{"title":"分析法理学:概念框架","authors":"Sergey Sergeevich Mitrokhin","doi":"10.7256/2454-0706.2024.2.69814","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n The subject of the study is the problem of defining the conceptual boundaries of analytical jurisprudence. In Anglo-American legal science, there is a well-established position recognised division into two stages in the development of analytical jurisprudence. The leader of the first stage is J. Austin, the founder of analytical jurisprudence, and the key figure of the second stage is H. L. A. Hart. At the same time, it is noted that scientific projects belonging to the first and second stages have fundamental differences. In this connection, in the present article the fundamental characteristics of analytical jurisprudence are identified through a comparative analysis of its projects presented in the works of the main representatives of the respective stages. The main method in the study is the interpretive method, which includes the method of problem-theoretical reconstruction. Through its application it is possible to reconstruct the theoretical provisions that determine the continuity between the two stages of analytical jurisprudence. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that it focuses on the common elements of the two stages in the development of analytical jurisprudence, which calls into question the absolute differentiation between them accepted in Anglo-American legal thought. In this regard, the study substantiates that the founding elements of analytical jurisprudence are its general and descriptive character, as well as positivist legal understanding. At the same time, the article shows that (1) the actual identification of conceptual analysis and analytical jurisprudence does not allow us to reliably explicate the continuity between the stages of analytical jurisprudence and identify analytical jurisprudence as an independent direction of research; (2) the exclusion of legal positivism from the identifying characteristics of analytical jurisprudence causes the risk of absorption of analytical jurisprudence as a legal science by philosophical discourse.\n","PeriodicalId":503816,"journal":{"name":"Право и политика","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Analytical Jurisprudence: Conceptual Framework\",\"authors\":\"Sergey Sergeevich Mitrokhin\",\"doi\":\"10.7256/2454-0706.2024.2.69814\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n The subject of the study is the problem of defining the conceptual boundaries of analytical jurisprudence. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
本研究的主题是界定分析法学的概念边界问题。在英美法学界,分析法学的发展被公认为分为两个阶段。第一阶段的领军人物是分析法学的创始人 J. Austin,第二阶段的关键人物是 H. L. A. Hart。同时,我们也注意到,属于第一和第二阶段的科学项目有着本质的区别。因此,本文通过对各阶段主要代表人物著作中的分析法学项目进行比较分析,确定了分析法学的基本特征。研究的主要方法是解释性方法,其中包括问题理论重建方法。通过该方法的应用,可以重构决定分析法学两个阶段之间连续性的理论规定。本研究的新颖之处在于,它侧重于分析法学发展过程中两个阶段的共同要素,这就对英美法律思想所接受的将它们绝对区分开来的观点提出了质疑。在这方面,研究证实了分析法学的基本要素是其一般性和描述性特征,以及实证主义的法律理解。同时,文章指出:(1) 概念分析与分析法学的实际识别并不能使我们可靠地解释分析法学各阶段之间的连续性,也不能将分析法学确定为一个独立的研究方向;(2) 将法律实证主义排除在分析法学的识别特征之外会导致分析法学作为一门法律科学被哲学话语所吸收的风险。
The subject of the study is the problem of defining the conceptual boundaries of analytical jurisprudence. In Anglo-American legal science, there is a well-established position recognised division into two stages in the development of analytical jurisprudence. The leader of the first stage is J. Austin, the founder of analytical jurisprudence, and the key figure of the second stage is H. L. A. Hart. At the same time, it is noted that scientific projects belonging to the first and second stages have fundamental differences. In this connection, in the present article the fundamental characteristics of analytical jurisprudence are identified through a comparative analysis of its projects presented in the works of the main representatives of the respective stages. The main method in the study is the interpretive method, which includes the method of problem-theoretical reconstruction. Through its application it is possible to reconstruct the theoretical provisions that determine the continuity between the two stages of analytical jurisprudence. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that it focuses on the common elements of the two stages in the development of analytical jurisprudence, which calls into question the absolute differentiation between them accepted in Anglo-American legal thought. In this regard, the study substantiates that the founding elements of analytical jurisprudence are its general and descriptive character, as well as positivist legal understanding. At the same time, the article shows that (1) the actual identification of conceptual analysis and analytical jurisprudence does not allow us to reliably explicate the continuity between the stages of analytical jurisprudence and identify analytical jurisprudence as an independent direction of research; (2) the exclusion of legal positivism from the identifying characteristics of analytical jurisprudence causes the risk of absorption of analytical jurisprudence as a legal science by philosophical discourse.