内部资本市场的 q q$ 理论

IF 7.6 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-02-24 DOI:10.1111/jofi.13318
MIN DAI, XAVIER GIROUD, WEI JIANG, NENG WANG
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们为一家面临高成本外部融资的多部门企业提出了一个关于动态投资、分拆、融资和风险管理的可行模型。我们的分析正式提出了以下观点:(i) 企业内部的资源配置不仅基于分部的生产率(如赢家选拔模型),还基于分部的风险;(ii) 企业可能会自愿分拆生产性分部以增加流动性;(iii) 在低流动性状态下,多元化会降低企业价值,因为多元化会增加分拆成本并阻碍流动性管理;(iv) 企业社会主义会降低流动性的价值;(v) 分部投资由边际 q $q$ 与现金边际价值之间的比率决定。
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A q $q$ Theory of Internal Capital Markets

We propose a tractable model of dynamic investment, spinoffs, financing, and risk management for a multidivision firm facing costly external finance. Our analysis formalizes the following insights: (i) Within-firm resource allocation is based not only on divisions' productivity, as in winner-picking models, but also their risk; (ii) firms may voluntarily spin off productive divisions to increase liquidity; (iii) diversification can reduce firm value in low-liquidity states, as it increases the spinoff cost and hampers liquidity management; (iv) corporate socialism makes liquidity less valuable; and (v) division investment is determined by the ratio between marginal q $q$ and marginal value of cash.

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来源期刊
Journal of Finance
Journal of Finance Multiple-
CiteScore
12.90
自引率
2.50%
发文量
88
期刊介绍: The Journal of Finance is a renowned publication that disseminates cutting-edge research across all major fields of financial inquiry. Widely regarded as the most cited academic journal in finance, each issue reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government entities, and financial institutions worldwide. Published bi-monthly, the journal serves as the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization dedicated to advancing knowledge and understanding in financial economics. Join us in exploring the forefront of financial research and scholarship.
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