同行对监管执法的回应:非受制裁公司的游说活动

IF 9.3 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Journal of Management Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI:10.1177/01492063231226250
Sergei Kolomeitsev, Kristie J. N. Moergen, Jason W. Ridge, Dan L. Worrell, Scott Kuban
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引用次数: 0

摘要

政府机构依靠一般威慑来保护公众。企业则利用游说来施加影响和获取信息。本文探讨了一般威慑与企业游说的交集,同时调查了监管机构的一般威慑努力是否会得到游说的回应。具体而言,我们提出,在竞争对手公司受到制裁后,未受制裁的同行公司将增加针对制裁机构的游说活动,而这些有针对性的游说活动增加的主要驱动因素将是处罚力度、对可能造成的声誉损害的担忧以及价值一致性。我们以美国环境保护局的违规行为为背景检验了我们的假设,结果在很大程度上得到了支持。
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Peer Response to Regulatory Enforcement: Lobbying by Non-Sanctioned Firms
Government agencies rely on general deterrence to protect the public. Firms utilize lobbying for influence and information purposes. This paper explores the intersection of general deterrence and lobbying by firms while investigating whether general deterrence efforts of regulators are met with a lobbying response. Specifically, we propose that following a competitor firm being sanctioned, the non-sanctioned peer firms will increase their amount of lobbying targeted at the sanctioning agency, and the key drivers of these increases in targeted lobbying will be penalty severity, concerns over likely reputational damage, and value alignment. We test our hypotheses using U.S. Environmental Protection Agency violations as a context, and they largely receive support.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
22.40
自引率
5.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Management (JOM) aims to publish rigorous empirical and theoretical research articles that significantly contribute to the field of management. It is particularly interested in papers that have a strong impact on the overall management discipline. JOM also encourages the submission of novel ideas and fresh perspectives on existing research. The journal covers a wide range of areas, including business strategy and policy, organizational behavior, human resource management, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and research methods. It provides a platform for scholars to present their work on these topics and fosters intellectual discussion and exchange in these areas.
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