{"title":"零和奇异控制器与停止器游戏的无界域上的变量不等式","authors":"Andrea Bovo, Tiziano De Angelis, Elena Issoglio","doi":"10.1287/moor.2023.0029","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study a class of zero-sum games between a singular controller and a stopper over a finite-time horizon. The underlying process is a multidimensional (locally nondegenerate) controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE) evolving in an unbounded domain. We prove that such games admit a value and provide an optimal strategy for the stopper. The value of the game is shown to be the maximal solution in a suitable Sobolev class of a variational inequality of min-max type with an obstacle constraint and a gradient constraint. Although the variational inequality and the game are solved on an unbounded domain, we do not require boundedness of either the coefficients of the controlled SDE or of the cost functions in the game.Funding: A. Bovo was partially supported by the Doctoral Studentship from the University of Leeds.","PeriodicalId":49852,"journal":{"name":"Mathematics of Operations Research","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Variational Inequalities on Unbounded Domains for Zero-Sum Singular Controller vs. Stopper Games\",\"authors\":\"Andrea Bovo, Tiziano De Angelis, Elena Issoglio\",\"doi\":\"10.1287/moor.2023.0029\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study a class of zero-sum games between a singular controller and a stopper over a finite-time horizon. The underlying process is a multidimensional (locally nondegenerate) controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE) evolving in an unbounded domain. We prove that such games admit a value and provide an optimal strategy for the stopper. The value of the game is shown to be the maximal solution in a suitable Sobolev class of a variational inequality of min-max type with an obstacle constraint and a gradient constraint. Although the variational inequality and the game are solved on an unbounded domain, we do not require boundedness of either the coefficients of the controlled SDE or of the cost functions in the game.Funding: A. Bovo was partially supported by the Doctoral Studentship from the University of Leeds.\",\"PeriodicalId\":49852,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Mathematics of Operations Research\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Mathematics of Operations Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"100\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2023.0029\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"数学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"MATHEMATICS, APPLIED\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mathematics of Operations Research","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2023.0029","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MATHEMATICS, APPLIED","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
我们研究的是一类在有限时间范围内奇异控制器与阻止者之间的零和博弈。基本过程是在无界域中演化的多维(局部非enerate)受控随机微分方程(SDE)。我们证明了这种博弈存在一个值,并为阻止者提供了一个最优策略。博弈值被证明是具有障碍约束和梯度约束的最小-最大类型变分不等式的合适 Sobolev 类中的最大解。虽然变分不等式和博弈都是在无界域上求解的,但我们并不要求受控 SDE 的系数或博弈中的代价函数有界:A. Bovo 部分获得了利兹大学博士生奖学金的资助。
Variational Inequalities on Unbounded Domains for Zero-Sum Singular Controller vs. Stopper Games
We study a class of zero-sum games between a singular controller and a stopper over a finite-time horizon. The underlying process is a multidimensional (locally nondegenerate) controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE) evolving in an unbounded domain. We prove that such games admit a value and provide an optimal strategy for the stopper. The value of the game is shown to be the maximal solution in a suitable Sobolev class of a variational inequality of min-max type with an obstacle constraint and a gradient constraint. Although the variational inequality and the game are solved on an unbounded domain, we do not require boundedness of either the coefficients of the controlled SDE or of the cost functions in the game.Funding: A. Bovo was partially supported by the Doctoral Studentship from the University of Leeds.
期刊介绍:
Mathematics of Operations Research is an international journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). The journal invites articles concerned with the mathematical and computational foundations in the areas of continuous, discrete, and stochastic optimization; mathematical programming; dynamic programming; stochastic processes; stochastic models; simulation methodology; control and adaptation; networks; game theory; and decision theory. Also sought are contributions to learning theory and machine learning that have special relevance to decision making, operations research, and management science. The emphasis is on originality, quality, and importance; correctness alone is not sufficient. Significant developments in operations research and management science not having substantial mathematical interest should be directed to other journals such as Management Science or Operations Research.