{"title":"学校问责制改革的意外后果:公立学校与私立学校","authors":"Michael Coelli , Gigi Foster","doi":"10.1016/j.econedurev.2024.102523","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we show that the public provision of information on Australian schools’ average national test score outcomes via the <em>My School</em> website, launched in 2010, resulted in poorly performing schools testing fewer students in subsequent years. This increased non-participation in testing was driven primarily by formal parental withdrawal, and poorly performing students were much more likely to be withdrawn from testing. This phenomenon is consistent with schools attempting to ‘game’ the system to improve published test scores. We also provide weaker evidence that withdrawal responded more strongly to initial poor performance in independent private schools than in government schools.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48261,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Education Review","volume":"99 ","pages":"Article 102523"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775724000177/pdfft?md5=d704b459090945cc88bdae5038f87e1c&pid=1-s2.0-S0272775724000177-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Unintended consequences of school accountability reforms: Public versus private schools\",\"authors\":\"Michael Coelli , Gigi Foster\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.econedurev.2024.102523\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>In this paper, we show that the public provision of information on Australian schools’ average national test score outcomes via the <em>My School</em> website, launched in 2010, resulted in poorly performing schools testing fewer students in subsequent years. This increased non-participation in testing was driven primarily by formal parental withdrawal, and poorly performing students were much more likely to be withdrawn from testing. This phenomenon is consistent with schools attempting to ‘game’ the system to improve published test scores. We also provide weaker evidence that withdrawal responded more strongly to initial poor performance in independent private schools than in government schools.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48261,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics of Education Review\",\"volume\":\"99 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102523\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775724000177/pdfft?md5=d704b459090945cc88bdae5038f87e1c&pid=1-s2.0-S0272775724000177-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics of Education Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775724000177\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics of Education Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775724000177","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Unintended consequences of school accountability reforms: Public versus private schools
In this paper, we show that the public provision of information on Australian schools’ average national test score outcomes via the My School website, launched in 2010, resulted in poorly performing schools testing fewer students in subsequent years. This increased non-participation in testing was driven primarily by formal parental withdrawal, and poorly performing students were much more likely to be withdrawn from testing. This phenomenon is consistent with schools attempting to ‘game’ the system to improve published test scores. We also provide weaker evidence that withdrawal responded more strongly to initial poor performance in independent private schools than in government schools.
期刊介绍:
Economics of Education Review publishes research on education policy and finance, human capital production and acquisition, and the returns to human capital. We accept empirical, methodological and theoretical contributions, but the main focus of Economics of Education Review is on applied studies that employ micro data and clear identification strategies. Our goal is to publish innovative, cutting-edge research on the economics of education that is of interest to academics, policymakers and the public. Starting with papers submitted March 1, 2014, the review process for articles submitted to the Economics of Education Review will no longer be double blind. Authors are requested to include a title page with authors'' names and affiliation. Reviewers will continue to be anonymous.