erin C. McKie, Aravind Chandrasekaran, Sriram Venkataraman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

推进循环经济的责任主要由企业承担,但许多再利用机会只能通过符合环保要求的家庭一级回收行为来实现。为此,政策制定者和回收组织正在利用一系列反馈机制来促进符合当地质量标准的家庭回收。然而,这些策略的有效性仍不明确,利益相关者对其使用的适当性也存在分歧。在这项研究中,我们考察了两种流行的反馈机制--纯信息反馈机制和信息加惩罚机制--在纠正家庭路边回收行为中的作用。在只提供信息的反馈机制下,住户只需了解回收利用的最佳做法,不会因犯错而受到惩罚。在信息加惩罚的反馈中,住户也会收到信息,但会暂时放弃回收服务。虽然之前的研究已经探讨了使用信息和惩罚作为反馈机制来引导行为改变,但关于其有效性,尤其是在回收方面的有效性,证据不一。我们通过分析 2019 年在中西部一个大城市进行的路边审计工作中收集到的独特数据,填补了这一研究空白。我们的分析利用了计量经济学方法,以及来自 11,899 户家庭和 15 条回收路线的 25,359 次审核的回收反馈和绩效数据。我们发现,只提供信息的反馈机制虽然受到一些利益相关者的青睐,但却与回收质量的提高(用家庭污染率衡量)无关。相比之下,我们的结果表明,涉及拒收手推车的惩罚性机制(即信息加惩罚)与污染率的显著降低有关:即收到惩罚性反馈的家庭污染率严重程度降低了 59%,今后再犯的可能性降低了 75%。更重要的是,我们没有发现证据表明惩罚性反馈机制通常会阻碍家庭参与回收计划(用未来的回收率来衡量)。我们的研究通过调查不同严重程度的路边反馈机制如何影响家庭回收绩效的关键维度(即回收质量和参与度),为可持续运营管理文献提供了信息。我们还为政策制定者提供了如何更有效地利用路边反馈机制来增加材料再利用机会的信息。
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EXPRESS: How Do Curbside Feedback Tactics Impact Households' Recycling Performance? Evidence from Community Programs
Much of the responsibility for advancing the circular economy has been directed towards firms, yet many reuse opportunities can only be achieved through environmentally compliant, household-level recycling behaviors. In response, policymakers and recycling organizations are using a range of feedback mechanisms to promote household recycling that meets local quality standards. However, the effectiveness of these tactics remains unclear, and stakeholders are divided on the appropriateness of their use. In this research, we examine the role of two popular feedback mechanisms - information-only and information plus penalty - in correcting households' curbside recycling behaviors. With information-only feedback, households are provided with best practices for recycling and are not penalized for their errors. With information plus penalty feedback, house­holds also receive information, but temporarily forfeit their recycling services. While previous studies have explored the use of information and penalties as feedback mechanisms to guide behavioral changes, there is mixed evidence on their effectiveness, particularly in the recycling context. We address this research gap by analyzing unique data collected from a 2019 curbside auditing effort that occurred in a large, Mid-Western city. Our analysis leverages econometric methods, and recycling feedback and performance data from 25,359 audits across 11,899 households and 15 recycling routes. We find that information-only feedback mechanisms, while preferred by some stakeholders, are not associated with improvements in recycling quality (measured using household contamination rates). By contrast, our results indicate that punitive mechanisms (i.e., infor­mation plus penalty) involving cart refusals are associated with significant reductions in contamination rates: i.e., households that receive punitive feedback reduce their contamination rate severity by 59%, and are 75% less likely to commit a violation in the future. More importantly, we do not find evidence that punitive feedback mechanisms generally discourage households' participation in recycling programs (measured using future set out rates). Our study informs sustainable operations management literature by investigating how curbside feedback mechanisms, with differing levels of severity, influence critical dimensions of households' recycling performance (i.e., recycling quality and participation). We also inform policymakers on how curb- side feedback mechanisms can be more effectively leveraged to enhance opportunities for material reuse.
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来源期刊
Production and Operations Management
Production and Operations Management 管理科学-工程:制造
CiteScore
7.50
自引率
16.00%
发文量
278
审稿时长
24 months
期刊介绍: The mission of Production and Operations Management is to serve as the flagship research journal in operations management in manufacturing and services. The journal publishes scientific research into the problems, interest, and concerns of managers who manage product and process design, operations, and supply chains. It covers all topics in product and process design, operations, and supply chain management and welcomes papers using any research paradigm.
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