搬迁运动:关于第一届国会和总统权力的新共识

IF 0.6 Q2 LAW AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Pub Date : 2024-02-03 DOI:10.1093/ajlh/njad015
Jed H Shugerman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如果有的话,"1789 年决定 "对总统免职权做出了什么决定?事实证明,学者们正在就第一届国会缺乏共识达成共识。单一行政权理论认为总统拥有专有且 "不可剥夺 "的行政权(即超越国会和司法制衡的权力)。本次专题讨论会为单一行政权理论者及其批评者提供了一个机会,就质疑单一行政权理论主张的最新历史研究(如乔纳森-吉纳普(Jonathan Gienapp)的《第二次创造》(The Second Creation)和我的文章《1789 年的决定》(The Indecisions of 1789))展开辩论。"1789 年的决定:不稳定的原始主义和战略模糊性"。单一理论者承认 "决定 "的主张存在问题。大多数人放弃了传统的说法,即根据立法辩论,第一届国会的大多数议员认可了关于第二条确立了总统罢免权的解释。相反,他们转向了新的主张:即使是少数派的支持也是实质性的;重要的是论证的质量,而不是支持者的数量(这是一种主观主张,与原始公共含义理论相矛盾);或者,也许重要的是发言人的质量或历史重要性(别忘了麦迪逊、汉密尔顿和马歇尔也反对罢免总统)。这些支点都无法拯救 "决定 "神话。单一制理论家转向了后来的证据:离建国和批准越来越远的实践和辩论。值得称赞的是,他们表现出了抛弃标准原始主义方法的意愿,并采用了更符合普通法宪法主义和活宪法主义的方法。他们面临的挑战是,他们是否承认必须在原创主义和统一理论之间做出选择。这场辩论更广泛的意义在于,它对作为可靠解释方法的原创主义的实践提出了质疑。
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Movement on Removal: An Emerging Consensus about The First Congress and Presidential Power
What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees about the First Congress’s lack of consensus. The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning the unitary theory’s claims (e.g., Jonathan Gienapp’s The Second Creation and my article. “The Indecisions of 1789: Inconstant Originalism and Strategic Ambiguity.” Unitary theorists conceded problems with the claims of a “decision.” Most pivoted away from the traditional account that, based on the legislative debates, a majority of the First Congress endorsed an interpretation that Article II established a presidential removal power. Instead, they shifted to new claims: that the endorsement of even a minority faction was still substantial; that it was the quality of the argument, not the quantity of supporters, that counts (a subjective claim that contradicts the theory of original public meaning); or perhaps it is the quality or historical importance of the speakers that counts (nevermind that Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall also rejected presidential removal). None of these pivots rescue the “Decision” myth. Unitary theorists turned to later evidence: practices and debates further and further away from the Founding and Ratification. To their credit, they demonstrated a willingness to leave behind standard originalist methods and engaged in methods more consistent with common law constitutionalism and living constistutionalism. The challenge is whether they will acknowledge that they have to choose between originalism and the unitary theory. The broader significance of this debate is the questions it raises about the practice of originalism as a reliable method of interpretation.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
17
期刊介绍: The American Journal of Legal History was established in 1957 as the first English-language legal history journal. The journal remains devoted to the publication of articles and documents on the history of all legal systems. The journal is refereed, and members of the Judiciary and the Bar form the advisory board.
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