{"title":"首席执行官薪酬的复杂性：最优合同还是代理问题？","authors":"Othman Alolah","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12383","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>I construct a CEO pay complexity index based on grant-level compensation data to test whether compensation complexity is consistent with optimal contracts or agency problems. Complexity may represent board efforts to contract optimally or a means by which the CEO camouflages agency issues and rent extraction. I find evidence supporting the agency view by showing how complexity is negatively related to firm value, profitability, and CEO turnover–performance sensitivity. I also examine the relation between complexity and CEO investment behavior and find mixed results. Overall, the findings relate to shareholders' dissatisfaction with the increased complexity of CEO compensation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"47 3","pages":"789-821"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CEO compensation complexity: Optimal contracts or agency problems?\",\"authors\":\"Othman Alolah\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/jfir.12383\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>I construct a CEO pay complexity index based on grant-level compensation data to test whether compensation complexity is consistent with optimal contracts or agency problems. Complexity may represent board efforts to contract optimally or a means by which the CEO camouflages agency issues and rent extraction. I find evidence supporting the agency view by showing how complexity is negatively related to firm value, profitability, and CEO turnover–performance sensitivity. I also examine the relation between complexity and CEO investment behavior and find mixed results. Overall, the findings relate to shareholders' dissatisfaction with the increased complexity of CEO compensation.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47584,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Financial Research\",\"volume\":\"47 3\",\"pages\":\"789-821\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Financial Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jfir.12383\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Research","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jfir.12383","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
CEO compensation complexity: Optimal contracts or agency problems?
I construct a CEO pay complexity index based on grant-level compensation data to test whether compensation complexity is consistent with optimal contracts or agency problems. Complexity may represent board efforts to contract optimally or a means by which the CEO camouflages agency issues and rent extraction. I find evidence supporting the agency view by showing how complexity is negatively related to firm value, profitability, and CEO turnover–performance sensitivity. I also examine the relation between complexity and CEO investment behavior and find mixed results. Overall, the findings relate to shareholders' dissatisfaction with the increased complexity of CEO compensation.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Financial Research(JFR) is a quarterly academic journal sponsored by the Southern Finance Association (SFA) and the Southwestern Finance Association (SWFA). It has been continuously published since 1978 and focuses on the publication of original scholarly research in various areas of finance such as investment and portfolio management, capital markets and institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and capital investment. The JFR, also known as the Journal of Financial Research, provides a platform for researchers to contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the field of finance.
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