学校问责制改革的意外后果:公立学校与私立学校

IF 1.8 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Economics of Education Review Pub Date : 2024-03-09 DOI:10.1016/j.econedurev.2024.102523
Michael Coelli , Gigi Foster
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中,我们展示了 2010 年推出的 "我的学校 "网站公开提供的澳大利亚学校全国平均考试成绩信息,导致成绩差的学校在随后几年中减少了对学生的测试。不参加测试人数增加的主要原因是家长正式退出,而成绩差的学生更有可能退出测试。这一现象与学校试图 "玩弄 "考试制度以提高考试成绩的做法是一致的。我们还提供了较弱的证据,表明与公立学校相比,退学对独立私立学校最初的不良表现反应更强烈。
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Unintended consequences of school accountability reforms: Public versus private schools

In this paper, we show that the public provision of information on Australian schools’ average national test score outcomes via the My School website, launched in 2010, resulted in poorly performing schools testing fewer students in subsequent years. This increased non-participation in testing was driven primarily by formal parental withdrawal, and poorly performing students were much more likely to be withdrawn from testing. This phenomenon is consistent with schools attempting to ‘game’ the system to improve published test scores. We also provide weaker evidence that withdrawal responded more strongly to initial poor performance in independent private schools than in government schools.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.30
自引率
4.50%
发文量
85
审稿时长
61 days
期刊介绍: Economics of Education Review publishes research on education policy and finance, human capital production and acquisition, and the returns to human capital. We accept empirical, methodological and theoretical contributions, but the main focus of Economics of Education Review is on applied studies that employ micro data and clear identification strategies. Our goal is to publish innovative, cutting-edge research on the economics of education that is of interest to academics, policymakers and the public. Starting with papers submitted March 1, 2014, the review process for articles submitted to the Economics of Education Review will no longer be double blind. Authors are requested to include a title page with authors'' names and affiliation. Reviewers will continue to be anonymous.
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