非阿基米德人口公理

Calvin Baker
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引用次数: 0

摘要

非阿基米德人口公理--也称为词法观点--声称:(i) 在非常高的正福利水平上,足够数量的生命比在非常低的正福利水平上的任何数量的生命都要好,和/或(ii) 在非常低的负福利水平上,足够数量的生命比在非常高的负福利水平上的任何数量的生命都要差。这类公理之所以流行,是因为它们可以避免(负)令人反感的结论,并满足古斯塔夫-阿伦尼斯(Gustaf Arrhenius)提出的人口公理中心不可能性结果中给出的充分性条件。我针对这些公理提出了一个新颖的论点,即好的生活和坏的生活在直觉上可以相互抵消。
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Non-Archimedean population axiologies

Non-Archimedean population axiologies – also known as lexical views – claim (i) that a sufficient number of lives at a very high positive welfare level would be better than any number of lives at a very low positive welfare level and/or (ii) that a sufficient number of lives at a very low negative welfare level would be worse than any number of lives at a very high negative welfare level. Such axiologies are popular because they can avoid the (Negative) Repugnant Conclusion and satisfy the adequacy conditions given in the central impossibility result in population axiology due to Gustaf Arrhenius. I provide a novel argument against them which appeals to the way that good and bad lives can intuitively outweigh one other.

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