警察军事化和地方警长选举

Christos Mavridis, Orestis Troumpounis, Maurizio Zanardi
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摘要

我们研究了美国通过 1033 计划转让军事装备如何影响那些获得大量装备、同时直接对选民负责的警长的选举表现。为了解决这个问题,我们编制了一个独特的数据集,涵盖 2006 年至 2016 年间 2714 个县的 7281 次警长选举。我们的研究结果表明,向警长办公室增加军转(从无军转到第 25 个百分点)会使现任警长连任的概率增加 5.8-12.5 个百分点。这是因为投给现任者的票数增加了,而对参加选举的选民总数没有影响。我们的异质性结果表明,选民倾向于奖励军事装备转让,尤其是在有地方报纸和共和党倾向的小县,这为地方选举中选民的反应能力提供了新的见解(JEL D72、H56、H76、K42)。
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Police militarization and local sheriff elections
We investigate how transfers of military equipment in the United States through the 1033 Program impact the electoral performance of sheriffs that receive a significant share of equipment while directly accountable to voters. To address this question, we have compiled a unique dataset covering 7281 sheriff elections in 2714 counties between 2006 and 2016. Our findings indicate that an increase in military transfers to the sheriff’s office, from no transfers to the 25th percentile, increases the probability of the incumbent being reelected by 5.8–12.5 percentage points. This is due to an increase in the number of votes cast for the incumbent while there is no effect on the total number of voters participating in the election. Our heterogeneity results demonstrate that voters tend to reward military equipment transfers, especially when local newspapers are present and in Republican-leaning small counties, providing novel insights into voter responsiveness in local elections (JEL D72, H56, H76, K42).
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